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ABSTRACT
Korean international construction industry is recently experiencing
difficulty due to the reduced demand especially from the Middle East
which has been the most important market for Korean contractors. Furth-
ermore, the nature of international construction is shifting to high
technology content projects while Koreans are not fully equipped to
switch their market to the projects of that nature.
The reduced demand from the market in the developing countries resulted
in the excess of construction capacity in many developed countries spill-
ing over each other's already saturated market. Along with this move,
Koreans have to look for the markets in the developed countries to sust-
ain their level of operation. Among the markets in the developed count-
ries, that in the U.S. offers unique opportunities for international
contractors because it is a huge, stable and still growing market.
This thesis reviews: Korean construction industry with respect to the
general background, status, structure and present issues; U.S. construc-
tion industry in the areas of economical, structural and operational
characteristics, contractual system and labor relations.
To be successful in the U.S. market, Koreans are recommended to achieve
a cost leadership through the effective utilization of the engineering
and managerial manpower in the market focused to a particular geographi-
cal area or field of specialization. As a long term proactive strategy,
the rigorous R&D effort for the development of new materials, new const-
ruction technology and innovative management system is recommended to
establish differentiated products and services of Korean construction
and related industries.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Fred Moavenzadeh
Title: Professor of Civil Engineering
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Korea has been quite successful in international construction
since the middle of 1970s due to their competitive advantage
in labor intensive construction and enormous demand from the
oil rich countries in the Middle East. However, the recent
drop in oil price has reduced revenues of oil exporting coun-
tries and this reduced the demand of the international cons-
truction significantly. This event has significantly impacted
Korean contractors, as their international activities are
heavily concentrated in the Middle East and they have not
found alternative market to compensate the reduced demand
from the Middle East. With the reduction of the demand, the
nature of construction demand is shifted to more technology
intensive projects at least for international construction
areas which a few Korean contractors have improved their
capability in this field. However, most of the other Korean
contractors are not competitive in this field as compared to
the firms in the other developed countries. Coupled with the
challenge from the other Third World countries in the ever
decreasing labor intensive construction area, Korea has to
restructure its strategy to sustain the once high level and
share of the international construction market.
Accepting the decreased demand from the Middle East and the
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structural changes in current international construction
market calling for high technology content projects and
changed nature of financing scheme, various studies have been
conducted by Korean construction related organizations to
find the way to sustain the level of Korean international
costruction activities. However, their studies have invari-
ably focused to the market in the developing countries so
called traditional international construction market outside
the Middle East. Although the market in those areas is cer-
tainly the first choice consideration to develop further,
the construction markets in the developed countries seems to
have been grossly overlooked or have not been seriously con-
sidered by Korean firms as a potential market. Among the
markets in the developed countries, North America especially
the United States provides a unique potential market as the
demand is expected to grow significantly unlike the other
regions of the market.
At the beginning, Korea's competitive advantage in theinter-
national construction was mostly in labor intensive constru-
ction where they could establish the cost leadership. Since
the Middle East market offered the type of work which Koreans
were competitive, their activities were extremely concentrated
in this area for the past ten years and they achieved inter-
national significance in the international construction market.
However, their compeittive advantage brought limited success
in other regional market as different factors require diff-
erent strategy. Because of geographical proximity, cultural
background and size of the market, Asia is considered to be
the number one alternative market to compensate reduced orders
from the Middle Eastand Korea has had some sizable projects
in this region. But Korea's traditional cost leadership based
on relatively cheap and disciplined manpower appeares to be
diminishing as much cheaper local laborers are now available
and coupled with increasing restrictions to the entry of
foreign labor. This market generally requires competitive
financing packages with technical assistance to local estab-
lishments where the Japanese have a decisive advantage con-
sidering their superior financing and technological capability.
The market in the developed countries, especially in North
America is not only large and diverse, but also stable. In
the U.S. alone the market is over $340 billion a year and all
indications are that it will grow to over 10 percent of the
U.S. GNP in the next few years. However, this market appar-
ently requires a different approach to other regional markets
as the characteristics of the market are different and offer
different problems. Furthermore, the contracting, subcont-
racting and procurement policies and procedures in the U.S.
market are in many respects different from those commonly
practiced in the international market. However, those are
not insurmountable, and recently several European and Japanese
companies have been successful in penetrating this market.
This market may also offer some other features which may allow
others such as Koreans competitive advantages. Furthermore,
this market provides stable demand free from the political
and financial risks which often are the characteristics of
the market in the developing countries. In any case, it is
clear that Koreans have to seek competitive strategies far
different from what they established and succeeded in the
other regional markets to be successful in the U.S. market.
One thing obvious from the beginning is that Koreans have to
free themselves from the perception that Korea's only com-
petitive advantage is labor. Based on the above, the purpose
of this study is to examine the following areas, find impli-
cations and draw conclusive suggestions for the Korean and
U.S. construction industry:-
-General characteristics of Korean construction industry,
reviewing the general background of Korean construction
enabled industry to reach present level, the structure of the
industry and issues presently facing the industry.
-General characteristics of U.S. construction industry.
The points to be reviewed are mostly the structure of industry,
the contracting systems and labor relation which Koreans have
little experience to deal with.
-Comparison between U.S. and Korean construction industry,
possibly with that of Other developed region of the world.
8
There are also marked differences between the characteristics
of the markets in the developing and developed countries.
-Based on those differences and unique characteristics of
the industry in both countries, the possibility of U.S. con-
struction industry as a potential market for Korean contrac-
tors will be examined. Penetrating into the U.S. construct-
ion market may require Korean contractors to change their
perception of the construction industry and its market. This
study will discuss the reorientation required for Korean con-
tractors with regard to working in the construction market
in developed countries. Since this study cannot cover all
the issues and strategies for the subject, some outstanding
issues are mentioned but left for further indepth research.
CHAPTER 2
KOREAN CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
2.1 General Background
During the past twenty years, Korea has shown the most imp-
ressive economic growth among developing and newly industr-
ialized countries. The accomplishment of high economic growth
is mainly attributable to the rapid industrialization and
growth of export resulting from the Government's emphatic
implementation of a series of economic development plans.
Until the early 1960s, the Korean economy was agriculture
based and underdeveloped. The cornerstone of Korea's success
has been a state commitment to outward looking trade and ind-
ustrial policies. The growth of the Korean construction
industry has followed its overall economy. In this regard,
this chapter will look into Korea's industrialization process
and structure. Based on the context of the industrialization
process, the process of evolution of Korean construction
industry will be discussed.
2.1.1 Industrialization Process
The industrialization process of the Korean economy can be
conveniently examined by dividing it into several periods,
each characterized by distinctive features; the rehabilitat-
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ion period (1954-61), high growth and implementation of the
economic development plans (1962-71), the development of the
heavy and chemical industries (1972-78), and structural adj-
ustment to strengthen the industrial foundations (1979 onward).
In the 1954-61 period, industrial policies emphasized the
rehabilitation of the major industrial facilities destroyed
in the Korean War (1950-1953) and the stabilization of living.
With the rehabilitation of such key industries as electric
power and cement, some consumer goods industries were devei-
oped. Industrial progress in the 1950s, however, was minimal.
From 1962 to 1971 corresponding to the first and second five
year economic development plans were implemented for the
first time in the nation's history and the economic foundat-
ion for industrial development commenced. The emphasis of
industrial policies moved to the development of strategic key
industries for import substitution and export and, to support
it, the expansion of social overhead capital. Large scale
investment on these areas was undertaken. The ratio of gross
investment to GNP, which was average of 12.2 percent during
1954-61 period, increased to 17.0 percent during 1962-66 and
26.0 percent during 1967-71 period (see table 2.1.1). During
1962-71 period about 21.7 percent of GNP was used for capital
formation. Of this, 9 G.7 percent was allocated to mining and
manufacturing, and social overhead capital and other services
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(see table 2.1.2). Average annual production growth rates of
these two sectors recorded 17.1 percent and 10.6 percent,
respectively over the period, much higher than that of 1950s
(see table 2.1.3). During this period chemical industries,
including various intermediary chemical goods industries,
achieved a remarkable development. In the first half of the
1960s the chemical fertilizer and oil refining industries
were developed to the extent of meeting domestic demand.
Consumer durable goods such as TV, refrigerators, and autom-
obiles began to be produced. The industrial activities in
these industries stimulated the development of related indu-
stries such as iron and steel, petrochemical, etc. Large
scale investments for the construction of highways, railways
and electric power facilities, were also undertaken, strength-
ening the infrastructure and industrialization.
In the 1970s, greater emphasis was given on the development
of the heavy and chemical industries to promote import sub-
stitution of intermediate and capital goods and to make those
industries new strategic export industries. Large scale
investments were made in shipbuilding, automobile, machinery
and chemical industries. As a result of the intensive devel-
opment, the heavy and chemical industry became a leading
sector in economic growth. In the late 1970s most of the
industries became export industries, shifting industrial act-
ivities from the domestic to international area. Economies
of scale were pursued to achieve international competitiveness,
as industrial activities became international market oriented.
The intensive development of the heavy and chemical industries
in the 1970s, contributed greatly to the advancement of ind-
ustrialization, but brought about a structural problem of
unbalanced sectoral investment. Due to the industrial policies,
investments during the 1970s, especially in the latter half
of the decade, were heavily concentrated in the heavy and
chemical industries, resulting in overcapacity of production
facilities. Investment for technological innovation in the
light industries was overlooked, reducing the comparative
advantage of these sectors. Many industries, which had been
internationalized could not successfully compete in the int-
ernational markets. The worldwide economic recession mainly
due to the second oil shock in 1979 combined with the nation-
alism of natural resources aggravated the problem of excess
capacity and misallocation of investment resources. The int-
ernational competitiveness of strategic key industries such
as rion and steel, nonferrous metals and petrochemicals was
affected. Indusrial output was substantially reduced and
GNP growth rate recorded minus 5.2 percent in 1980 for the
first time since economic development plans started (see
table 2.1.4).
In 1979, to stabilize economic growth and overcome the above
problems, the government introduced a number of economic
adjustment policies designed to improve the industrial str-
ucture and to strengthen international competitiveness.
Investment in the heavy and chemical industries was substan-
tially adjusted. Taking into account Korea's limited natural
resources, industries using relatively little energy and raw
materials were stratigically promoted such as consumer elec-
tronics goods, machinery and the fine chemical industries.
Recently the development of high technology industries such
as semiconductors, computers, bioengineering and new materials
industries is being accelerated. Attention has been drawn
to the balanced development among related component industries
plus small and medium enterprises. Since the late 1970s Korea
has intensified its efforts towards structural adjustments
so as to strengthen the industrial foundation for stable growth.
2.1.2 Structure of Industry
Industrialization is generally characterized by the expansion
of the nonagricultural sectors in the field of production,
employment and exports. Up to the early 1960s the agricult-
ure, forestry and fisheries sector dominated the Korean eco-
nomy, accounting for 45 percent of GNP. The mining and man-
ufacturing sector was below the 12 percent level. Rapid ind-
ustrialization, however, reshaped the industrial structure
and reversed those ratios. In 1976, the mining and manufact-
uring sector for the first time surpassed the agriculture,
forestry and fisheries sector. The expanding trend of the
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nonagricultural sector has accelerated along with the progr-
essive industrialization. The ratios of mining and manufact-
uring sector and other service sector reached 32.3 percent
and 52.6 percent respectively in 1984 (see table 2.1.4).
The employment by sector also indicated a similar trend. The
employment ratios of the mining and manufacturing sector, and
the social overhead capital and other services sector increased
to 24.2 percent and 48.7 percent in 1983 from 9.1 percent and
28.6 percent in 1963 respectively. The employment ratio of
the agriculture, forestry and fisheries sector, on the other
hand, decreased from 62.3 percent to 27.1 percent in 1984
(see table 2.1.5).
A substantial structural change also took place within the
manufacturing industries. Before 1962 when the first five
year economic development plan started, the light industries
were leading manufacturing industries accounted for 69.3 per-
cent of the total manufacturing products while the heavy and
chemical industries stood at only 30.7 percent in 1961 (see
table 2.1.6). The structure of manufacturing changed rapidly
with the implementation of the economic development plans.
leading growth industries have changed from labor intensive
industries to capital intensive, and now onto technology
intensive industries. In parallel, industries diversified
themselves from consumer goods to interemdiate goods and then
further to high technology products (see table 2.1.6). How-
ever, this change of industrial structure also means change
of industrial structuee from labor intensive to capital int-
ensive one and this resulted in steady decline in employment
elasticity in manufacturing (see table 2.1.7). The growth
of heavy and chemical industry brought change in industrial
pattern. The number of large firms was greatly increased and
expansion within firms was predominant increasing the role
of large firms in the nation's industrial activity. In the
manufacturing industries, the number of large firms (employing
more than 500 persons) increased from 72 in 1963 to 575 in
1982. The contribution by large scale firms total production
increased from 27.9 percent in 1963 to 56.9 percent in 1982
(see table 2.1.8). The increasing number of large firms con-
tributed greatly to productivity enhancement, product stand-
ardization and the improvement of quality and international
competitiveness. The pursuit of economy of scale brought
about cost reductions through mass production and increased
productivity. However, their great contribution resulted in
excessive concentration in some industry.
Korea's total commodity export reached 29.4 billion dollars
in 1984 and the ratio of export to GNP accounted for 36.3
percent (see table 2.1.9). Before the early 1960s, Korea's
principal exports consisted of primary products. But now
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more than 90 percent of all merchandise export goods is man-
ufactured goods. The major export of the early seventies -
clothing, plywood, silk, toys, fresh fish and teansisters -
having been largely outclassed by foreign competitors, the
leading sectors of export during the eighties are machinery,
transport equipment, chemicals and steel. Exports were con-
siderably diversified and the structure of merchandise export
had been changed dramatically toward heavy and chemical ind-
ustry (see table 2.1.10 and figure 2.1.1). Diversification
was also evident in the geographical area. The U.S. and Japan
which had bought three-fourths of Korean exports, took less
than half while European economies and the oil producers abs-
orbed close to 20 percent (see table 2.1.11). The steady
growth of export is accompanied by the similar growth of imp-
ort. The rising share in GNP of the industrial sector, part-
icularly of export activity, contributed the expansion of the
import bill. This is because of Korean industry's high dep-
endence of raw materials and capital goods on imports. Table
2.1.12 shows the steady increase in Korea's import of raw
materials for both export use and domestic use.
The Korean economy has been built up on the heavy dependence
on the foreign capital, and the stockpiling of foreign debts
is a critical concern. The annual growth of urban labor force
is expected to be growing to about 3 percent per annum for
next few years while the employment elasticity of manufact-
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uring sector has been on the steady decrease. These factors
necessitate Korea the high growth of economy (more than 6
percent per annum) and higher growth of export with the growth
of 6mport no faster than that of GNP to improve the balance
of payment. An analysis of past trading patterns suggests
that as labor rich, export oriented countries progress towards
industrial maturity, exports of raw materials and light man-
ufactures give way to exports of standardized intermediate
goods which in turn are later joined by exports of different-
iated manufactures. Evidently Korea is now moving to chall-
enge the advanced countries in products such as consumer
electronics, where the technology is still evolving. Behind
this strategy, was the realization that rising unit labor
costs in thelight industries were placing Korean producers
at a disadvantage in international markets. A continuation
of high export growth called for a change in the mix of man-
ufactures, as did the desire to deepen the industrial base
and raise domestic value added. In expanding the exports of
standardized commodities such as steel, chemicals, transport
equipment, machinery, consumer durables and electronics,
Korean firms have been aided by a number of factors:
-Government support, which included subsidized credit,
reduced some of the risks of establishing large capital int-
ensive production units in the absence of assured markets.
-A labor force well endowed with the necessary industrial
skills shortened the learning period.
-Fifteen years of intensive trading in light manufactures
had created links with foreign markets, established the rep-
utations of Korean firms and concentrated within large trad-
ing corporations a wealth of experience which could be harn-
essed to the scale of new products.
However, there are a number of disadvantages in such departure
from traditional trading and industrial patterns. These
include:
-The smallness of the economy militated against the reali-
zation of scale economies. If optimally sized plants were
constructed, they had from the outset to depend upon their
ability to sell abroad.
-The limited sophistication of the domestic market has not
allowed producers the lattitude to launch, test and refine
differentiated manufactures, in a protected environment,
before venturing overseas.
-Korea is only now beginning to accumulate sufficient re-
serves of scientific manpower to develop the research infra-
structure neede to sustain competitiveness in quality and
technology conscious, differentiated product markets.
-Whereas exports of light manufactures moved relatively un-
hindered into niches created by the decline of such production
in the West, the sale of machinery, durables and electronics
must compete head on with the still vigorous industries of
the importing nations.
Table 2.1.1 Trend of Gross Domestic Investment and Saving
(percent of GNP)
Year Gross domestic investment Gross domestic saving
1954-1961 12.2 3.2
1962-1966 17.0 8.8
1967-1971 26.0 16.0
1972-1976 27.1 20.8
1977-1981 30.9 22.8
1982 27.0 22.4
1983 27.8 24.8
1984 29.9 27.4
Source: Bank of Korea
Table 2.1.2 Composition of Fixed Capital Formation by Industrial Use
(percent)
Sector 1954-1961 1962-1970 1971-1978 1979-1983
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Agriculture, forestry
and fisheries 12.6 8.3 8.9 7.8
Mining and manufacturing 22.9 23.7 22.1 15.6
(Manufacturing) (21.6) (22.9) (21.2) (15.3)
Social overhead capital 2.8 38.2 33.8 34.5
Other services 61.7 29.8 35.2 42.1
Source: National Income Accounts, Bank of Korea
Note: 1954-1961 and 1962-1970 numbers are based on 1975 price, and
1971-1978 and 1979-1983 are based on 1980 price.
Table 2.1.3 Annual Growth Rates by Industrial Sectors
(percent)
Sector 1954-1961 1962-1970 1971-1978 1979-1980
Agriculture, forestry
and fisheries 3.4 3.5 3.3 2.9
Mining and manufacturing 11.1 17.1 17.7 5.9
Social overhead capital
and other services 3.3 10.6 9.8 4.1
GNP 3.9 8.7 9.9 4.4
Source: National Income Account, Bank of Korea
Table 2.1.4 Trend of GNP, Growth Rate and Composition
(in billions of 1980 won)
GNP Composition
Year GNP Gr. Primary Secondary Tertiary 1st 2nd 3rd
10,386.6.27.2 17.5 55.3
10,885.3
12,303.0
12,935.6
13,661.7
15,410.3
17,842.0
19,996.0.
20,993.5
20,606.0
20,738.1
22,260.1
24,449.4
25,883.8
26.5 18.7 54.8
24.7 21.1 54.2
24.6 22.4 53.0
24.2 23.5 52.3
23.2 25.1 51.7
21.1 25.8 53.1
17.4 28.3 54.3
17.5 29.0 53.5
14.4 30.2 55.4
16.9 30.6 52.5
16.3 30.0 53.3
16.2 30.3 53.5
15.1 32.3 52.6
Source: Korean Economic Yearbook, Federation of Korean Industries, 1985
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
18,797.4
19,868.7
22,677.8
24,425.2
26,113.5
29,803.8
33,590.0
36,851.6
39,249.2
37,205.0
39,509.1
41,736.7
45,634.6
49,179.7
8.8
5.7
14.1
7.7
6.9
14.1
12.7
9.7
6.5
-5.2
6.2
5.6
9.5
7.6
5,122.0
5,271.6
5,598.7
6,013.2
6,308.0
6,900.3
7,077.3
6,429.4
6,862.1
5,372.5
6,687.7
6,962.5
7,400.0
7,431.3
3,288.8
3,711.8
4,776.1
5,476.4
6,143.8
7,493.2
8,670.9
10,426.2
11,393.7
11,226.5
12,083.3
12,514.1
13,868.6
15,864.6
----------- -------"------------- ---- -- --- ---- --- ---- --- --
Table 2.1.5 Trend of Employment by Sector
(in millions)
Agr., forestry Mining & Social overhead
Year Total & fisheries manufacturing & other services
1963
1965
1967
1969
1972
1974
1976
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
7.7
8.2
8.7
9.4
10.6
11.6
12.6
13.5
13.7
13.7
14.0
14.4
14.5
14.4
4.8
4.8
4.8
4.8
5.3
5.6
5.6
5.2
4.9
4.7
4.8
4.6
4.3
3.9
0.7
0.8
1.1
1.3
1.5
2.1
2.7
3.0
3.1
3.1
3.0
3.2
3.4
3.5
2.2
2.5
2.8
3.2
3.7
3.9
4.2
5.3
5.7
6.0
6.2
6.6
6.8
7.0
Source: Korean Economic Yearbook, Federation of Korean Industries, 1985
Economic Statistics Yearbook, Bank of Korea, 1976
Table 2.1.6 Structural Changes in Manufacturing
(percent)
Industry 1954 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1983
Heavy & chemical ind. 25.8 30.7 36.3 42.5 53.1 60.0 60.6
Industrial chemical 0.4 1.4 2.6 4.8 7.0 7.7 7.3
Petroleum product - - 8.3 16.4 10.3 9.4 8.9
..Iroh &t..eel 0.3 2.5 3.8 4.2 7.4 10.7 10.8
Machinery 2.3 2.8 2.0 1.4 2.3 3.0 3.4
Electrical machinery 0.5 1.0 2.3 2.6 5.3 8.5 8.6
Transportation equip. 2.5 3.2 4.1 2.8 4.2 4.3 5.1
Other 19.8 19.8 13.2 10.3 16.6 16.4 16.5
Light industry 74.2 69.3 63.7 57.5 46.9 40.0 39.4
Food & beverage 33.3 33.0 24.4 19.3 14.7 12.3 12.8
Textile 21.1 17.6 13.7 12.7 14.5 12.8 11.9
Wearing apparel 6.6 7.1 5.4 4.4 5.6 4.6 4.2
Other 13.2 11.6 20.2 21.1 12.1 10.3 10.5
--------------------------------------------------
Source: National Account, Bank of Korea
Note: 1954, 1963, 1966 numbers are based on 1975 constant market price
1971, 1976, 1981, 1983 numbers are based on 1980 constant price.
Table 2.1.7 Manufacturing Employment Elasticities
1970-1982 1.057
1970-1975 1.394
1973-1978 1.077
1975-1980 0.790
Source: Korea, Development in a Global Context,
The World Bank, 1984
Note: Calculated by least squares regression
with respect to real GNP
Table 2.1.8 Ratio of Output by Firm Size in Manufacturing
Year 5-49 50-199 200-499 500- Total
1963 34.9 23.6 13.6 27.9 100.0
(93.1) (5.6) (0.9) (0.4) (100.0)
1972 12.4 16.1 20.6 50.9 100.0
(88.2) (8.3) (2.2) (1.3) (100.0)
1976 7.0 14.9 20.2 57.3 100.0
(79.5) (14.5) (3.8) (2.2) (100.0)
1982 9.2 17.1 16.8 56.9 100.0
(81.1) (14.1) (3.2) (1.6) (100.0)
Source: Manufacturing Survey, Economic Planning Board of
Korea
Note: The numbers in the Parentheses denote the ratio of
the number of firms
Table 2.1.9 Ratios of Export and Import to GNP
(in billions of dollars, percent)
1961 1971 1973 1981 1982 1983 1984
GNP (A) 2.1 9.4 13.5 67.2 70.8 75.1 81.1
Total export(B) 0.04 1.1 3.2 21.3 21.9 24.9 29.3
Total import(C) 0.3 2.4 4.2 26.1 24.3 26.2 30.6
B/A 1.9 11.4 23.9 31.6 30.9 32.6 36.3
C/A 15.0 25.6 31.4 38.9 34.3 34.9 37.7
(B+C)/A 16.9 37.0 55.3 70.5 65.2 67.5 74.0
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, Bank of Korea
Figure 2.1.1 Composition of Merchandise Exports
1978 - US$ 12.7 BILLION
LIGHT MANUF.
53.6%
CHEMICALS
3.2%
IRON & STEEL
4.3%
NON-MANUF.
11.3%
OTHER
10.6%
SHIP
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MANUF.
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ELECTRC
8.7%
1983 - US$ 23.1 BILLION
LIGHT MANUF.
CHEMICALS
6.2%
IRON & STEEL
10.2%
SHI
15.4
12.5%
NON-MANUF.
5.6%
OTHER MANUF.
6.2%
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Table 2.1.10 Korea's Major Export
(in U.S.$ million)
Ranked by Size
1970 1975 1978 1981 Growth rate
SITC Item Value SITC Item Value SITC Item Value SITC Item Value 1975-81 (2)
841 Clothing 213.4 841 Clothing 1,131.6 841 Clothing 2,523.2 841 Clothing 3,732.2 18.6
899 Other mfg. goods 104.2 031 Fresh fish 321.9 735 Ships 800.2 735 Ships 1,405.5 35.8
631 Plywood 92.2 653 Woven textiles 271.7 653 Woven textiles 775.0 653 Woven textiles 1,267.6 28.1
261 Silk 38.5 729 Elec. mach. NES 242.2 851 Footwear 686.2 724 Telecomm. eqpt. 1,118.0 39.5
031 Fresh fish 37.7 631 Plywood 208.1 724 Telecomm. eqpt. 611.5 851 Footwear 1,023.6 28.5
729 Elec. mach. 32.9 651 Textile yarn 205.0 031 Fresh fish 562.5 031 Fresh fish 765.6 17.3
653 Woven textiles 27.5 851 Footwear 191.2 729 Elec. mach. NES 486.6 729 Elec. mach. NES 706.3 18.3
652 Cotton fabrics 26.4 724 Telecomm. eqpt. 138.0 631 Plywood 414.7 651 Textile yarn 568.2 20.0
283 Nonfer. base 24.7 735 Ships & boats 137.8 651 Textile yarn 337.6 674 Iron, steel 564.4 40.8
metal ore 061 Sugar & honey 116.7 674 Iron, steel 298.2 plate, sheet
851 Footwear 17.2 899 Other mfg. goods 105.1 plate, sheet 678 Iron, steel 514.9 44.6
292 Crude veg. 14.6 332 Petroleum prod. 95.0 831 Travel goods 277.1 tubes, pipes
materials 629 Rubber articles 90.3 894 Toys, sporting 261.1 629 Rubber articles 482.3 34.7
054 Fresh veg. 14.5 NES goods 631 Plywood 395.2 8.0
651 Textile yarn 13.6 893 Articles of 86.6 629 Rubber articles 225.1 672 Iron, steel 390.3 .53.8
121 Tobacco unmfg. 13.4 plastics 891 Sound recorders 204.2 primary forms
276 Other crude 8.5 891 Sound recorders 83.2 678 Iron, steel 172.7 661 Cement 379.5 26.4
minerals 831 Travel goods 79.4 tubes, pipes 894 Toys, sporting 365.2 29.9
655 Special textile 7.7 674 Iron, steel 74.3 661 Cement 167.6 goods
products plate, sheet 561 Fertilizers 162.1 831 Travel goods 344.3 23.6
674 Iron, steel 7.6 661 Cement 73.1 899 Other mfg. goods 143.2 691 Structure & 328.4 82.3
plate, sheet 894 Toys, sporting 69.0 734 Aircraft 133.3 parts NES
561 Fertilizers 6.3 goods 691 Structure & 113.2 731 Railway vehicles 319.2 83.2
724 Telecomm. eqpt. 5.8 121 Tobacco unmfg. 66.3 parts NES 673 Iron, steel 290.4 47.1
734 Aircraft 5.2 shapes
891 Sound recorders 273.8 17.7
Total Exports 835.2 Total Exports 5O081.0 Total Exports 12,710.6 Total Exports 21,253.8 34.2
Notes: (1)
(2)
Growth rate 1975-81 - annual compound growth
SITC 629 Rubber articles NES mainly consists
rates between 1975 and 1981 for the
of rubber tires.
(3) SITC 724 Telecommunications equipment - TV, radios and electronic components.
(4) SITC 729 Electric machinery NES mainly consists of tranaistors, batteries.
Source: UN Trade Data (World Bank Trade System).
items listed in 1981.
Table 2.1.11 Total Exports by Country of Destination
(top five destinations, in millions of dollar)
Rank 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
1 U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A. U.S.A.
4,373.9 4,606.6 5,660.6 6,243.2 8,245.4 10,478.8
(29.0) (26.3) (26.6) (28.5) (33.7) (35.8)
2 Japan Japan Japan Japan Japan Japan
3,353.0 3,039.4 3,502.8 3,388.1 3,403.5 4,602.2
(22.2) (17.4) (16.4) (15.5) (13.9) (15.7)
3 W. Germany Saudi Africa Saudi Saudi Hong Kong
845.3 946.1 1,286.6 1,125.4 1,436.5 1,281.2
(5.6) (5.4) (6.1) (5.1) (5.8) (4.4)
4 Saudi W. Germany Hong Kong Africa U.K. India
740.2 875.5 1,154.7 1,096.5 1,005.2 1,048.6
(4.7) (5.0) (5.4) (5.0) (4.1) (3.6)
5 U.K. Hong Kong Saudi U.K. Hong Kong Saudi
541.6 823.3 1,136.2 1,102.6 817.7 990.3
(3.6) (4.7) (5.3) (5.0) (3.3) (3.4)
Source: Monthly Review, Korea Exchange Bank
Table 2.1.12 Korea's Imports, 1963-1983
(million U.S.$, current prices)
Raw mat'ls for
Capital Crude Raw materials domestic use &
Year Total goods oil for export use other imports
1963 560.3 115.6 32.2 - 412.5
1964 404.4 69.5 25.9 6.9 302.1
1965 463.4 60.0 28.9 10.4 364.1
1966 716.4 171.7 40.6 101.1 403.0
1967 996.2 310.2 59.4 135.2 491.4
1968 1,462.9 533.2 72.8 213.0 643.9
1969 1,823.6 593.2 107.6 297.2 825.6
1970 1,984.0 589.5 125.0 386.3 883.2
1971 2,394.3 685.4 174.0 506.0 1,028.9
1972 2,522.0 762.0 206.0 687.6 886.4
1973 4,240.3 1,156.8 277.0 1,555.5 1,251.0
1974 6,851.8 1,848.6 966.0 2,039.3 1,997.0
1975 7,274.4 1,909.2 1,271.2 1,452.0 2,642.0
1976 8,773.6 2,427.4 1,607.0 2,144.0 2,595.2
1977 10,810.5 3,008.1 1,926.0 2,427.0 3,449.4
1978 14,971.9 5,080.1 2,187.0 2,948.0 4,756.6
1979 20,338.6 6,314.0 3,100.0 3,444.0 7,480.6
1980 22,291.7 5,125.0 5,633.0 3,799.0 7,735.0
1981 26,131.4 6,158.2 7,375.7 4,587.3 9,010.2
1982 24,250.8 6,232.7 6,102.8 4,644.5 7,270.8
1983 26,192.2 7,814.7 5,576.7 4,801.7 7,999.1
Source: Major Statistics of Korean Economy, Econcmic Planning Board, 1983
2.1.3 Development of Construction Industry
The construction industry is a major sector of the economy,
and reflects to a very large extent both how well the economy
is doing in terms of growth, stability, and employment, and
in which direction the national economy is growing. The
annual volume of construction activity accounts for a signi-
ficant portion of the private and public sector investment.
To the extent that investment today is a prime determinant
of the future productive capability of the nation, its con-
tribution to GDP and the composition is of major concern.
The contribution of construction to GDP has grown from 2.5
percent in 1962 to 6.4 percent in 1972 and 9.9 percent in
1983, with the expansion of infrastructure and the industrial
base as well as the mass supply of housing. It is interest-
ing to observe the difference in growth rate between GDP and
construction has been fluctuating intensively. However, con-
struction has grown faster than GDP in general (see table
2.1.13). The construction industry employed 903,000 persons
in 1984 which accounted for 6.3 percent of total employed
manpower (see table 2.1.14). The total volume of construct-
ion output in 1984 was 16.2 trillion won (about $19.6 billion),
of which 8.8 trillion won (about $10.6 billion) was in the
domestic market and remaining 7.4 trillion won overseas.
Approximately 51 percent of the domestic activity is engaged
in public construction. The remaining 49 percent is for
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private owners and more than half of that is engaged in the
building construction. Table 2.1.16 shows the percentage
distribution in 1984 of total construction by type and owner-
ship. Korean contractors' international activities were
started in 1965 in Southeast Asia. In 1973, they had fiist
contract in the Middle East. Since then, Korean contractors
have shown remarkable performance in the international cons-
truction market. These performance were attributed to the
acquisition of required capabilities through the domestic
activities.
Korean construction industry gained its strength through the
reconstruction after Korean War, and grew rapidly by the
increased construction demand for construction of industrial
bases and infrastructures during the first and second economic
development plans in the 1960s. Some 42-44 percent of ind-
ustrial facilities, 40 percent of housing, 47 percent of
railways, 500 km of roads, 40 km of bridges and 80 percent
of the power generating facilities were destroyed by the war.
The rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts were made
largely based on U.S. aid. Korea received $3.2 billion eco-
nomic aid from U.S. from 1945 to 1961 and about $2.3 billion
was given from 1953 to 1961 period for rehabilitation and re-
construction efforts. Korean construction industry could
grow rapidly with the demand created by this situation, and
the construction of U.S. military facilities, As a result,
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they also accumulated a significant capital, experience and
construction technologies. Especially, U.S. military build-
up in Korea produced many large scale construction projects
since 1957. By 1960, construction's contribution to GNP
increased to 2.1 percent from 1.5 percent in 1953.
Korean contractors participation to U.S. military projects
provided unique opportunities to the construction industry.
U.S. military projects were mostly building and civil eng-
ineering project and not new for Korean contractors, but
offered many different characteristics largely unfamiliar to
Korean contractors. The following are a few different points
observed in carrying out the U.S. military projects:
-U.S. military projects were relatively more profitable
than other projects (especially with the aid of continuous
devaluation of the Korean currency against the dollar) and
many contractors participated in these projects were later
grown to pioneer the development of international construct-
ion markets in 1960s and 1970s.
-These projects required the preparation of formal bidding
documents and these requirements provided Korean contractors
the skills and experiences in estimation and bidding which
were necessary to enter international construction market.
-Standard project specifications were almost nonexistent
or usually ignored if existed due to urgency of rehabilita-
tion in local projects. However, these specifications were
strictly adhered for U.S. military projects and this helped
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Korean contractors acquire the knowledge and experience of
international standard specification and international stan-
dard practices of the project execution and quality control.
This experience greatly helped Korean contractors to enter
international construction markets.
-Generally U.S military projects required Korean contract-
ors to use more sophisticated equipment in project execution.
This requirement forced Korean contractors to acquire and
operate new construction equipments. This helped and exped-
ited the modernization of the industry.
U.S military projects were drastically reduced from 1965 when
U.S. forces in Korea was reduced and the Buy American policy
was strictly enforced. U.S. military projects contributed a
significant portion of total Korean construction as reached
$15.3 million dollars in 1964 which was equivalent to 17
percent of Korea's total construction that year (see table
2.1.17). Moreover, the U.S. military construction project
is more significant in terms of providing the opportunities
for Korean contractors to expose themselves to the internat-
ional standard specifications and practices in the areas of
building, contracting, project execution and procurement which
are vital for international construction operations.
In 1962, Korea started a series of ambitious economic devel-
opment plans. The first 5 year plan for economic development
(1962-4966) was characterized as achieving outward and export
oriented economic development through establishing the indus-
trial bases and infrastructures mostly by the foreign financ-
ing. During this period, construction played major role and
grew an average of 17.4 percent per year by constructing soc-
ial overhead capitals and upstream industrial facilities such
as refineries, fertilizer and cement plants etc.
The latter part of 1960s is characterized by the Korea's in-
volvement in Vietnam War, the second 5 year economic develop-
ment plan (1967-1971), and the rapid expansion of construct-
ion demand and construction of larger scale projects such as
the construction of Seoul-Busan highway and several multi-
purpose dams. And it was this period that Korea's first
overseas construction started. During this period, large
investments were made to the establishment of social overhead
capitals such as irrigation, reclamation, roads, port facil-
ities, electric power and communication facilities. Private
investment to the plant facilities and buildings were actively
made as well as government investment. The investment in
construction during this second 5 year economic development
plan period accounted for 34.3 percent of total investment
of 980 billion won and 72.4 percent of total construction
investment were made for the social overhead capital. One
ot the most important project constructed during this period
was the Seoul-Busan highway -- the first part of 10 year high-
way construction plan which included the construction of
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1,593 km of highway. Together with highway construction,
several of multipurpose dams were constructed during this
period and 10 year plan for 4 river basin development (1972-
1981) which included the construction od 12 multipurpose dams
was announced in 1971. In 1970, the task force project team
was formed in Seoul city to construct the subway system in
Seoul.
The large scale construction projects in the 1960s were mostly
financed by foreign loans and the constant increase of foreign
financing furtherfueled the demand for construction. During
the first and second economic development plan period, the
amount of foreign financing reached to $2,456 million and
$2,170 was made during the second plan period (see table
2.1.18). These foreign financed projects caused a lot of
changes in Korean construction in both quantity and quality.
Although the owners of the projectswere mostly the government
or parastatal organizations, those investments were thoroughly
examined by the foreign organizations who provided financing.
Those foreign financed projects provided Korean contractors
the momentum to improve the capabilities in design, constru-
ction, procurement, management and all the related fields.
Through the post-war reconstruction and two 5 year economic
development plans, Korean construction industry accumulated
substantial experience and technology. At the same time, the
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U.S. military projects in Korea and foreign financed large
scale domestic projects in 1960s provided the necessary exp-
erence and knowledge to carry out international construction
activities.
GDP and Construction Statistics,
GDP Constr. Constr./ GDP Constr. GDP Constr. Difference
1980 1980 GDP Index Index Growth Growth Gr. Rates
Year Bi. won Bi. won Percent 1980=100 1980=100 Rate Rate GDP-Const.
1972 18124 1152 6.4 54.1 38.5 5.5 0.9 4.6
1973 20615 1468 7.1 61.6 49.0 13.7 27.4 -13.7
1974 22194 1508 6.8 66.3 50.4 7.7 2.7 4.9
1975 23835 1716 7.2 71.2 57.3 7.4 13.8 -6.4
1976 26736 1894 7.1 79.8 63.3 12.2 10.4 1.8
1977 29553 2395 8.1 88.3 80.0 10.5 26.5 -15.9
1978 32303 2948 9.1 96.5 98.5 9.3 23.1 -13.8
1979 34622 3036 8.8 103.4 101.4 7.2 3.0 4.2
1980 33484 2994 8.9 100.0 100.0 -3.3 -1.4 -1.9
1981 35872 2832 7.9 107.1 94.6 7.1 -5.4 12.5
1982 37880 3399 9.0 113.1 113.5 5.6 20.0 -14.4
1983 41424 4119 9.9 123.7 137.6 9.4 21.2 -11.8
Source: Korean Econanic Yearbook, The Federation of Korean Industries, 1985
Table 2.1.13 1972-1983
Table 2.1.14 Employed Persons by Industry
thousand employees (percent)
Total Agriculture Mnufacturing
Year anployed etc. & mining Construction Others
1972 10,559 5,383 1,478 422 3,273
(100.0) (51.0) (14.0) (4.0) (31.0)
1973 11,139 5,570 1,782 334 3,453
(100.0) (50.0) (16.0) (3.0) (31.0)
1974 11,586 5,561 1,970 463 3,592
(100.0) (48.0) (17.0) (4.0) (31.0)
1975 11,830 5,442 2,248 473 3,667
(100.0) (46.0) (19.0) (4.0) (31.0)
1976 12,556 5,650 2,637 502 3,767
(100.0) (45.0) (21.0) (4.0) (30.0)
1977 12,929 5,430 2,844 646 4,008
(100.0) (42.0) (22.0) (5.0) (31.0)
1978 13,490 5,126 2,968 809 4,587
(100.0) (38.0) (22.0) (6.0) (34.0)
1979 13,664 4,919 3,143 820 4,782
(100.0) (36.0) (23.0) (6.0) (35.0)
1980 13,705 4,658 3,095 841 5,111
(100.0) (33.3) (22.6) (6.1) (37.3)
1981 14,048 4,806 2,996 875 5,372
(100.0) (34.2) (21.3) (6.2) (38.3)
1982 14,424 4,623 3,157 831 5,813
(100.0) (32.0) (21.9) (5.8) (40.3)
1983 14,515 4,314 3,383 816 6,002
(100.0) (29.7) (23.3) (5.6) (41.4)
1984 14,417 3,909 3,493 903 6,112
(100.0) (27.1) (24.2) (6.3) (42.4)
Source: Major Statistics of Korean Economy, Econamic Planning Board, 1980
Korean Econcanic Yearbook, The Federation of Korean Industries, 1985
Table 2.1.15 Total Value of Construction in Korea, 1984
(10 millions of won)
Industry Total value of construction
Private construction
Residential building 95,708.459 (10.9 %)
Nonresidential building 149,280.945 (17.0)
Civil work 38,782.447 (4.4)
Other 127,951.672 (14.6)
Total private construction 411,723.523 (46.9)
Public construction
Residential building 32,902.919 (3.7)
Nonresidential building 87,415.460 (10.0)
Civil work 249,849.243 (28.5)
--Other 80,875.924 (9.2)
Total public construction 451,043.546 (51.4)
Foreign organizations in Korea 14,979.708 (1.7)
Total value of construction 877,746.777 (100.0)
Source: Report on Construction Work Survey, Economic Planning Board,
1985
Table 2.1.16 Percent Distribution of Value of Construction
by Ownership
Public
Central Local Total Foreign
Type gov't. gov't. Other Public Private org. Total
----------------------------------------------- ---
Residential
building 0.2 %
Nonresidential 2.5
building
Civil work 5.5
Other 1.8
Total 10.0
Source: 1984 Report on
0.8 2.7 3.7 10.9 0.1 14.7
4.6 2.9 10.0 17.0 1.0 28.0
12.1 10.9 28.5 4.4 0.4 33.3
2.7 4.7 9.2 14.6 0.2 24.0
20.2 21.2 51.4 46.9 1.7 100.0
Construction Work Survey, Economic Planning Board
Table 2.1.17 Trend of U.S. Military Construction in Korea
Year Value of U.S. military Percent of total
projects ($ million) construction
1962 14.1 12.6
1963 5.4 4.8
1964 15.3 17.0
1965 13.4 15.3
Source: Construction Association of Korea
Table 2.1.18 Foreign Financing During the First and Second Economic
Development Plans (in millions of dollar)
Loans Foreign invest.
Year Total Sub total Official Percent Carmerc. Percent Amount Percent
1962-66 307.9 291.2 115.6 35.7 175.6 57.0 16.7 5.4
1967-71 2,261.9 2,165.5 810.8 35.4 1,354.7 59.9 96.4 4.3
Source: Econanic Planning Board of Korea, 1979
2.2 International Construction Operation
Koreans started their international construction operation
in 1965 when Hyundai Engineering and Construction Company
contracted highway construction project in Thailand. Since
then, Korean overseas construction activiteie were mostly in
Southeast Asia and the Pacific region until 1972. This period
is characterized as Korean involvement in Vietnam war. By
that, many Korean contractors could get contracts for the
projects related to the military operation or rehabilitation
of war destructed facilities. During this period, Korean
contractors also developed many other areas of the market.
When the Vietnam war was ended in 1972, Korean contractors
had to find alternative market elsewhere. In 1973, Samwhan
Corporation opened the Middle East market by contracting
highway construction project in Saudi Arabia. By 1973, Korean
contractors coverage of international market became substan-
tial but their total contract amount during 1965 to 1973
period was only about $423 million (see table 2.2.1).
From 1974, Korean international construction activity expanded
rapidly until 1981 when the slow decline started. The 1974-
1981 period is characterized as rapid expansion of Korean
international construction. This period is also concurrent
with the third (1972-1976) and fourth (1977-1981) economic
development plans. In this period, the economic development
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plans gave emphasis on the development of ehavy industry and
export promotion resulting in rapid internationalization of
Korean economy. Internationally, this period experienced two
oil shocks which caused worldwide economic recession while
oil exporting countries in the Middle East realized enormous
oil revenue. These oil dollars created the Middle East con-
struction boom. Although the countries in the Middle East
had more than enough financial resources for the development,
they lacked many other resources such as manpowers, technology
and management capability which all are vital for the devel-
opment. At the same time, Korean contractors could offer
experiences they accumulated in the domestic market as well
as in the Southeast Asia, well disciplined manpowers backed
up by efficient support from the government policies. On the
other hand, the stockpiling foreign debts due to chronic
current account deficit which was aggravated by the oil shock
became a heavy burden for Korean economy in the 1970s. The
biggest immediate task for Korean economy at that time was
earning the foreign currency to make its economy going.
Brisk performance of Korean contractors in the Middle East
greatly helped their national economy out of trouble during
that period. Until 1984, the total Korean international con-
tract amount was on the order of $80 billion; considering
that the total accumulated figure for overseas contract totaled
approximately $423 million by 1973, it can be readily seen
that the Korean overseas construction activity increased
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rapidly since 1974 (see tables 2.2.2 and 2.2.3). Internat-
ional work expanded slowly until 1974, then rapidly from 1974
to 1981. From 1982, Korean international contracts started
to decline considerably. In 1984, its total overseas contract
amount was reduced to $6.6 billion from $14.3 billion in 1981.
Since 1976 until 1983, Korean international contracts accounted
for more than 50 percent of its combined domestic and inter-
national contracts (see table 2.2.4); however this seems to
be unevenly distributed. Koreans have heavily concentrated
their efforts in the Middle East market. Of the 35 to 45
percent of its interantional contracts, the Middle East pro-
vided Korea with more than 70 percent of its international
contracts and if North Africa is included in the Middle East,
this number will go well over 80 percent.
Table 2.2.5 illustrates the rapid growth of migrant Korean
labor, mostly in support of and in parallel with the constr-
uction activities of the Middle East. By 1982, overseas con-
struction related employment accounted for 20.6 percent of
total construction employment; about 68 percent was in the
Middle East and more than 50 percent in Saudi Arabia. Well
trained but cheap manpower was a major reason for Korean com-
petitiveness. Beginning in 1962, Korea implemented five con-
secutive 5 year economic development plans successfully.
Throughout the 1960s it maintained a reasonable infrastructure
and industrial base which resulted in surplus trained manpower
and construction equipments which they then utilized in South
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east Asia (Vietnam, Malaysia, Guam etc.) to meet increased
construction demand. By the end of the Vietnam war, Korean
contractors had to find other markets for their manpower.
It was the first oil shock that ignited Middle East constru-
ction boom providing the Koreans with their largest market.
They were able to carry out their Middle Eastern projects
economically and efficiently through the experience they had
gained in Southeast Asia.
Export oriented government policies and incentives have aided
the development of Korea's competitiveness in the internat-
ional construction market. The Korean construction industry
is allowed an accelerated depreciation for its construction
equipment; and in order to increase earnings of foreign exch-
ange, domestic construction firms (as well as other exporters)
are exempted from business tax and are given a 50 percent tax
credit against income and corporate taxes from all foreign
currency earned. This has been an enormous help in developing
the country's construction industry and has led to Korea's
success in exporting its services. Another aid has been the
continuous devaluation of Korean currency.
As of 1983, 99 companies were licensed to carry out overseas
construction projects. As a result of the high concentration
of Korean contractors in a limited area thereby creating
excessive internal competition, prices began to decrease
significantly. However more than 80 percent of the contracts
have been awarded to the ten largest companies (see figure
2.2.1). From 1978 to 1983, the five largest companies acc-
ounted for 42 to 67 percent, and top ten accounted for 61 to
83 percent, and top twenty for 85 to 94 percent of the total
overseas orders received by Korean contractors. The contrib-
ution of the top five is increasing significantly since 1980
and this trend becomes more significant as the market condi-
tions deteriorate. In 1983 the top five accounted for 67
percent, top ten for 82.9 percent and top twenty accounted
for 93.8 percent of total order received while 44 of total
99 licensed companies had received no orders at all. This
illustrates that the bigger companies are generally more com-
petitive in the international construction market. Based on
this fact, the Korean government has encouraged the formation
of large and more competitive units. Since 1983 the amount
of new orders has dropped sharply as has awards to Korean
contractors. Terms of payment have become more rigid. Many
Korean contractors faced severe financial problems and the
Korean government has had to step in to curtail the activities
of several ailing contractors.
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Table 2.2.1 Number of Firms Doing Overseas Construction
(1965-1981)
Middle South-East Pacific Latin North
Year East Asia area America Africa America
1965 3
1966 5
1967 12 1
1968 11 1
1969 10 2 1
1970 10 3 2
1971 12 4 1
1972 13 7
1973 1 14 7 1
1974 7 15 9 3 1
1975 20 12 9 2
1976 38 8 4 2 1
1977 51 13 5 1 1
1978 74 11 3 1 4
1979 60 15 3 3
1980 64 23 1 2
1981 72 22 2 4
Source: Nongovernmental White Paper on Overseas Construction,
Overseas construction Association of Korea, 1984
Table 2.2.2 Market Share of International Construction by 250 Largest
Firms in billions of dollar (percent)
1980
U.S.A.
Korea
Japan
Europe
-France
-W. Germany
-Italy
-U.K.
-Netherland
-Yugoslavia
-Other
Turkey
Other
1981
48.3
(44.5)
9.9
(9.1)
4.1
(3.8)
38.0
(35.0)
8.7
(8.0)
8.6
(7.9)
6.2
(5.7)
4.9
(4.5)
3.7
(3.4)
(-)
5.9
(5.4)
(-)
8.3
(8.0)
44.1
(33.9)
14.3
(11.0)
8.2
(6.3)
51.9
(39.9)
12.5
(9.6)
10.0
(7.7)
8.2
(6.3)
7.9
(6.1)
4.0
(3.1)
(-)
9.3
(7.1)
2.7
(2.1)
8.7
(6.8)
1982
44.9
(36.5)
13.8
(11.2)
9.3
(7.6)
46.5
(37.7)
11.4
(9.3)
9.5
(7.7)
7.8
(6.3)
7.5
(6.1)
2.0
(1.6)
1.3
(1.0)
7.0
(5.7)
2.7
(2.2)
5.9
(4.8)
1983
29.4
(31.4)
10.4
(11.1)
8.7
(9.3)
38.1
(40.7)
10.0
(10.7)
5.4
(5.8)
7.2
(7.7)
6.4
(6.8)
2.5
(2.7)
1.3
(1.4)
5.3
(5.6)
3.4
(3.6)
3.6
(3.9)
1984
30.7
(38.1)
6.6
(8.2)
7.3
(9.1)
29.9
(37.7)
5.3
(6.6)
4.8
(6.0)
6.8
(8.4)
5.6
(7.0)
1.2
(1.5)
1.3
(1.6)
4.9
(6.1)
1.9
(2.4)
4.2
(5.2)
1980-1984
197.4
(36.8)
55.0
(10.3)
37.6
(7.0)
204.4
(38.2)
47.9
(8.9)
38.3
(7.2)
36.2
(6.8)
32.3
(6.0)
13.4
(2.5)
3.9
(0.7)
32.4
(6.0)
10.7
(2.0)
31.1
(5.8)
108.6 129.9 123.1 93.6 80.5 535.7
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Source: Various issues of Engineering News Records
Total
---- --- ---- --- ---- --- ---- --- ---- --- ---- --- ---- --- ---- ---
Table 2.2.3 Market
Firms
Share of Middle Eastern Construction by 250 Largest
in billions of dollar (percent)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1980-1984
U.S.A. 8.9 10.4 18.5 12.7 10.7 61.2
(25.2) (22.4) (36.1) (38.5) (40.2) (31.8)
Korea 7.6 10.5 10.7 4.8 4.9 38.5
(21.5) (22.6) (20.9) (14.5) (18.4) (20.0)
Japan 2.3 3.9 2.5 2.5 1.2 12.4
(6.5) (8.4) (4.9) (7.6) (4.5) (6.4)
Europe 11.7 17.2 15.4 9.4 6.8 60.5
(33.0) (37.0) (30.1) (28.5) (25.6) (31.4)
-France 2.5 4.2 3.7 2.3 1.6 14.3
(7.2) (9.0) (7.2) (7.0) (6.0) (7.4)
-W. Germany 3.1 3.0 2.4 1.3 0.9 10.7
(8.8) (6.5) (4.7) (3.9) (3.4) (5.6)
-Italy 2.3 2.3 2.8 1.1 1.1 9.6
(3.5) (4.9) (5.5) (3.3) (4.1) (5.0)
-U.K. 0.9 1.4 3.0 1.4 1.2 7.9
(2.4) (3.0) (5.8) (4.3) (4.5) (4.1)
-Netherland 0.9 2.1 0.4 1.3 0.3 5.0
(2.6) (4.5) (0.8) (3.9) (1.1) (2.6)
-Yugoslavia - - 0.6 0.5 0.2 1.3
(-) (-) (1.2) (1.5) (0.8) (0.7)
-Other 2.0 4.2 2.5 1.5 1.5 11.7
(5.6) (9.1) (4.9) (4.6) (5.6) (6.1)
Turkey - 0.9 1.9 2.1 1.2 6.1
(-) (1.9) (3.7) (6.4) (4.5) (3.2)
Other 4.8 3.6 2.2 1.5 1.8 13.9
(13.6) (7.7) (4.3) (4.5) (6.8) (7.2)
Total 35.3 46.5 51.2 33.0 26.6 192.6
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Source: Engineering News Records
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Table 2.2.4 The Evolution of Korean International Construction Activity
Domestic versus Overseas Contract Amount
(millions of dollar)
Contract amount Percentage
Year Domestic Overseas Total Domestic Overseas Total
1970 513 50 563 91 9 100
1971 467 113 563 81 19 100
1972 535 175 710 75 25 100
1973 681 238 919 74 26 100
1974 913 300 1,213 75 25 100
1975 1,056 800 1,856 57 43 100
1976 1,526 2,500 4,026 38 62 100
1977 2,608 3,516 6,124 43 57 100
1978 4,792 8,145 12,937 37 63 100
1979 5,963 6,351 12,314 48 52 100
1980 4,795 8,095 12,889 37 63 100
1981 6,056 13,536 19,592 31 69 100
1982 7,142 13,828 20,970 34 66 100
1983 7,358 10,786 18,144 41 59 100
1984 7,883 6,502 14,385 55 45 100
1985 9,545 4,500 14,045 68 32 100
Source: Economic Statistics
Statistics Yearbook
Korean Institute of
Note: Discrepancy may exist
Yearbook 1985
of Construction Industry 1985
Construction Technology 1984
in exchange rate
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Table 2.2.5 Effect on Employment by Overseas Construction
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
1. Overseas employment (person) 45,725 84,964 105,696 131,137 163,088 171,170
2. Employment opportunity (") 30,000 114,000 99,000 102,000 125,000 132,000
3. Overseas construction
employment opportunity (") 75,725 198,964 204,696 233,137 288,088 303,170
4. Available ranpower (thousand person) 13,440 13,932 14,206 14,454 14,710 15,080
5. Employed nmanpower (") 12,929 13,490 13,664 13,706 14,048 14,424
6. Construction employment (") 626 821 836 841 875 831
7. Unenployed (") 511 442 542 749 661 656
8. 3/5 (percent) 0.58 1.47 1.49 1.70 2.05 2.10
9. 1/6 (") 7.31 10.34 12.64 15.59 18.63 20.60
10. 6/5 (") 4.84 6.09 6.12 6.14 6.23 5.76
11. Unemployment rate (") 3.80 3.17 3.81 5.20 4.49 4.35
12. Increase in employment (thousand person) 373 561 174 42 342 376
13. Increase in overseas construction
employment opportunity (person) 73,682 123,239 5,732 28,441 54,951 15,082
14. Rate of increase in total
employment (percent) 2.97 4.34 1.29 0.30 2.49 2.67
15. Rate of increase in overseas
construction employment opportunity
(percent) 320.35 162.74 2.80 13.89 23.57 5.23
16. Contribution of 13 to increase in
total employment (percent) 19.75 21.96 3.29 67.71 16.06 4.01
Source: Ministry of Construction
Bank of Korea
Figure 2.2.1
Trend of Overseas Orders by the Size of the Firms (1978-1983)
Top 5 companies 6th to 10th llth to 20th 21st +
48.8% 18.0 % 18.0% 15.2 %
65.0 % 16.6 % 11.7 % 6.7
42.4 % 18.7 % 23.0 % 15.9 %
46.7 % 17.0 % 20.5 % 15.8 %
49.4 % 19.5 % 16.6 % 14.5 %
67.0% 15.9 % 10.9% 16.2
0 1
0 100 %
Source: Nongovermrental White Paper on Overseas Construction, Overseas Cahstrcution
Association of Korea, 1984
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
2.3 Structural Characteristics
Construction industry consists of Two major categories namely
the general contractors and the specialty trade contractors.
Out of 10,602 construction establishments, there were 1,821
general contractors and 8,781 specialty trade contractors
in 1984. If the specialization of contractors is used to
categorize them, the resulting major classifications are
general builders, civil engineering contractors and specialty
trade contractors (see table 2.3.1). A large number of small
firms and small number of large firms make up the construct-
ion industry. In 1984, 47 percent of all construction est-
ablishments had tital receipts of less than 50 million won
(approx. $60,000), and 1.1 percent of all construction con-
cerns reported total receipts of 10 billion won (approx. $12
million) or more which accounted for 73 percent of total
receipts of nation's construction industry that year (see
table 2.3.2). Another way to look at the size of construct-
ion firms is to consider the number of employees each firm
has. Of the 10,602 construction industry establishments in
1984, 5,731 (54.1 percent) had less than 10 employees. These
establishments had receipts of 165 billion won, which was
only one percent of total industry receipts of 16.2 trillion
won (see table 2.3.3).
In 1984, there were 1,821 general contractors that accounted
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for only 17.2 percent in number but 75.5 percent in number
of employees and 87.6 percent in total value of construction.
In a sense, these general contractors almost represent the
Korean construction industry. This leaves only 24.5 percent
of employees and 12.4 percent of construction receipts to
specialty trade contractors although the number of the spec-
ialty trade contractors is 8,781 or 82.8 percent of total
establishments. Among the general contractors, the general
buildersnumber only 403 (3.8 percent), but account for 58.8
percent of the total value of construction and 45.9 percent
of employees. The average number of employees per establish-
ment varied widely by categories; general builders have ave-
rage of about 965 employees and 23,641 million won (approx.
$29 million) receipts in year 1984 while specialty trade con-
tractors averaged 23.6 employees and 229 million won (approx.
$280 thousand) per firm. These numbers for civil engineering
firms were 176.5 employees and 3,287 million won (approx. $4
million) per firm (see table 2.3.1). These numbers lead us
to characterize Korean construction industry as dominated by
the small number of large general builders. The area of
specialty trade contractors is relatively weak. About 91
percent of all establishments had less than 100 employees on
average monthly basis. These establishments accounted for
18.4 percent of the industry's total employment, 9.5 percent
of total construction receipts and 10.6 percent of total con-
struction industry value.added. At the other end of the size
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scale, only 0.8 percent of all establishments employed 1,000
or more employees, and these accounted for 45.5 percent of
all industry employees, 66.8 percent of construction receipts
and 63.3 percent of total value added. Medium sized firms,
having 100 to 1,000 employees, accounted for 8.3 percent of
the establishments, 36.1 percent of employees, 33.7 percent
of construction receipts and 26.1 percent of the industry's
total value added (see table 2.3.3).
The large establishments predominate the general builders
while the small establishments with less than 100 employees
play negligible roles even in number of establishments. The
negligible role of small builders suggests that either there
is not much single family housing construction or some of
single family housing may not have been recorded in constru-
ction statistics. The reason is that there exists some dis-
economy of scale in single family housing construction and
many of single family housing in rural area of the developing
countries is done by informal sector of the construction and
Korea can be one of them. Recently the greater portion of
Korea's urban housing is developed and provided in the form
of multiple family housing and mostly in large scale apart-
ment complexes constructed by large scale general contractors.
This may be the reason that small general builders do exist
but take only negligible proportion accounting for 8 percent
of the total number of establishments, 0.5 percent of empl-
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oyees, 0.3 percent of the value added of total general buil-
ders (see table 2.3.4). On the contrary, the small establ-
ishments with less than 100 employees dominate the specialty
trade contractors accounting for 95.6 percent of establish-
ments, 56.3 percent of employees, 57.3 percent of the receipts
and 53.1 percent of value added. This may reflect the char-
acteristics of the specialty trade contractors' business and
unlike the general contractors diseconomy of scale exists in
this group of contractors.
Approximately one-eighth of the total domestic construction
receipts were in the form of subcontracting (see table 2.3.5).
However, the portion subcontracted varied widely wihtin the
three major contracting geoups. Among three major contract-
ing groups, only 0.7 percent of general builders and 5.2 per-
cent of civil engineering contractors receipts were in the
form of subcontracts while the comparable number of the
specialty trade contractors was 51.3 percent. This suggests
that the subcontracting is the major source of revenue of the
specialty trade contractors.
There are two major forms of organization for construction
firms; the individual proprietorships and the company corpor-
ations. Other less common legal forms of organization such
as partnerships may also be used. According to 1984 Report
on Construction Work Survey, there were 6,496 individual pro-
prietorships accounting for 61.3 percent of all construction
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establishments. These individual proprietorships accounted
for construction value of 569 billion won, or 3.5 percent of
total value of construction. Establishments classified as
corporations accounted for 38.5 percent of all establishments
and 96.5 percent of total business receipts. Although there
are a large number of individual proprietorships, their con-
tribution to the number of employees and value of construct-
ion is negligible in construction as a whole and this feature
is more significant in general builders as they are mmostly
bigger companies. The specialty trade contractors are more
or less the smaller companies and naturally the proportion of
individual proprietorship is higher accounting for 69 percent
of establishments, 24.6 percent of total employees and 21.8
percent of total value of construction (see table 2.3.6).
Table 2.3.1 Summary Statistics for Construction Establishments,
in millions
1984
of won
No. of establishments Number of employees Total value of construction
Industry Number Percent Number Percent Av./firm Amount Percent Av./firm
Construction
as a whole 10,602 100.0 846,318 100.0 79.8 16,201,852 100.0 1,528
General contractors 1,821 17.2 639,062 75.5 350.9 14,188,638 87.6 7,792
-General builders 403 3.8 388,809 45.9 964.8 9,527,516 58.8 23,641
-Civil engineering 1,418 13.4 250,253 29.6 176.5 4,661,123 28.8 3,287
Specialty trade
contractors 8,781 82.8 207,256 24.5 23.6 2,013,214 12.4 229
Source: 1984 Report on Construction Work Survey, Econcaic Planning Board, 1985
Table 2.3.2 Summary Statistics of Establishanmts by Receipts Size Class, 1984
in millions of won
Number of Number of Total value of
Receipts size establishments employees construction
Construction as
a whole 10,602 100.0 846,318 100.0 16,201,852 100.0
Less than 5 mil. von 241 2.3 294 0.0 796 0.0
5-9.9 mil. won 684 6.5 1,482 0.2 5,177 0.0
10-49.9 mril. 4,043 38.1 17,642 2.1 97,165 0.6
50-99.9 mil. 1,219 11.5 11,798 1.4 87,081 0.6
100-499.9 mil. 2,608 24.6 73,536 8.7 645,000 4.0
500-999.9 mril. 811 7.6 56,265 6.6 570,003 3.5
1,00-4,999.9 mil. 691 6.5 155,911 18.4 1,651,725 10.2
5,000-9,999.9 mril. 185 1.8 119,348 14.1 1,322,460 8.2
10,000 mil. or nmore 120 1.1 410,042 48.5 11,822,445 73.0
Source: !984 Report on Construction Work Survey, Economic Planning Board, 1985
Table 2.3.3 Summry Statistics of Establishments by Employanet Size Class, 1984
Amount: millions of won
Nunber of Number of Total value of
establishments employees construction Value added
Employment
size class Number Percent Number Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent
Less than 10 5,731 54.1 24,867 3.0 165,324 1.0 80,681 1.1
10-19 1,423 13.4 19,808 2.3 199,355 1.2 95,174 1.3
20-49 1,618 15.3 51,014 6.0 561,511 3.5 272,311 3.8
50-99 856 8.1 59,588 7.1 607,945 3.8 311,225 4.3
100-199 358 3.4 50,641 6.0 573,758 3.5 299,394 4.2
200-499 344 3.2 116,283 13.7 1,402,268 8.7 698,162 9.7
500-999 184 1.7 138,938 16.4 1,865,220 11.5 883,163 12.3
1,000 or more 88 0.8 385,179 45.5 10,826,472 66.8 4,552,127 63.3
Total 10,602 100.0 846,318 100.0 16,201,852 100.0 7,192,287 100.0
Source: 1984 Report on Construction Work Survey, Econoric Planning Board, 1985
Table 2.3.4 Distribution of Major Contracting Groups by EHployment Size Class, 1984
Amount: millions of won
Nunber of Nunber of Total value of Value added
establishments enployees construction
Fmployment
size class Nunber Percent Nunber Percent Amnunt Percent Anount Percent
General Builders
less than 100 32 8.0 1,940 0.5 26,535 0.3 10,995 0.3
100-999 312 77.4 145,537 37.4 2,002,068 21.0 891,000 21.8
1,000 or more 59 14.6 241,331 62.1 7,498,912 78.7 3,187,697 77.9
Civil engineering contractors
Less than 100 1,192 84.1 36,792 14.7 353,423 7.6 188,309 9.2
100-999 200 14.1 73,197 29.3 997,181 21.4 510,389 24.9
1,000 or more 26 1.8 140,264 56.0 3,310,519 71.0 1,349,353 65.9
Specialty trade contractors
less than 100 8,392 95.6 116,545 56.3 1,154,174 57.3 560,088 53.1
100-999 386 4.4 87,128 42.0 841,999 41.8 479,379 45.5
1,000 or more 3 0.0 3,583 1.7 17,041 0.9 15,126 1.4
Source: 1984 Report on Construction Work Survey, Eccncmic Planning Board, 1985
Table 2.3.5 Percentage of Subcontracting Within Major Contracting Groups
Percentage of total Percent of industry
Industry construction receipts receipts subcontracted
General contractors 87.6 (77.7) 2.1 (2.4)
-General builders 58.8 (47.3) 1.5 (0.7)
-Civil engineering 28.8 (30.4) 3.3. (5.2)
Specialty trade contractors
12.4 (22.3) 50.3 (51.3)
Construction as a whole 100.0 (100.0) 8.1 (12.9)
--------------------------------------------- ------------
Source: 1984 Report on Construction Work Survey, Economic Planning
Board, 1985
Note: Numbers in the parentheses denotes domestic construction.
Table 2.3.6 Sumary Statistics of Establishments by Legal Form of Organization, 1984
mllions of won (percent)
Nunber of Number of Total value of
establishinnts enployees construction
Canstruction as a whole 10,602 (100.0) 846,318 (100.0) 16,201,852 (100.0)
Coapany corporation 4,080 (38.5) 780,470 (92.2) 15,625,013 (96.5)
Other corporation 26 (0.2) 784 (0.1) 7,122 (0.0)
Individual 6,496 (61.3) 65,064 (7.7) 569,718 (3.5)
General contractors 1,821 639,062 14,188,638
General builders 403 388,809 9,527,516
Cc~pany corporation 395 (98.0) 388,579 (99.9) 9,525,378 (100.0)
Individual 8 (2.0) 230 (0.1) 2,137 (0.0)
Civil engineering 1,418 250,253 4,661,123
Company corporation 985 (69.5) 235,983 (94.3) 4,529,803 (97.2)
Other corporation 5 (0.3) 452 (0.2) 3,484 (0.1)
Individual 428 (30.2) 13,818 (5.5) 127,835 (2.7)
Specialty trade contractors
8,781 207,256 2,013,214
Company corporation 2,700 (30.8) 155,908 (75.2) 1,569,832 (78.0)
Other corporation 21 (0.2) 332 (0.2) 3,638 (0.2)
Individual 6,060 (69.0) 51,016 (24.6) 439,745 (21.8)
Source: 1984 Report on Construction Work Survey, Econanic Planning Board, 1985
2.4 Development of Engineering Consultancy and Design
Capability
Before 1961 almost no investment on engineering services
took place in Korea. During the first five year economic
development plan (1962-1967), plants for fertilizer product-
ion and petroleum refining were built on a turnkey basis,
which resulted in little impact on indigenous engineering
capability. Some pioneering efforts to establish integrated
engineering firms by technical entrepreneurs in the 1960s
were not successful due to restricted domestic demand and
lack of technical capability. Only construction and archit-
ectural design services maintained their operations. In late
1960s, a partial localization of engineering services was
accomplished in the construction of several chemical plants
by a fertilizer company's technical team. In the early 1970s,
the first integrated engineering firm, Korea Engineering Co.,
Ltd. was created under the auspices of the Korean government,
as a joint venture with Lummus Co. of U.S. The company part-
icipated in a few engineering projects, but Lummus withdrew
due to the lack of a market for engineering services, being
replaced in the partnership by Toyo Engineering of Japan.
The government influenced the engineering industry through
the Professional Engineer's Law before 1973 and, thereafter
through the Engineering Service Promotion Law. The latter
stipulated that a domestic engineering company should be the
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prime contractor for engineering services except when not
feasible, and it required registration of engineering firms
and an annual report of their activities.
The value of engineering services was estimated at about 1
billion won (about $3.6 million) in the late 1960s, 2.1 bill-
ion won (about $4.3 million ) for 632 projects in 1973, 25.6
billion won (about $50.7 million) for 3,031 projects in 1977
and 233.1 billion won (about $280 million) for 6,334 projects
in 1984 domestically (see table 2.4.1). Contract amounts
have increased sharply since 1976 due to plant export as well
as the localization of thermal power plants. Korean engin-
eering services have passed through three developmental stages.
The first stage was a period of foreign dependence in the
1960s, with package type foreign investment and engineering
services; local participation was restricted to some constr-
uction activities. The second stage in the early 1970s was
characterized by the birth of domestic engineering services,
helped by an accumulation of technical experience, the enact-
ment of a promotion law, and increase in plant construction.
Some development was achieved in the areas of detailed engin-
eering, procurement, supervision of construction, and project
management. Construction technology was enhanced signific-
antly. During the second half of the 1970s the foreign con-
struction boom (especially in the Middle East) spurred the
further development of domestic engineering services. Turn-
key engineering services and plant construction by domestic
firms became feasible, and some plant export were achieved.
Government intervention caused the localization of most eng-
ineering services, especially for plant construction. A rem-
arkable upgrading of domestic engineering services was , there-
fore, achieved except for basic engineering, start-up, and
operation guarantee. Korean engineering companies started
to get contracts from abroad since 1977 and their foreign
contract amount reached $109 million in 1982 then started to
decline as the overseas construction activities declined (see
table 2.4.2).
Since the middle of the 1970s, Korean engineering services
have grown remarkably. As of 1985, there were 269 engineer-
ing firms in Korea. Among them, 14 are plant engineering
companies, 7 integrated construction engineering firms, 193
specialized engineering service companies and 55 individual
engineering services firms (see table 2.4.3). They employed
25,950 employees and 2,659 of them were high level engineers
which equivalent to the Professional Engineer by the Korean
standard (see table 2.4.4). 14 plant engineering companies
and 7 integrated engineering companies represent the larger
and diversified engineering companies in Korea. However, the
majority of these companies are more or less captive and not
truly independently operated. 12 out of 14 plant engineering
companies are either subsidiary of large integrated constru-
ction companies or part of the construction companies. This
means, at least in plant engineering, that engineering comp-
anies alone have limited capability to secure the market.
From the engineering company's standpoint, they have had pro-
blems in securing their workload without firm forward linkage
with large construction companies or plant equipment fabric-
ators. Possible explanation to this could be that the plant
construction demand is particularly unstable compared to other
kind of construction such as building and civil works, and
the projects are usually come in the form of turnkey contract.
At the same time, the construction companies needed to have
their own engineering arms to qualify themselves for turnkey
projects. By having their own engineering company and some-
times general trading company, the construction company (usu-
ally a part of large business conglomerate) could achieve
vertical and horizontal integration. In addition, construct-
ion companies have developed a close cooperation with sectors
of the heavy industries. The larger companies have developed
heavy industry divisions with international connections for
cooperation in overseas and domestic plant construction.
Although Korean engineering services have grown remarkably
during last 10 years, their growth lies more on quantity than
quality. They have achieved some capacity in basic design
especially in thermal power plant but their activities are
still mostly in detailed design. Still they have to rely the
62
most of the basic design on the foreign engineering companies.
This is partly because the engineering workloads were acquired
through the construction companies. Table 2.4.5 shows that
about 80 percent of the engineering contracts acquired abroad
is in the form of subcontract. This dependency of engineer-
ing companies to construction companies is more significant
in plant construction area. So far the strategy of Korean
construction companies for engineering services has not been
based on long term development of engineering capabilities.
They tried to get the turnkey project for plant construction
and mobilized the engineering organization around them. The
construction companies being a leader of the turnkey project
organization determine the capacity of domestic engineering
company and find foreign engineering company for basic design
and engineering if necessary. The leader of the turnkey
project is generally conservative and risk averse in select-
ing engineering organization as engineering gives very vital
impact on the whole project but its cost is only a fraction
of the total project cost. Furthermore, engaging less qual-
ified engineering company may risk whole project.
Table 2.4.1 Trend of Domestic Engineering Contract by
(millions of won)
Total Plant engineering Integrated construction Special engineering Individual engineering
No. of Contr.
Year proj. amount Number Amount Pct. Number Amount Pct. Number Amount Pct. Number Amount Pct.
1973 632 2,134 134 994 46.6 108 454 21.3 390 686 32.1
1974 1,071 4,931 223 2,371 48.1 246 972 19.7 602 1,588 32.2
1975 1,738 8,629 243 3,246 37.6 430 2,462 28.5 1,065 2,920 33.9
1976 2,403 19,160 171 6,055 31.6 584 8,333 43.4 1,648 4,772 25.0
1977 3,031 24,608 375 9,801 39.8 2,619 14,687 59.7 37 119 0.5
1978 3,416 36,827 341 9,374 25.4 3,051 27,440 74.5 24 13 0.1
1979 3,838 79,032 566 48,282 61.1 68 1,385 1.8 3,204 29,365 37.1 - - -
1980 3,329 72,099 380 21,810 30.3 85 1,460 2.0 2,864 48,829 67.7 - - -
1981 3,981 105,913 314 39,409 37.2 119 1,746 1.6 3,667 66,304 61.2 - - -
1982 4,419 125,343 362 47,446 37.9 134 20,705 16.5 3,866 57,016 45.5 57 177 0.1
1983 4,825 177,769 526 83,550 47.0 686 37,655 21.2 3,472 55,944 31.5 141 620 0.3
1984 6,334 233,132 497 109,763 47.1 741 43,159 18.5 4,484 79,398 34.1 612 812 0.3
Source: Korean Engineering Service Association
VDeVDe
Table 2.4.2 Trend of Foreign Engineering Contract by Type
(thousand of dollar)
Total Plant engineering Integrated engr'g Individual engineering
No. Contract No. Amount Percent No. Amt. Pct. No. Amt Pct.
Year pjt. anount
1977 38 55,103 11 20,889 37.9 - - - 27 34,214 62.1
1978 33 20,326 17 10,399 51.2 - - - 16 9,927 48.8
1979 84 95,712 21 29,323 30.6 - - - 63 66,389 69.4
1980 66 93,194 34 30,347 32.6 - - - 29 62,847 67.4
1981 110 51,028 56 39,896 78.2 - - - 54 11,131 21.8
1982 129 109,040 62 83,303 76.4 1 362 0.2 66 25,475 23.4
1983 105 108,133 62 69,258 64.0 3 550 0.5 40 38,325 35.5
1984 136 62,990 52 48,373 76.8 3 365 0.6 81 14,252 22.6
Source: Korean Engineering Service Association
Table 2.4.3 Number of Engineering Firms by Type, 1985
Type Number of firms
Plant engineering
Plant engineering
Integrated environmental engineering
Nuclear industrial engineering
Integrated construction engineering
Specialized engineering services
Individual engineering services
Total
14 (25)
13 (10)
0 (10)
1 (1)
7 (9)
193 (193)
55 (55)
269 (282)
Source: Korean Engineering Service Association
Note: () denotes the number of licerses.
2.4.5 Trend of Foreign Contract by Type
(thousand of dollar)
of Contract
Total Prime contract Subcontract
Year Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent
1980 93,194 100.0 21,897 23.5 71,297 76.5
1981 51,028 100.0 7,790 15.3 43,238 84.7
1982 109,040 100.0 34,166 31.3 74,874 68.7
1983 108,133 100.0 19,208 17.8 88,925 82.2
Source: Korean Engineering Service Association
Table 2.4.4 Status of Manpower in Engineering Service Industry in Korea,
1984
Total Plant eng. Int. const. Special eng. Indiv. eng.
Qualification No. Pct. No. Pct. No. Pct. No. Pct. No. Pct.
Total 25,950 100.0 8,899 100.0 2,512 100.0 14,332 100.0 207 100.0
High level engineer 2,659 10.2 1,137 12.8 358 14.2 1,127 7.9 37 17.9
P.E.* 829 3.2 330 3.7 125 5.0 349 2.5 25 12.1
Other 1,830 7.0 807 9.1 233 9.2 778 5.4 12 5.8
Fngineer 9,169 35.4 3,517 39.5 1,074 42.8 4,502 31.4 76 36.7
Engr. 1st class* 3,160 12.2 1,425 16.0 376 15.0 1,336 9.3 23 11.1
Other 6,009 23.2 2,092 23.5 698 27.8 3,166 22.1 53 25.6
Other 14,122 54.4 4,245 47.7 1,080 43.0 8,703 60.7 94 45.4
Technician* 7,781 30.0 2,493 28.0 556 22.1 4,687 32.7 45 21.7
Other 6,341 24.4 1,752 19.7 524 20.9 4,016 28.0 49 23.7
Source: Korean
Note: * denote
Engineering Service Association
the qualification officiated by the Ministry of Science and Technology
2.5 Research and Development
The total factor productivity is influenced by a number of
changes in the characteristics of inputs. The growth of out-
put is generally ascribable to increases in the input of cap-
ital per man-hour and that which is contributed by technical
change. There have been many studies to estimate the contr-
ibution of increased capital and technological change to
growth of output. The results invariably indicate the tech-
nological change as a predominant source of the growth of
output. Technological change or improvement can be made by
various means. While the process can commence through tech-
nology transfer from abroad, it must be supplemented by ind-
igenous efforts both in assimilating foreign technology and
innovating. In this section, Korea's industrial policies for
technological changes, and research and developmentactivities
particularly in construction industry will be briefly reviewed.
2.5.1 Industrial Policies for Technological Changes
The source of technologies used in the development of Korean
products in the 1970s has been foreign adopted and assimilated
in the traditional sectors and foreign in modern industries.
Foreign suppliers and buyers, staffed with foreign experience
and license and technical agreements have been cited as impo-
rtant sources of foreign technologies primarily in modern and
to a less degree in traditional industries. In addition,
technological cooperation has enabled the Koreans to survey
and study technologies unknown to them which are complement-
ary to their own traditional capabilities. However, the acq-
uisition of know-how is endangered by increasing unwillingn-
ess by other countries to share technological knowledge. In
addition, high technology projects offer few opportunities
to unbundle new from traditionally familiar technologies and
resources. Moreover, the policies aiming at this acquisition
of know-how through international partnerships have resulted
in the absence of substantial domestic research and develop-
ment efforts which Korea is trying to develop now.
In the 1960s and early 1970s, the existing technologies ref-
lected the increased capacity and concentration in production
rather than investment capabilities. Investment focused more
in industries with long history and less in modern industries.
Only in the mid-1970s government policies have attemted to
deal with this lack of investment in modern industries. The
new policies were incorporated in the Technological Develop-
ment Promotion and Engineering Service Promotion Acts. These,
among others, provide a framework for the assimilation of
imported technologies, development of local research and
and development and integration of engineering, construction
and managerial services in international projects.
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Marketing has not been a high priority for most internation-
ally involved sectors and products. Overall, the Korean con-
struction and related industries' marketing strategy have
been more on the reactive rather than proactive side. In
short term, reactive strategy helps maintain the current
market share. Under this category, we can include the defence
of building and simple infrastructure categories against int-
ernational competitors and the imitation of foreign technol-
ogies. These have proved successful policies to penetrate
existing market with existing products; i.e., in the building
and simple infrastructure areas. The difficulties facing the
Korean construction and related industries today are selling
their products and services both in the existing and new
markets. A proactive marketing strategy is required to succ-
essfully attract future buyers of construction and related
services. This approach needs to focus on finding the cust-
omers needs to focus on finding the customers' needs and put-
ting together packages that satisfy them before other inter-
national competitors. The indepth organization of research
and development is also a proactive strategy that often places
innovators way ahead of their competitors when a new techno-
logy is developed and gives them the time to capture and then
maintain their market share based on the name they established.
2.5.2 Research and Development
By comparison to resources devoted to research and development
by industrial countries, the developing countries devoted
modest amounts--both absolutely and relatively. In 1973 the
developing countries accounted for less than 3 percent of
world total expenditures on research and development, and
their ratio of expenditures to GNP averaged about 0.35, where-
as the ratio was more than 2 in industrial countries (UNIDO
1979). Until mid-1970s, Korea's expenditures on R&D were
less than 0.5 percent of GNP (see table 2.5.1). Korea's
ratio of expenditures on R&D to GNP at this time represented
that of typical developing countries. Despite its importance,
any significant investments for technology development were
not undertaken. With the active development of the heavy and
chemical industries, however, investment for technology dev-
elopment were substantially boosted. The ratio of investment
for technology development to GNP increased to 1.06 percent
in 1983, exceeding the level of 1.0 percent which the UNESCO
suggests to the developing countries as a guideline for tech-
nological development. The economic planners in Korea now
see technology as the touchstone of industrial maturity and
fundamental to the continuing of export-led economic growth.
The government objective is to raise R&D spending to 2 per-
cent of GNP by 1986 when the fifth economic development plan
is finished (1982-1986) bringing Korea almost abreast of Japan
70
which invest 2.2 percent in R&D and U.S. which devotes 2.3
percent of GNP to research. The R&D spending is planned to
be increased further to 2.5 percent of GNP by 1991 the final
year of the sixth economic development plan (1987-1991).
Until recently the pattern of allocation of R&D expenditures
favored the government institutions and non-profit organiza-
tions working on basic research rather than industrial firms,
which tended to concentrate on product development and engin-
eering. This is not particularly desirable as the government
institutes normally cannot respond effectively to actual needs
and opportunities in industry. However, this tendency has
been reversed by 1983 when 60.6 percent of R&D expenditure
was allocated to the industry research organizations (see
table 2.5.2). The concentration of R&D activity in govern-
ment institutes and related organizations reflects two con-
ditions: First, the government is the source of the majority
of funds for R&D and normal practice is to support government
related organizations rather than to contract with private
industry. Second, industry does not have the incentives or
funds to undertake much work of its own. However, this tend-
ency has been gradually corrected as industry's appreciation
of the needs of R&D and increased incentives on R&D by the
government policies. By 1983, the private sector financing
on nation's total R&D expenditures reached to 72.5 percent
(see table 2.5.3)
723 research organizations with 12,586 researchers in Korean
industry spent 375.8 billion won in 1983 which was equivalent
to 0.66 percent of total sales (see tables 2.5.4 and 2.5.5).
These are in fact negligible numbers compared to U.S. and
Japan and other advanced countries. 505,000 researchers were
working for U.S. industry and they spent $55.7 billion in
1982. In Japan, industry running 17,646 research organizat-
ions with 201,137 researchers spent $19.2 billion in 1983.
Korean construction industry keeping 19 research organizations
(2.6 percent) with 315 researchers (2.5 percent) spent 12
billion won (3.2 percent) for research and development. This
is equivalent to 0.14 percent of total sales in 1983 and this
is one of the lowest level of expenditures spent on R&D among
all the industries. However, the figures mentioned are an
average and does not represent the situation comprehensively.
As there are only 19 research institutes in the construction
industry run mostly by high ranking construction companies.
This means the companies running the research institutes are
spending the money for the R&D activities to the level sub-
stantially higher than the 0.14 percent of the sales. The
research operations can be classified into fbur-categozies.
based on the purpose as follow:-
-To provide solutions for the problems encountered during
project execution
-The research originated by the researchers and conducted
with the approval of the management
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-The research based on the company's long term technology
development plan
-The research for the outside clients
Presently the activities of the research institutes in con-
struction industry are more or less confined to the first
two categories. However, the third categories should be vig-
orously persued as R&D should be looked at and judged by its
long term contribution. This is particularly so because the
industry is already convinced that the Korean construction
industry should move from the low-technology end to high
technology construction, as their competitive advantage in
the low technology area is now being challenged by the comp-
etitors from the other third world countries which can offer
much lower wages. The formation of the Korea Institute of
Construction Technology (KICT) that has its goal to improve
quality and productivity of construction through development
of new technologies and materials or improvement of existing
ones shows the recognition of the need of the R&D by the con-
struction industry and the government for Korean construction
industry to stay competitive. In January 1986, the Ministry
of Construction announced the recommendation on R&D to the
nation's large scale construction companies of annual sales
exceeding 10 billion won as follow:-
-94 construction companies with annual sales more than 10
billion won are recommended to invest at least 0.15 percent
of annual sales for R&D
-Among them, 44 companies with annual sales exceeding 50
billion won are recommended to establish research institutes
with not less than 10 researchers
This recommendation could be a good start considering the
present level of R&D expenditures in construction industry
which is one of the lowest among the various industries. The
fragmented nature of the industry makes it more difficult to
make a concerted effort for R&D and the Ministry of Constru-
ction's recommendation can be a very effective and relevant
initiative. However, R&D effort must not be regarded as
equivalent to establishing special institutes and organizat-
ions. Care must be taken to prevent a proliferation of res-
earch institutes that are too weak to be effective. Techno-
logical capability resides in human and institutional capital.
The development of research manpower which is presently in
short supply is very important. The present educational sys-
tem seems not fully serving its purpose in providing capable
research personnels and some reform in this area may be needed
to counter the present and future necessity on research man-
powers. Additionally, the government's initiative of provi-
ding the research infrastructure support on a common-use or
special-use basis would help eliminate the redundant invest-
ment and waste of research resources.
Table 2.5.1 R&D Expenditures as a Percentage of GNP
A. R&D Expenditures B. GNP
Year (current won in mill.) (current won in mill.) A/B (%)
1970 10,547.75 2,735.93 0.39
1971 10,666.71 3,375.93 0.32
1972 12,028.15 4,154.02 0.29
1973 15,628.48 5,378.46 0.29
1974 38,182.08 7,503.10 0.51
1975 42,663.73 10,092.23 0.42
1976 60,900.04 13,881.11 0.44
1977 108,285.66 18,115.41 0.60
1978 152,418.34 24,225.30 0.63
1979 174,038.63 31,248.72 0.56
1980 211,726.65 37,204.98 0.57
1981 293,131.47 45,725.09 0.64
1982 457,688.49 51,786.60 0.88
1983 621,749.31 58,428.40 1.06
Source: Ministry of Science and Technology, Technology Annual, 1984
Note: Excluding Military and Defence R&D and Social Science and Humanities
Table 2.5.2 Allocation of R&D Expenditures by Sector
(current won in million)
Total
Year expenditures
Research
institutes
Universities
& colleges
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
42,663.7
60,900.0
108,285.7
152,418.3
174,038.6
211,726.7
293,131.5
457,688.5
621,749.3
Source: Science &
1984
28,139.2 (66.0)
43,780.1.(71.9)
61,088.5 (56.4)
78,072.9 (51.2)
98,207.6 (56.4)
104,472.6 (49.3)
145,309.2 (49.6)
186,076.5 (40.7)
180,556.5 (29.1)
2,181.8
1,978.7
5,482.2
20,548.4
16,536.3
25,902.1
27,168.4
66,610.0
64,251.2
(5.1) 12,342.7
(3.2) 15,141.2
(5.1) 41,714.9
(13.5) 53,802.0
(9.5) 59,294.8
(12.2) 81,351.9
(9.4) 120,653.9
(14.6)205,002.0
(10.3)375,810.0
Note: () denotes percentage
Industry
(28.9)
(24.9)(38.5)
(35.3)
(34.1)
(38.4)
(41.9)
(44.8)
(60.6)
Technology Annual, Ministry of Science and Technology,
--------------------------------------- -------------- --
---------------------------------- ------- ---------
Table 2.5.3 R&D Expenditures by
(millions
Source of Funds,
of current won)
Sector Total Public Private Foreign
Total 621,749.3 187,897.9 268,747.0 1,043.5
(27.3) (72.5) (0.2)
Research inst. 180,556.5 140,188.3 39,653.8 714.4
(77.6) (22.0) (0.4)
Univ. & colleges 64,251.2 25,870.6 38,008.3 372.3
(40.3) (59.2) (0.5)
Industry 375,810.0 2,385.5 373,363.0 61.5
(0.6) (99.3) (0.1)
Source; Science & Technology Annual, Ministry of Science and Technology,
1984
Note: () denotes percentage
Table 2.5.4 Intramural R&D Expenditures in Industry as a Percent of Total Sales by Field,
1983
A. Intranural B. Total
Classification R&D Exp. (millions) sales (billions) A/B (percent)
Industry total 375,810.0 56,530.2 0.66
Agriculture and fishing 2,647.2 157.8 1.67
Mining 1,938.8 207.2 0.93
Manufacturing 342,840.8 42,381.9 0.80
Food & beverages 23,449.5 3,305.5 0.70
Textile & leather 21,118.3 2,870.3 0.73
Wood (prod.), furnitures 1,828.8 274.0 0.66
Paper (prod.), printing 4,151.9 7,860.3 0.05
OGhmicals, petroleumn, etc. 75,513.4 13,405.3 0.56
Non-metalic mineral products 9,335.0 1,198.5 0.77
Basic metal industries 13,034.6 3,916.1 0.33
:Fabriated itetal 192,549.9 9,409.5 2.04
Other manufacturing 1,859.3 142.3 1.30
Electricity, gas and water 2,355.0 2,959.7 0.07
Construction 12,004.6 8,029.9 0.14
Transport, camunication, etc. 2,115.4 2,078.5 0.10
Financing, insurance, etc 7,591.6 110.1 6.89
Other industries 4,316.6 605.1 0.71
Source: Science and Technology Annual, Ministry of Science and Technology, 1984
1983
Table 2.5.5 Industry's R&D Expenditures and Numnber of Researchers, 1983
Total Number of R&D expense
No. of R&D expenditure researchers per researcher
Crassification institutes (million Won) (person) (million wmn)
Industry total 723 375,810.0 12,586 29.9
Agriculture and fishing 4 2,647.2 123 21.5
Mining 3 1,938.8 49 39.6
Manufacturing 671 342,840.8 11,224 30.5
Food & beverages 62 23,449.5 864 27.2
Textile & leather 82 21,118.3 684 30.9
Wood (prod.), furnitures 12 1,828.8 62 29.5
Paper (prod.), printing 24 4,151.9 153 27.1
Chenicals, petroleum, etc. 139 75,513.4 2,185 34.6
Non-metalic mineral prod. 42 9,335.0 329 28.4
Basic metal industries 27 13,034.6 402 32.4
Fabricated metal 258 192,549.9 6,437 29.9
Other manufacturing 25 1,859.3 322 5.8
Electricity, gas & water 2 2,355.0 131 7.5
Construction 19 12,004.6 315 38.1
Transport, camc nication, etc. 3 2,115.4 89 23.8
Financing, insurance, etc. 15 7,591.6 429 17.7
Other industries 6 4,316.6 226 19.1
Source: Science and Technology Annual, Ministry of Science and Technology, 1984
2.6 Construction Materials and Equipments
Among the factors contributing to the international competi-
tiveness of construction industry is the ability to provide
the integrated packages of work including construction mat-
erials and equipments as construction industry is one of the
industries which dependent heavily on the inputs from the
other sectors. The construction materials and equipments
industries in Korea were developed partly to support domestic
social overhead capital investments, primarily housing and
infrastructure projects in the 1960s. At present, most of
the construction materials are now produced enough to meet
the domestic need except for a few high quality materials.
However, the growth of the export of construction materials
and equipments has not kept up with that of the overseas con-
struction. Furthermore, the construction equipments manuf-
acturers are now suffering from very low operating rates of
the plants while the size and the production capacity are by
far larger than what the domestic market can bear. In this
regard, we will look into the status and the problems which
Korean construction materials and equipments industries are
facing.
2.6.1 Construction Materials
As mentioned earlier, Korea is now selfsufficient in most of
the construction materials for domestic use (see tables 2.6.1
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and 2.6.2). However, the local input in overseas construct-
ion is very low and even decreasing. From 1966 to 1983, the
cost of materials has constituted average of about 40 percent
of the total cost of overseas construction and that of equip-
ment accounted for about 8 percent. However, only less than
14 percent of the materials and 8 percent of the equipments
used for the overseas construction during 1983 and 1984 were
Korean made (see table 2.6.3). Table 2.6.4 shows the growth
pattern of Korean construction materials production in comp-
arison with that of overall producer goods and gross domestic
product of construction. The growth rate of the construction
materials production has been slower than that of the prod-
ucer goods but faster than that of domestic construction (see
figures 2.6.1, 2.6.2 and 2.6.3). However, the production of
construction materials is slow in terms of growth compared
to the growth of total, domestic and overseas, construction
(see table 2.6.5). This suggests that the Korean construct-
ion materials industry has mostly dependent on the demand
from the domestic construction activities although there has
been a tremendous increase in the overseas construction. The
reasons that Korean construction materials are not sold as
much as Korean international construction can be explained
in two ways. First, the demand for domestic construction has
been increased very fast. Second, the quality of Korean pro-
duced construction materials does not meet the internationally
accepted standard quality or the quality standard has been
met but not fully appreciated by the foreign clients. The
example of the first category is the cement, which Korea con-
sumes more than 80 percent of its domestically produced cement
although its production capacity expanded very rapidly (see
table 2.6.6).
Although the construction materials industry is closely rel-
ated to the construction industry, it can be understood better
by comparing with other manufacturing industry in general as
the construction materials industry is a sector of manufact-
uring. Korea's commodity export recently accounted for about
1.5 percent of the world trade. This is a result of remark-
able growth of the Korean economy. But this number is not
very impressive if we compare this with that of Korea's over-
seas construction which accounted for about 10 percent of the
total international construction for last few years. This
may mean that Korean international construction has grown
disproportionately compared to the size of the economy backed
up by the various manufacturing industries. Expanded inter-
national construction activities of Korean contractors prov-
ided excellent opportunities for construction materials ind-
ustry to expand its market to match their construction mater-
ials export to that of construction. To be successful in
international market, they have to produce differentiated
products as the owners or engineers who determine and approve
the materials incorporatedinto the project are mostly conser-
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vative and risk averse in selecting the materials. It is
especially difficult for new comers like Koreans to penetrate
through the invisible barriers of this kind without having
support from design and engineering personnel of the project.
Like other manufacturing industries, the smallness and the
limited sophistication of the Korea's domestic market is a
big disadvantage as economy of scale is difficult to achieve
and the market gives no lattitude to launch, test and refine
differentiated manufactures in the protected environment.
Export of the home produced construction materials and equip-
ments has been decreasing since 1981 when the actual exports
reached record $1billion. If Korean construction materials
industry is only to satisfy the demand from the local market
and local construction companies, there is not much room for
further growth except for some moderate growth as the level
of sophistication of the local construction demand and size
of domestic market increase in line with the growth of the
national economy. Naturally, if they want to grow further,
the construction materials industry has to look beyond the
demand from the Korean contractors. If we compare the cons-
truction materials export by Japanese and Korean manufactures
to Saudi Arabia, the suggestion is clearer. In 1980, Japan
exported $1.1 billion worth of construction materials to
Saudi Arabia while Korean export was only $0.5 billion/ The
difference is more significant if we consider that Korea had
contracted $7.6 billion worth of international construction
in the Middle East that year while Japanese did only $2.7
billion (see table 2.6.7). This example shows the potential
of the construction materials export beyond the Korean cont-
ractors' activities abroad. Following are some of the prob-
lems observed explaining the reasons of inactive construction
material export for overseas construction:-
-Preference placed on the products of the developed count-
ries by the technical services companies and owners.
And lack of understanding on the Koreanproducts.
-preference of Korean contractors on foreign produced goods,
because of financing as well as technical reasons. Quite
often foreign producers offer better financial terms while
Korean producers -often Iack i6aprvidgie tehdicaltdata
and experts needed to obtain approval for the usage of the
certain materials for the project.
-Weak promotional activities of the manufactures and infl-
exible delivery terms.
-Low international competitiveness in quality and standard.
-Import restrictions in favor of locally produced materials.
The causes of the problems encountered in the international
market are often found in the domestic operational character-
istics. Following are some of the reasons found in the prac-
tices of the manufacturing in Korea:-
-Manufacturers' technological lag.
-Excessive price competition ignoring the quality.
-Limited quality control capability.
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2.6.2 Construction Equipments
The construction equipment manufacturing has several differ-
ent characteristics from other machinery manufacturing.
First, there are numerous kinds of construction equipments
but the production facility of each type requires large inv-
estment and relatively long time for the return on investment.
In most cases, it is characterized as assembling the various
parts and depend heavily on the skill of the technicians in
contrast to its capital intensive nature. Third, it involves
many different parts and consequently depend largely on the
industry's part supplying capacity. Fourth, unless the size
of the firm is to cover worldwide market, planned production
is difficult as the demand is not large enough. Korean con-
struction equipment manufacturing industry started as a rep-
air shops but expanded rapidly with the growth of the const-
ruction industry. In the latter part of the 1970s, with the
emphasis placed on the heavy and chemical industries, the
construction equipment manufacturing plants have grown to the
integrated machinery manufacturing plants. However, the inv-
estments were proved to be excessive. This excessive invest-
ment coupled with the reduced demand due to the worldwide
economic recession, the operating rate of this industry is
extremely low. Although the local industries for the parts
manufacturing are not fully established, the investment for
the construction equipment manufacturing has been concentrated
to the final assembly plants. This made Korean construction
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equipment manufacturing industry dependent on the imported
parts. The localization of the parts currently imported is
considered not economical as the size of the domestic demand
is not large enough to reach the economical scale of produc-
tion whereas the prospect for the export of large number of
construction equipments is not probable in the near future.
The differentiated quality is particularly important to be
successful in the construction equipment market as the cont-
ribution of the construction equipments is critical to the
success of the construction operation. However, Korean con-
struction equipment industry's technological level is not as
high as it should be to produce the differentiated quality.
This is because ;-
-Insufficient accumulation of the capital and technology
due to relatively short history of the industry.
-Investment for the construction equipment industry was
concentrated to the production facilities and that to the
R&D and accumulation of technology was largely neglected.
-In itroducing the foreign technology, the emphasis was
given to the manufacturing technology resulting in the
lack of design capability made the development of own
model difficult.
Since the situation of the Korean parts industry is improving
rapidly with the fast growth of the automobil industry, it
may be easier now to expect support from the parts industry
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for construction equipment manufacturing. For the market to
reach the economy of scale in manufacturing construction
equipments, the cooperation with the U.S. or other European
manufacturers is suggested to be made. The cooperation with
foreign technology and Korean labor productivity and relat-
ively modern facilities in Korea may result in the winning
combination in this area. In any case, the size of Korean
domestic market makes it impossible to be competitive staying
only in the domestic market.
Table 2.6.1 Self-Sufficiency Rate of Construction Materials
(percent)
Item 1980 1981
Cement 100.0 100.0
Slate - 99.9
Reinforcing bar 100.0 100.0
Steel section 63.6 55.1
Steel plate 93.0 94.9
Steel wire 66.8 72.4
Steel pipe 85.6 83.3
Plywood 100.0 100.0
Tile 98.3 98.3
PVC 74.0 95.0
Coating 96.9 95.2
Plate glass 88.2 94.7
Ceramic sanitary 98.7 99.1
Electric wire 91.2 86.4
Bulbs 97.9 99.6
Source: KICT, Construction, Construction MAterials and Machinery Industry
in Korea, For UNIDO Special Industrial Services, April, 1985
Note: Self-sufficiency rate = 1 - amount imported/domestic demand
Table 2.6.2 Self-Sufficiency Rate of Construction Equipments
(percent)
Item 1980 1981
Buldozer 30.4 40.8
Loader 28.9 40.2
Motor Grader 12.5 41.9
Excavator 96.4 92.9
Crane -100.0 -168.0
Fork lift 75.5 93.0
Source and Note, same as table 2.6.2
Table 2.6.3 Composition of Construction Materials and
in Overseas Construction by the Origin
(percent)
Equipments Used
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Materials Domestic 30.9 25.0 23.9 18.7 13.8 13.6
Foreign 69.1 75.0 76.1 81.3 86.2 86.4
Equipment Domestic 26.3 26.0 13.8 14.8 8.1 8.2
Foreign 73.7 74.0 86.2 85.2 91.9 91.8
Total Domestic 29.9 24.3 22.1 18.0 13.7 13.2
Foreign 70.1 75.7 77.9 82.0 86.3 86.8
Source: KICT, Construction, Construction Materials and Machinery Industry
in Korea, For UNIDO Special Industrial Services, April, 1985
Production of
in GDP (based
Construction Materials versus Producer Goods and Construction
on 1975 constant price)
Producer goods Construction materials Construction in GDP
Index Growth Cumu. Index Growth Cunm. Index Growth Cun.
Year 1975=100 rate growth 1975=100 rate growth 1975=100 rate growth
1966 15.2 25.5 28.9
1967 17.9 18 18 34.3 35 35 34.5 19 19
1968 28.1 57 85 47.2 38 85 47.8 39 65
1969 35.0 25 130 55.9 18 119 65.7 38 127
1970 33.9 -3 123 56.2 1 120 69.0 5 139
1971 38.2 13 151 63.8 14 150 67.5 -2 133
1972 43.2 13 184 66.9 5 162 66.8 -1 131
1973 60.9 41 301 89.1 33 249 85.6 28 196
1974 83.2 37 447 91.7 3 260 87.8 3 204
1975 100.0 20 558 100.0 9 292 100.0 14 246
1976 131.0 31 762 128.0 28 402 122.3 12 288
1977 158.4 21 942 166.4 30 553 140.6 25 386
1978 198.8 26 1,208 204.5 23 702 176.2 25 509
1979 224.8 13 1,379 213.0 4 735 179.2 2 520
1980 224.0 0 1,374 203.2 -5 697 177.7 1 515
1981 251.4 12 1,554 214.9 6 743 168.8 -5 484
Source: Major Statistics of Korean Econanomy, The Bank of Korea, 1982
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Table 2.6.5 Total Construction Contracts and Production of Construction
Materials Indexes (1970-1983)
Domestic + Overseas
Year contracts Construction materials
1970 42 56
1971 49 64
1972 53 67
1973 69 89
1974 64 92
1975 100 100
1976 194 128
1977 270 166
1978 511 205
1979 409 213
1980 395 203
1981 547 220
1982 596 237
1983 548 292
Source: Moavenzadeh, A Brief Overview of the South Korean Construction
and Construction Materials Industries, 1985
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Supply and Demand of Major Construction Materials
Production Domestic
Item Unit Year capacity Production demand Export Import
Steel 1,000 M/T 1980 - 8,397 5,636 4,818 2,162
(All products) 1981 - 10,244 6,880 5,618 2,152
1982 - 11,262 6,969 6,094 1,387
1983 - 12,557 8,248 6,319 2,180
Re-bar 1,000 M/T 1980 - 1,991 1,419 567 0
1981 2,859 1,795 1,277 537 0
1982 - 2,285 1,793 - -
1983 - 2,774 - - -
Cement 1,000 M/T 1980 22,185 15,574 13,172 2,300 0
1981 23,825 15,600 12,489 3,243 0
1982 23,450 17,913 14,301 3,561 0
1983 23,450 21,282 17,649 3,602 0
Plywood Million 1980 6,300 4,239 1,797 2,564 0
Sq. Ft. 1981 6,134 4,303 1,563 2,701 0
1982 5,198 3,291 1,845 1,588 0
1983 5,106 3,298 2,405 889 0
Glass 1,000 1980 4,550 3,168 3,430 146 323
(Plate) Case 1981 6,620 3,888 3,500 579 32
1982 6,620 4,229 3,580 846 68
1983 6,620 5,081 4,609 612 169
Source: Moavenzadeh, A Brief Overview of the South Korean Construction and Construction
Materials Industries, 1985
Table 2.6.6
Table 2.6.7 Comparison Between Korean and Japanese
Construction Materials and Equipments to Saudi
Arabia (in millions of dollar)
1978 1979 1980
A. Korea
Materials 244.5 331.3 502.7
Equipments 12.3 41.7 12.9
Sub total 256.8 373.0 515.6
B. Japan
Materials 685.6 924.2 1,093.4
Equipments 82.4 105.4 115.5
Sub total 768.0 1,029.6 1,208.9
A/B: Percent
Materials 35.7 (16.8) 35.8 (20.4) 46.0 (30.4)
Equipments 14.9 (4.4) 39.6 (15.2) 11.2 (6.4)
Sub total 33.4 (15.1) 36.2 (19.7) 42.7 (27.3)
Source: Korea Institute for Industrial Economics & Technology,
Strategy to Promote Construction Materials and
Equipments to Middle East.
Note: Numbers in Parenthesis are for the Total of the Middle
East.
2.7 Issues Presently Facing the Korean Construction Industry
As previously noted, Korean international construction cont-
racts rose sharply until 1981 and then started to decline.
By 1984 total overseas contracts had decreased to $6.6 bill-
ion from the 1981 figure of $14.3 billion. To date the com-
mon priority of Korean contractors seems to have been the
expansion and growth of its market, regardless of the side
effects caused from this fast-track growth. During the per-
iod of rapid growth, these problems can be ignored but not
so in a period of recession. Considering the current inter-
national market condition, it seems very hard to expect to
realize the rapid growth of 1970s. Instead, it has to res-
olve many problems created and overlooked during the rapid
expansion and consolidate itself to regain the momentum of
the growth. In a sense, the difficulties presently exper-
ienced by many Korean contractors should be considered as an
opportunity to enhance the fitness of overgrown company str-
ucture. Within this context some of the issues facing the
Korean construction industry are highlighted below.
2.7.1 Issues Related to Activities in the Middle East
Demand for the international construction has decreased sig-
nificantly. It reached its peak in 1981 when total interna-
tional contracts amounted to $129.9 billion. By 1984 this
figure was reduced to $80.5 billion (see table 2.7.1). This
decrease is mainly due to the decrease in construction demand
from the Middle Eastern oil-exporting countries which acc-
ounted for about 35 to 45 percent of international construc-
tion. This lessened demand is due primarily to the decline
in oil prices. The curtailing of overseas awards by the Mid-
dle Eastern countries severely impacted the Korean internat-
ional construction market due to its heavy concentration in
this area (see table 2.7.2). Korea's concentration in the
Middle East is much more significant if we compare this with
that of the U.S. and Japan. The U.S. has markets all over
the world and their share is more or less balanced and Japan
has a larger market in Asia than Middle East (see tables
2.7.3 and 2.7.4).
Since 1973 oil-exporting countries in the Middle East have
carried out ambitious economic development plans using enor-
mous oil revenues. A major portion of this investment has
been in infrastructure, housing and urban development. These
are mostly labor intensive or are projects requiring the
lower end of technology; areas in which the Korean contractors
are competitive; in fact, more than 80 percent of the Korean
contracts in this region are civil work and building const-
ruction (see table 2.7.5). However the need for infrastruc-
ture building is nearly completed in the many of the Middle
Eastern countries. The nature of future projects will be
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shifting to the so called "high technology content", with a
very strong demand for innovative engineering and design com-
ponents. Moreover, we will witness more reliance on new fin-
ancing scheme, such as counter-trade barter systems, and eq-
uity participation which will require a bidding practice in-
volving knowledge of economics as well as determining finan-
cial risk. Firms participating in this new market will have
to provide highly sophisticated, up-to-date engineering and
design capabilities as well as financial packaging capabil-
ities. Innovative financing and turnkey capabilities are
essential to this market. A major element of the turnkey
operation is a strong, well-qualified engineering and design
component capable of providing the conceptual as well as
detailed design needed for the sophisticated construction
projects of this market. Having in the past executed projects
in collaboration with foreign companies who provided all of
the design and engineering services, the Koreans have little
opportunity to develop their own expertise in this area.
This is a major handicap for the Korean international contr-
actors.
The fact that many countries that were traditionally buyers
of construction services and products from the international
marketplace now focus on the development of their own indig-
enous construction capabilities which are preferred to those
of the international firm, has changed the picture entirely.
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The percentage of contracts being awarded domestically in the
Middle East has grown from 2.3 percent in 1975 to 27.9 percent
in 1984. Among them, Saudi Arabia is the most remarkable,
showing a percentage rate of 43.8 in 1984 (see table 2.7.6).
The indigenous construction capability is seen mostly in the
area of civil engineering works and building construction;
areas in which Korean contractors relied heavily. The least
significant area of domestic concentration is in plant plant
construction. Along with this preference by Arab governments
for their own construction companies, the entry of Turkish,
Indian, Pakistani and other firms with lower labor cost than
that of Korea, means more intense competition. This trend
is particularly so in the low end of technology and at this
point in time the Koreans are not fully equipped to switch
their market to the high end of technology. In addition due
to an increase in the standard of livings in Korea, constru-
ction firms are faced with higher labor costs, not necessarily
accompanied by an increase in productivity (see table 2.7.7).
The Korean domestic construction market has increased steadily
over the past 20 years; however after 21.2 percent growth
during 1983, domestic construction market remained relatively
static during 1984. Government construction expanded 9.5
percent, led by new town developments but private construct-
ion grew by only 3.3 percent, due mostly to tight credit con-
ditions that discouraged-residential construction. In spite
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of active investment in government construction and factories
(including subway projects) overall construction investment
in 1984 was up by only 0.3 percent. This was due primarily
to the sharp decline in housing construction. Since 1976
domestic construction has been exceeded by overseas constru-
ction which implies certain limitations in the domestic mar-
ketplace rendering it incapable of countering the sluggish
overseas market. This seems evident that from 1982 to 1985,
total contract amount has been decreasing although there has
been hefty growth in domestic construction. This excessive
dependency on international construction means that Korean
construction industry is very much vulnerable to change in
international market condition. The share of international
construction in Korea's total construction has been reduced
to below 50 percent since 1984 when Korea's international
construction was reduced sharply.
2.5.2 Issues Related to Activities in the Traditional
International Construction Market
Looking at the traditional international construction projects,
outside of the oil-rich countries, we seethat these projects
of the Third World capital-poor countries are financed through
international agencies, bilateral and soft-loan programs and
through international financial institutions such as commer-
cial banks. A major component of such a project is a detailed
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and in-depth feasibility study which is normally prepared by
an international consulting firms, whose primary concern is
to identify the benefits of the project and to assure its
financial viability. It is at this stage of project develop-
ment that the level of technological sophistication and labor,
material and equipment requirements are determined. In order
for Korean firms to compete in this market, Korea has to
develop and strengthen its international consulting capabil-
ities. Presently, this capability is at its very early
stages of development and no concerted effort is apparently
being made to expedite its development. As long as these
types of services are not being offered, the Korean enginee-
ring, design, contracting and supplying firms may not be able
to participate in this market very easily.
As stated earlier, developing countries or owners may require
contractors to participate in equity sharing. This is highly
desirable for developing countries. They can reduce the
level of risk attached to external capital inflow and secure
the benefits of technology and expertise by expanding the
amount of direct investment in total external financing. As
an invester, this kind of investment could be made as a def-
ensive measure against local protectionism for certain comm-
odity exports. Contractors, by and large, are not familiar
with the nature of economic risk involved in such participa-
tion and have shied away from projects that require equity
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participation. Korean contractors, at least the major ones,
are in a better position to take advantage of this opportun-
ity. They are mostly members of very large conglomerates
which have in-house capabilities in barter trade, commodity
exchange, and in several cases financial and banking instit-
utions. Generally speaking, however, Korean contractors have
limited experience in working with international agencies and
have limited capability required by these international ag-
encies. Furthermore, they are inexperienced in financial
management. There are a few conglomerates in Korea who have
had limited experience in international financing, but their
knowledge is very limited and not transferable to the cntr-
acting arm. In as much as Korean capital is limited and the
very nature of financial management is new, the government
is not likely to provide substantial funds for this end.
The international construction market for the remainder of
the century is going to concentrate mainly on high technology
projects. Turnkey projects and integration of various fin-
ancing schemes, such as barter agreements, counter trade and
equity participation will be predominant characteristics.
It seems that Korean contractors have reached a point where
their traditional method of acquiring technology know-how
has reached its limit. Participation in joint ventures with
sophisticated technological partners is becoming more diff-
icult. This is due in part to the reluctance on the part of
the international owner of technology to share it with the
Korean counterpart and partly due to the fact that advanced
technology require a major technological base. This leads
us to the conclusion that the Korean construction industry
must revise its strategy with regard to the acquisition of
new technological know-how. At the same time it must recog-
nize the importance of indigenously developed advanced tech-
nologies through research and development programs both for
existing and new markets.
2.5.3 Markets in the Developed Countries
Finally, Koreanfirms have not seriously considered the markets
in developed countries. Although international construction
demand is on the decreasing side, the importance of the mar-
kets of the developed countries in the international constr-
uction market is actually increasing. According to "Histor-
ical Statistics of OECD", total size of the construction
market of OECD countries is about $924 billion in 1983.
Among them, the U.S. accounted for $307 billion (33.3 %),
Japan for $215 billion (23.3 %), total of EEC countries for
$249 billion (26.9 %) and the rest of OECD countries accounted
for $152 billion. No exact statistics of the size of the
construction market for the rest of the free world is avail-
able but it is generally estimated to about $300 billion.
The size of the construction market in the developed region
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is overwhelmingly larger than that of the developing countries.
This market, especially in North America, is not only large
and diverse, but also is undergoing certain change. In the
U.S. alone, the market is over $300 billion and all indicat-
ions are that it will grow to over 10 percent of U.S. GNP in
the next few years. This large and almost unexplored market
requires new materials, equipment, engineering and design,
as well as new management and financing. Although contract-
ing, subcontracting, and procurement policies and procedures
in the U.S. are in many respects different from those commonly
practiced in the international market place, they are, how-
ever, not insurmountable, and recently several European and
Japanese companies have been successful in penetrating this
market.
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Table 2.7.1 Regional Distribution of New Orders Contracted Abroad with
250 Largest Firms (billions of dollar)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1980-1984
Middle East 35.3 46.5 51.2 33.0 26.6 192.6
(32.5) (35.8) (41.6) (35.3) (33.0) (36.0)
Asia 15.9 21.4 23.5 15.4 18.3 94.5
(14.6) (16.5) (19.1) (16.5) (22.7) (17.6)
Africa 18.7 23.9 17.7 21.4 12.5 94.2
(17.2) (18.4) (14.4) (22.9) (15.5) (17.6)
Latin America 15.8 17.4 10.3 6.3 5.4 55.2
(14.5) (13.4) (8.4) (6.7) (6.7) (10.3)
Europe 12.3 9.8 11.1 9.5 9.2 51.9
(11.3) (7.5) (9.0) (10.1) (11.4) (9.7)
Canada 7.7 6.4 4.5 4.4 2.9 25.9
(7.1) (4.9) (3.7) (4.7) (3.6) (4.8)
U.S.A. 2.9 4.5 4.8 3.6 5.6 21.4
(2.7) (3.5) (3.9) (3.8) (7.0) (4.0)
Total 108.6 129.9 123.1 93.6 80.5 535.7
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.) (100.0)
Source: Engineering News Records
Note: Numbers in the parentheses denote percentage
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Table 2.7.2 Trend of Korean Overseas Construction Contracts by Region
billions of dollar (percentage)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1980-1984
Middle East 7.6 10.5 10.7 4.8 4.9 38.5
(76.8) (73.8) (77.5) (46.2) (74.2) (70.0)
Asia 0.7 1.4 2.4 1.2 0.8 6.5
(7.1) (9.8) (17.4) (11.5) (12.1) (11.8)
Africa 1.6 2.4 0.6 4.4 0.9 9.9
(16.2) (16.8) (4.3) (42.3) (13.6) (18.0)
Latin America - - * * * 0.1
(-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (0.2)
Europe - - - - - -
Canada - - - -
U.S.A.
Total 9.9 14.3 13.8 10.4 6.6 55.0
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Source: Engineering News Records
Note: * denote the amount less than 50 million dollars.
Table 2.7.3 Trend of U.S. Overseas Construction Contracts by Region
billions of dollar (percentage)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1980-1984
Middle East 8.9 10.4 18.5 12.7 10.7 61.2
(18.4) (23.6) (41.2) (43.2) (34.9) (31.0)
Asia 10.5 9.4 9.4 4.8 8.8 42.9
(21.7) (21.3) (20.9) (16.3) (28.7) (21.7)
Africa 4.0 3.2 2.8 2.4 1.6 14.0
(8.3) (7.3) (6.2) (8.2) (5.2) (7.1)
Latin America 9.8 9.1 3.9 1.7 1.6 26.1
(20.3) (20.6) (8.7) (5.8) (5.2) (13.2)
Europe 8.0 6.5 6.8 4.7 5.5 31.5
(16.6) (14.7) (15.1) (16.0) (17.9) (16.0)
Canada 7.1 5.5 3.6 3.1 2.5 21.8
(14.7) (12.5) (8.0) (10.5) (8.1) (11.0)
Total 48.3 44.1 44.9 29.4 30.7 197.4
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Source: Engineering News Records
Source: Engineering News Records
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Table 2.7.4 Trend of Japanese Overseas Construction by Region
billions of dollar (percentage)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1980-1984
Middle East 2.3 3.9 2.5 2.5 1.2 12.4
(56.1) (47.6) (26.9) (28.7) (16.4) (33.0)
Asia 1.4 2.4 5.6 4.8 4.4 18.6
(34.1) (29.3) (60.2) (55.2) (60.3) (49.5)
Africa 0.3 0.9 0.8 0.4 0.6 3.0
(7.3) (11.0) (8.6) (4.6) (8.2) (8.0)
Latin America 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.2 1.4
(2.4) (9.8) (1.1) (2.3) (2.7) (3.7)
Europe * 0,2 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.9
(-) (2.4) (2.2) (4.6) (1.4) (2.4)
Canada * * -
(-) (-) (-) .8 1.3
U.S.A. - 0.1 0.4 (11.0) (3.5)
(-) (-) (1.1) (4.6)
Total 4.1 8.2 9.3 8.7 7.3 37.6
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Source: Engineering News Records
Note: *denote the amounts less than 50 million dollar
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Table 2.7.5 Korean Overseas Construction Record by
millions of dollar
Type of Work
Type of work 1966-1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 Total Perceny
Civil 1,112 1,448 1,571 2,019 1,679 3,739 5,023 4,876 5,494 26,961 39.8
Road 443 94 254 286 210 1,087 2,317 752 324 5,767 8.5
Harbor 479 1,325 727 313 170 496 129 476 - '4,115 6.1
Other 190 29 590 1,420 1,299 2,156 2,577 3,648 5,170 17,079 25.2
Building 263 590 1,022 4,979 2,979 3,852 7,608 6,238 3,958 31,489 46.5
Mechanical 98 381 677 469 1,219 392 692 1,677 439 6,044 8.9
Electrical and
communication 24 66 219 621 470 271 295 580 501 3,047 4.5
Engineering 2 17 27 57 4 5 63 12 52 239 0.3
Source: Overseas Construction Association of Korea, Nongovernmental White Paper on Overseas Construction
Table 2.7.6 Trend of Localization in Middle East by Contract Amount
amount in millions of dollar
------------------------------~ ----A CA. Amount B. Total x 100 C. No of D. Total x 100
Year localized Contract ptOjefts- No. of
localized projects
1975 609.5 26,917.8 2.3 39 394 9.9
1976 2,366.2 37,485.4 6.3 46 428 10.7
1977 2,998.7 49,205.8 6.1 85 546 15.6
1978 2,336.1 31,751.8 7.4 83 560 14.8
1979 3,339.0 30,574.4 10.9 99 516 19.2
1980 6,540.1 38,800.9 16.9 254 783 32.4
1981 6,444.7 62,589.4 10.3 263 912 28.8
1982 8,794.8 45,667.5 19.3 291 868 33.5
1983 5,174.6 33,494.3 15.4 228 647 35.2
1984 6,419.3 22,979.5 27.9 315 720 43.8
Source: Middle East Economic Digests
Table 2.7.7 Comparison of Manpower Productivity between Korea: and Other
Developping Countries (1982)
Productivity Wage
Korea 100 100
Other developping
countries 78 56
Source: The Korean Embassy at Saudi Arabia
Note: The developping countries mean the average of Thailand, Bangladesh,
India, Pakistan, Philippine and Sri Lanka.
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CHAPTER 3
U.S. CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
3.1 Economical Characteristics
Construction is one of the most important parts of the
American economy and often referred to as an industry but is
more like a sector of the economy, such as manufacturing,
transportation, or services. It is not a single activity but
a group of activities loosely related to one another by the
nature of their products, technologies, and institutional
settings. Were construction viewed as an industry, it would
be considered one of the largest in the economy. As a sector,
it is one of the smallest, whether measured in terms of the
value of output, or number of persons employed in its activ-
ities.
3.1.1 Measures of Construction Activity
Construction involves both new construction and maintenance
and repair work. New construction is the larger part, but
maintenance and repair are significant. The value of new
construction in 1977 amounted to 72 percent of all construc-
tion. Maintenance and repair accounted for remaining 28 per-
cent. These percentages differ from those in 1972, when the
value of new construction accounted for 78 percent and maint-
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enance and repair construction for 22 percent. Maintenance
and repair work fluctuate in volume and perhaps expand most
rapidly when new construction is low. Building owners prob-
ably stretch out the life of structures by means of mainten-
ance and repair when new construction seems inadvisable.
New construction activity has accounted for about 11 percent
of the nation's GNP on average since World War II. This fig-
ure fluctuates, however, because construction follows busin-
ess cycles of its own. Recently, the constructionactivity
accounts for about 9 percent of GNP. Construction is Known
to be one of the most cyclical industries. Since 1967, there
have been three cyclical peaks: in 1968, 1973, and 1978.
Increase in the cost and reduction in the availability of
credit have been the chief causes of the downturns. The
trend in new construction put in place - adjusted for infla-
tion - has apparently been downward since 1973. The output
in 1980 was lower than any year since 1975. Table 3.1.1 also
shows that new construction has not kept up with the growth
of GNP, especially if both are measured in constant dollars.
From 1967 to 1980, new construction in constant dollars dec-
lined by 5 percent, while real GNP increased by 47 percent.
As a result, new construction dropped from 12 percent to 7
percent of real GNP. In current dollar terms, however, new
construction maintained a 9 to 11 percent share of GNP. The
construction industry employs 4.3 million people, about 5
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percent of the nation's labor force. Work in the construct-
ion industry is seasonal, so that the percentage of persons
employed in construction rises to more than 6 percent in
summer and fall to less than 4 percent in winter. The port-
ion of total employment in construction is less than the
portion of GNP because the GNP measurement is based on the
final use of products, not their intermediary stages. Cons-
truction involves the installation of materials and compon-
ents produced in manufacturing industry. The income origin-
ating in construction which excludes the value of input is
about 6 percent of the GNP, about same portion of the GNP as
construction employment is of total employment. The total
volume of U.S. construction output in 1984 reached #344 bil-
lion, of which $313 billion was in the domestic market and
$31 billion overseas. Approximately 18 percent of the dom-
estic activity is engaged in the public construction. The
remaining 82 percent of the domestic market is for private
construction and more than half of that is engaged in resid-
ential building (see table 3.1.2). Table 3.1.3 shows the
percentage distribution in 1982 of total new construction and
addition and alteration by type of structure and by ownership.
Several interesting points are observable.
-The relative role of public versus private ownership var-
ies greatly among the type of construction. Government agen-
cies are major purchasers of such items as highways, streets,
military facilities, and the like, but minor buyers of resid-
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ential construction. The government role as an owner is
large one, consisting in 1982 of 21.5 percent of all constr-
uction expenditures (public construction is keep decreasing
as compared with increasing private construction). Most of
these expenditures came from state and local government, but
much of the money spent by the states and localities was pro-
vided by the federal government. Federal construction expen-
ditures finance virtually all federally owned construction.
Thus, the value of federal construction related expenditures
is much greater than the value of federally owned new constr-
uction put in place. In fiscal year 1984, only 25 percent
of new construction expenditures were for federally owned
construction, while 55 percent were for structure owned by
state and local governments, and 20 percent were privately
owned structures (see table 3.1.4). State and local govern-
ments are the largest recipiants of federal construction-rel-
ated expenditures. Most of these federal disbursements to
states and local governments consists of grant-in-aid, alth-
ough there are several loan programs. State and local gov-
ernments rely heavily on federal assistance to finance their
construction projects (see table 3.1.5).
-There are thousands of government agencies in the U.S.,
and hundreds of thousands of private organizations. None
individually constitutes a large factor in the purchase of
construction. The federal government is the largest single
buyer of construction but accounted only 2.2 percent of all
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purchase in 1982. The producers of construction sell to a
very large and diverse group of buyers. The construction
industry is highly cyclical in nature, and its cyclicality
tends to vary by branch of the industry. The market demand
characteristics are quite different for the major branches
of the industry, and even for the specialized firms within
the industry. The construction industry is, in a sense, a
whole set of sub-industries, each with its own subset of
economic characteristics. The nonresidential general build-
ing branch, for example, is quite different from the heavy
construction branch, in terms of market demand, labor force
composition, sensitivity to national economic policy, and
the production elements of the actual construction process.
One very basic division of the industry in this regard can
be made between the residential and nonresidential sectors.
Private nonresidential construction tends to rise during booms
and fall during recessions and thus moves with the business
cycle, while private residential construction exhibit a coun-
tercyclical pattern and thus help stabilize the economy (see
table 3.1.6).
3.1.2 Construction Cost
Costs are among the most difficult to measure of all economic
statistics, and there are more pitfalls associated with con-
struction costs than most because the output of construction
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is so heterogeneous. However, because of the importance of
changes in construction costs, several government and private
agencies have undertaken the risky task of developing const-
ruction cost indexes. Table 3.1.7 shows trends in the Depart-
ment of Commerce composite cost index, construction workers'
average hourly earnings, the producer price index for all
construction materials, and interest rates on short-term
business loans. It should be noted that the composite cost
index is based on the costs of the various inputs used to
produce a great output, while the other three series reflect
prices of individual categories of inputs. This is not sim-
ply a theoretical distinction, since costs have increased
much faster than prices in the construction industry.
Interest rates have increased faster than material prices and
average hourly earnings although have fluctuated widely. The
composite cost index has increased faster than any of the
three price series. There are at least three explanations
for this development. First, unit labor costs have risen
faster than average hourly earnings because of declining pro-
ductivity. Second, financing costs have risen faster than
interest rates, because the interest rate is a multiplier
which is applied to the loan amount. Third, there are addi-
tional cost factors besides those listed in table 3.1.7, such
as taxes, rental costs, return on equity capital, overhead
costs, capital goods costs, and purchased services. Trends
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in unit labor costs are summarized in table 3.1.8. The rise
in average hourly earnings of construction workers has been
slightly slower than the rate for manufacturing workers.
However, there is an additional determinant of unit labor
costs: Productivity. The poor productivity record in recent
years has resulted in a serious rise in unit labor costs,
which exceeds even the increase in the Department of Commerce
composite cost index.
3.1.3 Productivity
Since the mid 1060s, average output has declined significantly
in the construction industry. In fact, the decline in cons-
truction productivity has been among the most serious in the
U.S. economy (see table 3.1.9). From 1965 to 1975, product-
ivity declined by 20 percent, an average annual rate of minus
1.6 percent. There are several conventional ways to measure
changes in productivity other than the method used in table
3.1.9. In this series, labor productivity is measured as the
real gross product originating (GPO) per hour; in rough terms,
it is the output of the construction industry less the mat-
erial inputs (all adjusted for inflation), divided by the
input labor hours. The decline in construction productivity
is of major concerns because of the importance of the const-
ruction industry and the magnitude of the decline. To date,
no study has fully explained the cause of the problem. There
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are, however, two general types of explanations for the sit-
uation. The first is that the statistics are inacurate. The
second is that productivity is declining because of a number
of things that have happened to construction since the early
1960s. The accuracy of productivity statistics have been
examined and there are three possible reasons of the errors
in measuring productivity. 1) The construction subsectors
with lower rates of productivity may have grown proportionally
greater in last two decades while the necessary changes in
statistical weight were not made. 2) Maintenance and repair
activities - which account for about 30 percent of the total
- may not have been properly measured. 3) Some of the defl-
ators used to adjust current dollar output are based on input
costs rather than output prices. If these deflators overst-
ate inflation, then real output and productivity of the con-
struction industry are understated. Although errors and
weakness have been found, it is unlikely that they could fully
explain the large drop in productivity.
Assuming that construction productivity has in fact declined
sharply since the mid 1960s, some of the possible explanations
are:-
-A change in the mix of construction toward maintenance and
repair work; It is very likely that productivity is lower in
maintenance and repair than new construction since it tends
to be smaller scale, less capital intensive, less standardized,
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and loses more time in start-up and clean-up.
-Regulation and regulatory delay; It is widely agreed that
regulations and regulatory delays have hurt construction pro-
ductivity, although the extent is not known. Construction
is one of the most regulated of all industries.
-Substitution of labor for capital and energy; A situation
that may be developing in construction is the substitution
of labor for capital and energy. Wage rates have not incr-
eased as rapidly as capital and energy costs. Since busin-
esses are interested in minimizing total costs rather than
simply labor costs, it is often economical to take actions
that reduce labor productivity.
-Fast tracking of construction projects; A practice that is
becoming common is fast tracking, which utilizes a number of
less efficient construction practices in order to build the
structure as quickly as possible. In an era of high financ-
ing costs, this is often the most economical strategy, but
it reduces labor productivity.
-Demographic characteristics of the labor force; There was
a shift in the age composition of the labor force toward
younger workers. In 1967, 13 percent of construction employ-
ees were under 25; by 1977 the proportion was 21 percent.
Most labor analyst agree that this development has had a neg-
ative effect on productivity, although the impact should not
be severe.
-Increased reliance on rented equipment; The industry has
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increasingly tended to rent construction equipment rather
than own it. This practice is economically efficient, but
reduces measured productivity in two ways. First, it reduces
productivity by limiting access to equipment. Second, equip-
ment rental is considered an expense, and is therefore not
included in the product of the construction industry.
3.1.4 Economic Conditions and Financial Performance
The economic conditions of the construction industry and the
financial performance of firms in the industry is to a sig-
nificant extent dependent upon factors external to both the
industry itself and to the construction process. Monetary
policy, which involves the expansion and contraction of the
money supply by the Federal Reserve and the subsequent effect
of those changes on the interest rate, has had its greatest
impact on the housing sector. Its impact falls in two areas,
on the potential owner of housing stock and on the resident-
ial contractors. The level of investment in residential con-
struction (and to a less degree in other types of construct-
ion) is highly sensitive to conditions in the capital markets
and to fluctuations in the interest rate. The most prevalent
method for owners to finance the purchase of residential pro-
perty has been through the mortgage, a long term credit ins-
trument generally covering in the range of 70 to 80 percent
of the purchase price. In last twenty years, three cyclical
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peaks of interest rates on short-term business loans can be
identified, that are 1970, 1974 and 1981. Those three cycl-
ical peaks coincide exactly with three cyclical troughs of
the private residential construction (see tables 3.1.6 and
3.1.7). The same trend can be observed in the number of new
housing starts. Fiscal policy, on the other hand, has its
greatest impact on the aggregate level of nonresidential con-
struction. The government exercises fiscal policy basically
through changes in the level of taxes and federal expenditures.
The effect on the construction industry is felt primarily
through the response of the private sector to the general
economic climate and is manifeted in the decision of industry
to invest or not to invest in capital facilities. A second
influence is felt through the government's purchase of cons-
truction, which accounts for about 20 percent of total cons-
truction activity. There has been substantial decline in
public sector construction relative to private construction.
However, the size of public construction is still large enough
to give a considerable impact on the industry.
The wide fluctuation in market demand exist for a number of
economic reasons; variety of demand composition, conditions
in the capital markets, the state of the national economy,
the seasonal nature of construction, and the local nature of
the markets. These facts, coupled with the impact of the
government, in its role as economic policy maker, purchaser,
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and financier of construction, create a climate of economic
instability in all sector of the industry.
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Table 3.1.1 Gross National Product and New Construction, 1965-1980
Gross New New Gross New New
national construction construction national construction construction
product (billions of as a percent product (billions of as a percent
(billions of current $) of GNP (billions of 1972 $) of GNP
Year current $) 1972 $)
1965 688.1 73.7 10.7 925.9 109.7 11.8
1966 753.0 76.4 10.2 918.0 109.5 11.9
1967 796.3 78.1 9.8 1,007.7 107.8 10.7
1968 868.5 87.1 10.0 1,051.8 114.4 10.9
1969 935.5 93.9 10.4 1,078.8 113.5 10.5
1970 982.4 94.9 9.7 1,085.6 107.0 9.9
1971 1,063.4 110.0 10.3 1,122.4 116.0 10.3
1972 1,171.1 124.1 10.6 1,185.9 123.9 10.4
1973 1,306.3 137.9 10.6 1,255.0 126.9 10.1
1974 1,412.9 128.5 9.8 1,248.0 109.1 8.7
1975 1,528.8 134.5 8.8 1,233.9 97.2 7.9
1976 1,702.2 151.1 8.9 1,300.4 105.0 8.1
1977 1,899.5 174.0 10.9 1,371.7 113.3 8.3
1978 2,127.6 205.5 9.7 1,436.9 116.9 8.1
1979 2,413.9 229.0 9.5 1,483.0 114.7 7.7
1980 2,628.8 227.8 8.7 1,480.7 102.8 6.9
percent change
1965-80 +282 +209 460 -6
1967-80 +230 +192 +47 -5
1970-80 +168 +140 +36 -4
Source: Construction Review, May/June, 1981
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Table 3.1.2 New Construction Put in Place in the U.S., 1983-1984
billions of dollar
Industry 1983 1984
Private construction
Residential building
Nonresidential building
Industrial
Commercial
Hospital and institutional
Other
Total
Farm construction
Public utilities
Telephone and telegraph
Electric light and power
Other
Total
All other private
Total private construction
Public construction
Buildings
Educational
Other
Total
Highways and streets
Military facilities
Conservation and development
Other public construction
Sewer systems
Water supply
Miscellaneous
Total
Total public construction
Total new construction
111.7
12.9
35.8
6.6
5.0
60.3
4.4
6.5
21.9
5.1
33.5
1.5
211.4
145.1 (46.4%)
13.7
48.1
6.3
6.0
74.1
2.9
7.2
19.5
7.1
33.8
1.9
257.8
5.4
11.9
17.3
14.2
2.6
4.8
5.3
2.1
4.5
11.9
50.8
262.2
5.6
12.3
17.9
16.3
2.8
4.7
6.2
2.6
4.7
13.5
55.2
(23.1%)
(0.9%)
(10.8%)
(0.6%)
(82.4%)
(5.7%)
(5.2%)
(0.9%)
(1.5%)
(4.3%)
(17.6%)
313.0 (100.0%)
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Source: Construction Review, September/October, 1985
Table 3.1.3 Percent Distribution of Value of Total New Constrcution and
Addition and Alteration by Ownership
Public Private
------------------ 
------------- 
--------- Total
State & Total Total public &
Type Federal local public private private
Residential 0.1 % 0.6 % 0.7 % 34.0 %a 34.7 %
Nonresidential
building 1.1 5.4 6.5 29.1 35.6
Public works
& utilities 1.0 13.3 14.3c 14 .9e 29.2
Other - - - 0.5 0.5
Total 2.2 19.3 21.5 78.5 100.0
Source: U.S., Department
Construction
Note:
of Commerce, Bureau of Census, 1982 Census of
a; includes nonhousekeeping buildings
b; industrial, educational, hospital, and other buildings
c; highways, streets, military facilities, conservation and develop-
ment, sewer systems, water supply facilities, and miscellaneous
public construction
d; includes nonresidential farm buildings
e; telephone and telegraph, railroad, electric light and power,
petroleum pipeline.
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Table 3.1.4 Federal Construction-Related Expenditures by Ownership
Category (millions of dollar)
Ownership category 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Government-owned 36,381 38,566 36,156 36,075 35,171 40,700
Federal 10,300 10,813 10,871 11,317 11,029 13,051
State & local 26,081 27,753 15,285 24,758 24,142 27,649
Privately-owned 12,629 13,877 11,652 11,377 8,593 9.809
Residential 7,539 8,321 8,115 8,437 6,044 6,264
Nonresidential 5,090 5,556 3,537 2,940 2,549 3,545
Total construction 49,010 52,443 47,808 47,452 43,764 50,509
expenditure
Source: Construction Review, March/April, 1985
Table 3.1.5 Federal Construction-Related Expenditures As a percentage
of the Value of New Construction Put in Place for Fiscal
Years 1980-1984 (percent)
Category 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
----------------------------------------- -----------------
Government-owned 67 71 72 70 65
Federal 106* 107* 112* 107* 101*
State & local 58 63 62 61 56
Privately-owned 7 7 7 6 4
Residential 8 9 11 8 5
Nonresidential 6 6 3 3 2
Total 21 22 21 19 15
----------------------------------- --------------------- --
Source: Construction Review, March/April, 1985
Note: * Expenditures for federally-owned construction exceed the value
of federally-owned construction put in place primarily because
of the inclusion of overseas construction, some maintenance and
repair construction, and costs other than construction, such as
land, installed equipment, and supervision.
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Table 3.1.6 Indexes of New Private Residential and Nonresidential
Construction Activities and Public Construction Activities
(1975 = 100, billions of 1977 dollar)
-------------------------- --- --------------
New private resid. New private nonres. New public const.
Year Amount Index Amount Index Amount Index
1970 57.581 102.7 35.692 127.4 17.922 108.4
1971 73.935 131.9 34.706 123.9 17.789 107.6
1972 86.701 154.6 35.294 126.0 16.992 102.8
1973 87.033 155.2 37.510 133.9 17.798 107.7
1974 66.393 118.4 33.379 119.2 17.101 103.5
1975 56.074 100.0 28.011 100.0 16.530 100.0
1976 67.737 120.8 27.642 98.7 14.630 88.5
1977 80.689 143.9 28.640 102.2 12.788 77.4
1978 81.226 144.9 32.224 115.0 13.550 82.0
1979 75.958 135.5 36.064 128.7 11.895 72.0
1980 60.911 108.6 35.444 126.5 12.540 75.9
1981 55.893 99.7 39.356 140.5 11.515 69.7
1982 50.900 90.8 41.856 149.4 10.904 66.0
1983 74.973 133.7 38.322 136.8 10.951 66.2
1984 85.681 152.8 45.396 162.1 10.917 66.0
Source: Construction Review, July/August, 1983, September/October, 1985
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Trends of Construction Costs and Input Prices
Deaprtment of Ccnm- Construction workers Producer price index Interest rates on
erce Composite Cost average hourly earn- for all construction short-term business
Year Index (1977=100) ings ($/hr.) materials(1977=100) loans(percent)
1970 56.8 5.24 54.9 8.48
1971 60.5 5.69 58.3 6.32
1972 64.1 6.06 61.8 5.82
1973 69.6 6.41 67.6 8.30
1974 81.8 6.81 78.5 11.28
1975 89.3 7.31 84.9 8.65
1976 92.4 7.71 91.6 7.52
1977 100.3 8.10 100.0 7.84
1978 113.0 8.66 111.4 9.80
1979 128.8 9.27 122.7 13.18
1980 143.2 9.94 130.0 15.17
1981 151.9 10.82 138.1 19.58
1982 154.1 11.63 140.5 14.69
1983 157.3 11.94 145.3 10.64
1984 163.7 12.12 149.5 12.02
Source: Construction Review, July/August, 1983, Septeanber/October, 1985
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Table 3.1.8 Average Earnings of Workers in Various Industries
-------------------------------------- 
------------------
Total nonfarm private ind. Construction Manufacturing
Year Hrs/week $/hour $/week Hrs/week $/hour $/week Hrs/week $/hour $/week
1970 37.1 3.23 119.83 37.3 5.24 195.45 39.8 3.35 133.33
1971 36.9 3.45 127.31 37.2 5.69 211.67 39.9 3.57 142.44
1972 37.0 3.70 136.90 36.5 6.06 221.19 40.5 3.82 154.71
1973 36.9 3.94 145.39 36.8 6.41 235.89 40.7 4.09 166.46
1974 36.5 4.24 154.76 36.6 6.81 249.25 40.0 4.42 176.80
1975 36.1 4.53 163.53 36.4 7.31 266.08 39.5 4.83 190.79
1976 36.1 4.86 175.45 36.8 7.71 283.73 40.1 5.22 209.32
1977 36.0 5.25 189.0 36.5 8.10 295.65 40.3 5.68 228.90
1978 35.8 5.69 203.70 36.8 8.66 318.69 40.4 6.17 249.27
1979 35.7 6.16 219.91 37.0 9.27 342.99 40.2 6.70 269.34
1980 35.3 6.66 235.10 37.0 9.94 367.78 39.7 7.27 288.62
1981 35.2 7.25 255.20 36.9 10.82 399.26 39.8 7.99 318.00
1982 34.8 7.68 267.26 36.7 11.63 426.82 38.9 8.49 330.26
1983 35.0 8.02 280.70 37.1 11.94 442.97 40.1 8.83 354.08
1984 35.3 8.33 294.05 37.7 12.12 456.92 40.3 9.18 373.63
1985 35.1 8.58 301.16 37.7 12.26 462.20 40.5 9.52 385.56
Source: U.S. Department
Feb., 1986
1 7"
.1.
1
1
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Fmployment and Earnings,
- construction
---- manufacturing
1977 = 100
-,r i
1970.
Year
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Table 3.1.9 Productivity Index*
Industry
for Construction and
(1972 = 100)
Manufacturing
Year Construction Manufacturing All business
1965 108.2 84.5 84.7
1966 105.3 85.4 87.3
1968 109.3 88.4 92.3
1969 99.1 89.9 92.5
1970 95.8 89.7 93.3
1971 100.8 95.1 96.5
1972 100.0 100.0 100.0
1973 95.5 105.4 102.5
1974 86.5 102.9 100.1
1975 89.6 105.9 102.3
1976 95.6 110.5 105.6
1977 93.7 113.4 108.2
1978 90.2 114.3 108.9
1979 83.9 115.1 107.6
1980 115.3 107.0
1981 105.3 109.6
1982 106.5 109.5
Source: J. E. Cremeans, Productivity in Construction Industry, Constru-
ction Review, May/June, 1981
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook
of Labor Statistics, 1983
Note: *Derived from BEA Gross Product Originating data and BLS hours
data from establishment survey
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3.2 Structural Characteristics
3.2.1 General
There are a vast number of construction firms, and they range
greatly in size. General contractors take responsibility for
an entire project but subcontract most of the actual constr-
uction. Most firms operate in a particular locality or reg-
ion, but some are national in scope. Those that are national
are generally specialized to a branch of sector or a type of
work. The major branches of construction by type of product
include residential buildings, nonresidential buildings,
highways, dams and other civil engineering projects, pipelines,
electric transmission lines, and industrial and power plants.
If the specilaization of contractors is used to categorize
them, the resulting major classifications are general contr-
actors, heavy and highway contractors and specialty trade
contractors (see table 3.2.1).
A large number of relatively small firms make up the constr-
uction industry. In 1982, 51 percent of all costruction est-
ablishments had total receipts of less than $25,000, while
less than 1 percent of all construction firms reported total
receipts of $5,000,000 or more, though these establishments
did accounted for 47 percent of total receipts of construct-
ion industry that year (see table 3.2.2). In 1982, Stearn-
127
Catalytic Corp. was reported as the contractor doing the lar-
gest domestic volume of business, but its total domestic
awards of $3.7 billiob gave it only 1.2 percent of the U.S.
construction market. Another way to look at the size of con-
struction firms is to consider the number of employees each
firm has. Of the 1.4 million construction industry establ-
ishments in 1982, 933,000 (67 percent) had no employees.
These establishments had receipts of $40.9 billions, which
was only about 11 percent of total industry receipts of $365.4
billion. About 46 percent of the contractors without emplo-
yees had receipts less than $10,000, strongly suggesting that
these are part-time business run by person who do not rely
on their small contracting business for their sole support.
All but 16 percent of the establishments without payroll had
receipts under $50,000 in 1982. Over three fourth of the
non-employee firms were specialty trade contractors, i.e.,
htose engaged in activities such as plumbing, heating, and
air-conditioning, and electrical work. These non-employee
firms comprised 70 percent of all trade contractors, but
received only 12.3 percent of all psecial trade contractors'
receipts (see table 3.2.3).
In 1982, the 457,000 costruction establishments with paid
employees accounted for 89 percent of all industry receipts.
Special trade contractors comprised the largest of the three
major groups in 1982 as measured by number of establishments
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(66.4 percent of total), by employees (about 56.4 percent),
ro by net construction receipts (51.7 percent). The second
largest group consisted of the general building contractors
and operative builders, which accounted for 27.3 percent of
the establishments, 23.5 percent of the employees, and 24.7
percent of net construction receipts. Heavy construction
contractors accounted for only 6.3 percent of the establish-
ments in 1982, but ebcause of relatively large average work-
force of those establishments they accounted for over one
fifth of all employees and nearly one fourth of net constr-
uction receipts.
The construction industry is fragmented. The total work
force (and total amount of construction activity) is divided
among a large number of diverse contractor establishments that
vary widely with respect to the average number of employees
per establishment, average annual payment per construction
worker, value added per employee, and share of total constr-
uction receipts subcontracted to others. Although the top 10
contractor classification groups accounted for 70.3 percent
of total construction employment in 1982, no single group
accounted for more than 12.1 percent of all construction emp-
loyees. Each of the sixth through tenth ranking categoies
accounted for 5 percent or less of total industry employment
(see table 3.2.4). .Within the 10 contractor groupings pres-
ented in the table 3.2.4, the average number of employees per
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establishment varied from a high of about 54.2 for heavy con-
struction n.e.c., to 4.3 for general contractors of single
family houses.
3.2.2 Scale of Operation
98 percent of establishments with payroll had less than 50
employees on an average annual basis. These establishments
accounted for 60 percent of total industry employment, 54 per
cent of net construction receipts and 52 percent of total
construction industry value added. At the other end of the
size scale, less than one tenth of one percent of all estab-
lishments employed 500 or more employees, and these accounted
for about 12.1 percent of all industry employees, 13.2 per-
cent of net construction receipts, and 14.8 percent of total
value added. Medium-sized firms, having 50 to 499 employees,
accounted for 2 percent of the establishments, 28 percent of
employees, 32 percent of construction receipts, and 33 per-
cent of the industry's total value added (see table 3.2.5).
The small establishments predominate the general building
contractors building single family houses. The predominance
of small establishments in single-family houses suggests that
any economies of scale that exist in building single-family
houses are counterbalanced by the superior ability of small
firms, which often have knowledge of local zoning practices,
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local building codes and inspection procedures, and consumer
tastes. It also suggests that the subcontracting system work
well in giving small contractors who may have large amount
of capital invested in specialized machonery and equipment
access to the services of other contractors on a when needed
basis. However, if single-family house contractors are excl-
uded from general building contractors and operative builders,
composition becomes different. Small firms coexist with med-
ium and large establishments, but do not have a large share
of the business. Establishments with fewer than five emplo-
yees had only 11 percent of the total number of employees,
those with fewer than 10, only 23 percent, and fewer than 50
accounted for 57 percent. At the other end of the scale,
establishments with 50 to 249 workers employed 22 percent and
those with 250 or more workers accounted for 17 percent of
the workers.
The coexistence of large and small firms reflects the general
building contractors' practice of subcontracting operation
requiring highly skilled workers or expensive equipments to
the special trade contractors. It also reflects the relative
ease of entry because of low capital requirements for some
contracting business (e.g., single-family houses), and high
capital requirements for others (e.g., heavy construction
general contractors). The failure of large firms to dominate
construction as they do in the manufacturing sector has been
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attributed to a lack of economies of scale for most types of
contractors, and relative importance of the management func-
tion in creating a nonstandardized, custom-built product
under unpredictable weather and labor market conditions.
3.2.3 Subcontractors and Other Participants
Approximately one fourth of total construction receipts were
subcontracted to other construction establishments (see table
3.2.6). However, the portion subcontracted varied widely
both within the 3 major contracting groups and within 10 lar-
gest industry categories which accounted about 70 percent of
all industry employees. Among the 3 major contracting groups,
subcontracting to others by general building contractors and
operative builders accounted for 70.8 percent of all work.
subcontracted to others; heavy construction contractors acc-
ounted for 16 percent and special trade contractors 12.2 per-
cent. General contractors, nonresidential builders other
than industrial builders and warehouse had the highest share
among the 10 largest industry categories of work subcontracted
to others. Within the general building contractors and oper-
ative builders' category, there was a tendency for the share
of work subcontracted to others increase with the size of the
establishment. Establishments with fewer than 5 employees
subcontracted about 34 percent of their total construction
receiptsto others; the percentage of work subcontracted grad-
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ually increases to 58 percent for the firms employing 250 or
more persons (see table 3.2.7).
Together with the construction phase, there are many other
steps to a projects, including assessment of need, prelimin-
ary planning, design, and operation and maintenance among
others. Each project requires the participation of many
different people, such as architects, engineers, contractors,
subcontractors, and suppliers from many different organizat-
ions. In most case, these participants are independent of
one another, and for each project a group of participants is
brought together as an ad hoc team, usually for the first time
under temporary contract. These independent participants
engage in the project only when their particular expertise
is needed, and have few opprotunities to establish working
relationships which can be extended to other projects. The
outcome is the dispersion of the management function of sin-
gle project among these many independent participants, and
this, along with the naturally occurring lack of continuous
working relationships, result in the cordination, organizat-
ion, and operation of projects being considerably less eff-
icient than might be possible if these participants were more
closely tied together in a vertically integrated firms.
There is, however, an increasing tendency toward some vert-
ical integration, such as architecture-engineer design firms
and design-ocnstrut firms, especially in the alrger corporat-
ions.
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3.2.4 Specialization and Fragmetnation
Many contractors specialize in a particular kind of constr-
uction work. General contractors tend to specialize more
than specialty trade contractors, and their most frequent
specialization is residential building. The BUreau of Census
defines specialization as having over half of the firm's rec-
eipts from a given type of construction. By this definition,
about 90 percent of them concentrated their efforts on one
type of project to the exclusion of others. Firms that spec-
ialize in residential building, especially the construction
of single-family homes, are most likely to do that type of
work exclusively, while firms specializing in other kinds of
construction tend more often to have some receipts from out-
side of their area of specialty.
The structural characteristics of the construction industry
have arison in response to the demand placed upon the indus-
try. The specialization is necessitated by many of the prod-
uct characteristics, usch as complexity, continuously chang-
ing technology, custom-built nature and the great variety of
product types. The fragmentation gives firms much greater
flexibility and makes regrouping of participants reasonably
feasible. This, in turn, helps lessen the necessity for con-
traction and expansion of individual firms as they adjust to
the frequent changes in the type and level of construction
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demand. Other features, such as a relatively low level of
capital investment (see table 3.2.8) and floating labor force,
enable firms to contract and expand to a limited extent if
necessary. It should be noted, however, that a small number
of general contracting firms, primarily the larger one, gen-
erally tend to be diversified within the industry. It is nat
uncommon for a general costruction firm with gross revenues
of $100 million or more to be engaged in a variety of const-
ruction work, which may include general (nonresidential),
highway and street, and heavy construction. The larger the
firm, the greater is the tendency for this kind of diversif-
ication within the industry. The fluctuating demand, along
with the fact that constructed products are immobile, requires
that a firm must be small if it plans to exist in local bus-
iness only, and this is still the most common situation, al-
though larger national firms which are capable of necessary
mobility are increased in number. Many of the features dis-
cussed above help explain the rather limited mass production
in the industry, with the fluctuating demand playing a part-
icularly important role.
3.2.5 Geographical Scope of Market
The overwhelming majority of the value of construction put-
in-place by contractors is performed by contractors working
close to the home base 'in their home city, region, or state
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(see table 3.2.9). For the industry as a whole in 1982, 84
percent of the construction work was done by establishments
located in the home state. Groups reporting a high percent-
age of construction receipts coming from their home state
include general building contractors specializing in single-
family houses (94 percent), operative builders (95 percent),
and glass and glazing contractors (90 percent). Among the
factors contributing to the geographic concentration of work
are the variations in building codes and lack of reciprocity
among jurisdictions with respect to licensing requirements
for both contractors and some of the skilled trades (e.g.,
plumbers and electricians). In addition, the small firms
might not want to bid on jobs at a distance as long as some
work is available locally, since this would involve spreading
limited management and supervisory resources over too wide a
geographic area. Also, out-of-area small establishments would
ordinarily be at disadvantage competing with local firms which
have better local business contacts and better knowledge of
local construction labor market. Significant differences do
appear, however, between the primary industry branches, most
notably in the heavy construction contractors. In that group,
a lower portion of the construction receipts was derived from
work in the home state. This is no doubt due to a variety
of reasons. Their market opportunities tend to be geograph-
ically more diversified, in that a large proportion of the
types of projects performed by heavy construction contractors,
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such as power plants, dams, and marine facilities, are large
dollar volume but are built much less frequently than "gen-
eral" construction. Those segments of the industry with
higher than average capital investment per construction worker
operate over a wider geographical area in order to minimize
the adverse effects associated with idle machinery and equip-
ment.
3.2.6 Discontinuity of Firms
Another significant feature of the construction industry is
tis ease of entry and exit. The rate of entry to and exit
from the construction industry is generally much higher than
htose of other industries (see tables 3.2.10 and 3.2.11).
The many features of the industry that were discussed above,
along with high growth rate of the industry, the high rate
of exit of firms from the industry, and the fact that estab-
lished firms have little in the way of an absolute cost or
product differentiation advantage over potential entrant firms,
make entry to the industry quite feasible and easy.
One more contribution to the high rate of discontinuance of
firms in the construction industry is the industry's high
rate of business failure (see tables 3.2.12 and 3.2.13). In
1976, over 18 percent of all business failures were constr-
uction business, accounting for 14 percent of the liabilities
of all failing business. A Dun and Bradstreet study came up
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with a list of what seems to be the major underlying cause
of business failures in construction industry (see table 3.2.
14). The study shows that, in 1976 in 92.1 percent of the
cases, management, due to lack of managerial experience, or
incompetence, was the underlying cause of the failure. These
findings are not surprising since managers in the construct-
ion industry, especially in the smaller firms, are often just
men who have risen from the ranks of workers. However, with
the trend toward larger firms and the emphasis on the manage-
ment, there is strong trend toward more professional manage-
ment in the industry today.
3.2.7 Legal Form of Organization
There are three major forms of organization for construction
firms: the individual proprietorships, the partnerships, and
the corporations. Other less common legal forms of organiz-
ation such as limited partnership and subpartnership, may
also be used, and on very large and complex projects, several
construction firms may pool their resources in a joint vent-
ure which will be desolved once the project is completed and
the proceeds have been properly distributed. According to
the 1982 Census, there were 988,480 individual partnerships,
accounting for 71 percent of all construction establishments.
These individual proprietorships accounted for total business
receipts of $39.6 billion, or 11 percent of total business
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receipts of all establishments. Establishments classified
as corporations accounted for 25 percent of all establishments
and 84 percent of total business receipts. Partnerships acc-
ounted for 4 percent of all establishments and 5 percent of
all total business receipts (see table 3.2.15). Moreover,
conglomerates have become more common in the industry. In
the area of residential construction, several large nonbuild-
ing corporations have acquired established building, design
and real estate development firms as subsidiaries. Total
constrcution receipts for all construction establishments
with payroll in 1982 amounted to $312 billion. Establishments
of multiunit companies accounted for 31 percent of the total
construction receipts. On the other hand, establishments of
single unit companies accounted for 97 percent of the number
of employer establishments and 69 percent of the total cons-
truction receipts (see table 3.2.16).
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Table 3.2.1 Summary Statistics for Establishments With and Without
Payroll: 1982 and 1977
AI establishments Establishments without payroll Establishments with payroll
Propri Prop- ,/' Proprie.
Industry trs nd AN tors and All tors and A
working All e business working business working All em- busti-ss
Number partners ployees" receipts Number partners receipts Number partners ployees" rece ;•
A B C D E F G H I J K
1982
Construction Industres
and subdviders and
developers ...... 1 39 309 1 089 667 A4 275 070 365 420 747 932 608 930 114 40 908 315 456 701. 159 553 4 275 070 324 512 432
Constructlon ndustres'b . 1 3 228 1 068 575 4 234 887 356 049 302 912 452 909 754 34 961 402 450 776 158 821 4 234 887 321 087 900
General building contracors
and operative builders . 3084 428 211 178 993 629 131 060 477 181 248 174 480 13 9060 706 123 180 36 698 993 629 117 099 771
Heavy construction general
contractors......... S 55 36 652 852 065 73 321 457 30 371 30 367 2 297 883 28 187 6 285 52 065 71 023 574
Specal trade contractors -.-. 1 6 241 620 744 2 389 193 151 667 367 700 833 704 907 18 702 813 299 408 115 837 2 389 193 132 964 554
Plunmbing. heating, and air
conditiornng ............. 122 733 82 310 512 004 36 001 797 62 490 62 549 2 480 358 60243 19761 512 004 33 521 439
Electrical work ............ 89 619 61 571 434 764 28 060 308 50 056 49 779 1 619223 39 563 11 792 434 764 26 441 C85
Subdividers and developers,
n.e --------..........----- ..... 81 21 092 40 183 9 371 444 20 156 20 360 5 946 913 5 925 732 40 183 3 424 531
1977
Construction Industries
and subdividers and
developers......... 1 200 407 1 013 961 4 272 659 244 015 908 720 393 734 652 20 150 970 480 014 279 309 4 272 659 224 664 938
Construction ndustries' I 183 221 996 942 4 233 658 239 426 850 708 285 719 381 17 804 427 474 936 277 561 4 233 658 221 622 423
General bulding contractors
and operatve bullders ........ 6 320 219 077 1 180 747 98 116 714 130 349 130 596 8 330 156 155 971 8 481 1 180 747 89 786 558
Heavy construction general
contractors.................. SS 210 37 449 917 083 51 674 514 23 915 24 366 946 739 31 295 13 083 917 083 50 727 775
Specal trade contractors ..... 841 91 740 416 2 135 828 89 635 622 554 021 564 419 8 527 532 287 670 175 997 2 135 828 81 108 090
Plumbingk heating. and air
-conditioning ------ 106 603 79 806 458687 22 650 620 50 168 51 106 1 219435 56435 28 698 458 687 21 431 165
Electrical work.,- .. 75958 58 230 356 591 15 213 602 39 194 39 656 731 760 36 764 18 574 356 591 14 481 E-42
Subdividers and developer,
n.e.c .... ------------ 17 18 17 019 39 001 5 389 058 12 108 15 271 2 346 543 5 078 1 748 39 001 3 042 515
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, 1982 Census of
Construction Industry
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Table 3.2.2 Summary Statistics for Establishments With and Witout
Payroll by Receipts Size Class: 1982
(thousands of dollar)
VIdustry
Construction
ktdustries and
subdividers and
gevelopers ..........
$10,000.000 or more ...........
$5,000,000 to $9,999,999 .....
$2,500,000 to $4,999,999 ......
$1,000.000 to 52.499.999 ......
o500.000 to $999,999 ..........
$250,000 to $499.999 ..........
100,000 to 3249,999 ..........$50.000 to $99.999 ..........
$25.000 to $49,999 ............
Less than $25,000 .............
$10.000 to $24.999 ..........
$5.000 to 59.999 ............$2,000 to $4,999 ............
Less Uhan 2,000 ............
Number
A
1 369 309
4233
5 558
11 344
31 533
45860
74 151
159 169
162 283
183722
711 435
(NA)(NA)(NA)9NAW
AlD estabishments
Proprie-
tors and
workingpartners
B
1 089 667
456
509
1 072
4 143
9 655
25 587
90 829
122 968
158 387
676 058
(NA)
(NA)
Al e-
ployees"
C
070
783
138
481
884
250
204
311
553
261
206(NA)
(NA)(NA)(NA)
Al
business
receipts
D
365 420 747
132 186 488
38 357 518
39 457 225
48 536 868
31 983 041
25 964 624
25 038 233
11 488 056
6 495 566
5 913 125
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
(NA)
Estabihr --itns Rithcut payrof
Number
E
932 608
ISO
234
598
2 194
4643
11 696
45 278
82 646
133 890
651 279
225 580
160 930
157 018
107 751
Proprie-
tors and
working
partners
F
930 114
'163
289
691
2 361
4 227
10 636
44 611
84 216
134 902
648 018
224 895
160 100
156 197
106 826
An
business
rece'pts
40 908 315
4 465 874
1 594 514
'2 038 368
3 298 986
3 181 710
3 992 491
6 774 319
5 694 559
4 667 585
5 199 909
3 544 747
1 093 333
454 078
107 751
Number
H
456 701
4083
5 324
10 746
29 339
41 217
62 455
113 911
79 637
49 832
60 156
(NA)(NA)(NA)(NA)
Establishments wi~ pajr:I
Proprie-
tors and
working
partners
I
159 553
293
220
381
1 782
5 428
14 951
46 218
38 752
23 485
28 040(NA)(NA)(NA)(NA)
All em-
ployees"
J
4 275 070
1 078 780
384 138
449 451
635 884
489 250
439 204
453 311
187 553
66 261
71 206(NA)
(NA)(NA)(NA)
AX
bus;ness
rece :ts
K
324 512 432
127 720 6"4
36 763 OC4
37 418 8.7
45 237 U2
28 801 331
21 972 133
18 263 9:4
5 793 497
1 627 981
713 215(NA)
(NA)
Source: 1982 Census of Construction Industry
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Table 3.2.3 Distribution of Establishments Without Payroll
Among Major Group of classification
Establishments without payroll
Percent of Percent of
total all business
Industry establishments receipts
General buliding contractor
and operative builders 19.4 34.2
Heavy construction
general contractors 3.3 5.6
Specialty trade contractors 75.1 45.7
Subdividers and developers, n.e.c. 2.2 14.5
Source: Construction Review, September/October, 1985
Table 3.2.4 Distribution of Employees Among the Top 10
Contractor Classification
Number Percent of
of
employeesIndustry
all
Rank employees
Plumbing, heating and air
conditioning
Electric work
Heavy construction, n.e.c
General contractors,
nonresidential buildings, n.e.c.
General contractors, single
family houses
Highways and street construction
Plastering, drywall and
insulation work
Roofing and sheet metal work
Heavy construction, water, sewer
and utility lines
Concrete work
Total
All other construction industries
Total employment in construction
industries with payroll
512,004
434,764
415,199
359,856
309,614
212,610
199,790
191,489
186,674
157,241
2,979,241
1,255,646
4,234,887
12.1
10.3
9.8
4 8.5
7.3
5.0
4.7
4.5
4.4
3.7
70.3
29.7
100.0
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Source: Construction Review, September/October, 1985Source: Construction Review, September/October, 1985
--------------------------------------------------------
Table 3.2.5 Selected Statistics for Establishments With Payroll by Industry Group
and Employment Size Class: 1982
Selected statistics
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES AND
SUBDIVIDERS AND DEVELOPERS
Number of establishments ...................
Al employees" ............................
Payroll, all employees .............----------------.........
Constrnction worker hours (thousands) ........
All business iocoipts----------........................------..
Total construction receipts ...................
Not co.tuction rocoptot.......--..--..-..--..---
Value addodtt-----------------------------
Payments for materials, compononts, suppfles,
and fuels-.................----...........---------------------
Payments for construction work subcontracted
to others .....----------------------..........................----
Runlal paymnts for machinery, oquipmont. and
structures --------------------------------
Capital expenditures, other than land ..........
End-of-year gross book value of depreciable
assets ..................-----------..............-----------------....
Total
456
4 275
78 665
5 568
324 512
312 178
233 267
145 965
96 355
78 911
4 511
5 222
56 742
Establishments with an average of-
1 to 4
employees
284
566
5 905
672
30 713
29 727
24 307
13 996
10 870
5 330
329
559
7 324
6 to O
employees
85 449
559 039
7 598 384
648 808
31 654 781
30 590 120
25 057 740
14 937 173
10 782 629
5 532 380
428 850
596 375
6 778 633
10 to 19
employees
47 954
641 525
10 426 802
768 058
41 608 127
40 258 518
31 00H 732
19 412 520
13 356 767
8 359 785
590 435
729 714
8 003 272
20 to 49
employees
27 207
810 300
15 338 967
1 045 029
63 174 062
61 070 900
45 734 2680
28 106 006
19 052 745
15 336 632
910 392
1 040 742
10 980 396
50 to 90
employees
7 090
482 731
10 376 185
677 229
44 255 187
42 717 237
30 776 108
19 509 658
12 408 506
11 941 128
700 358
761 777
7 158 798
100 to 249
employees
3 126
462 999
375 793
669 864
526 164
104 088
264 063
482 858
886 215
839 225
700 576
761 089
7 448 517
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, 1982 Census of Construction Industry
250 to 490
employees
694
232 220
5 373 963
337 147
23 541 687
22 578 633
15 318 003
9 940 551
10 505 373
7 260 540
338 342
389 776
4 096 217
600 to 999
employees
234
157 945
3 743 507
237 866
16 908 665
16 294 739
10 t92 769
8 957 507
(D)
5 401 970
188 987
156 520
1 686 822
1,000
employees
or more
121
361 415
9 526 103
511 596
29 130 469
26 836 641
19 027 522
14 622 133
7 492 064
6 909 119
324 451
227 242
3 265 024
_ C~__~~ __ __ __
__
---
·--c------~
Table 3.2.6 Percentage of Subcontracting Within Major Contracting Groups
Percent of total Percent of industry
construction receipts subcont-
Industry receipts racted to other
firms
General building contractors and
operative builders 36.3 49.3
Heavy construction general
contractors 21.6 18.8
Specialty trade contractors 41.5 7.5
Subdividers and developers, n.e.c. 0.6 37.2
Constrcution industries, and
subdividers and developers 100.0 25.3
Source: Construction Review, September/October, 1985
Table 3.2.7 Percentage of Subcontracting for General Building Contractors
and Operative Builders by Employment Size Class
(thousands of dollars)
Size class
Total
construction
receipts
Payments
subcontractors
Percentage
subcontract
1-4 11,831 4,049 34.2
5-9 11,189 4,120 36.8
10-19 14,337 6,115 42.7
20-49 22,854 11,454 50.1
50-99 16,662 8,948 53.7
100-249 15,696 9,225 58.8
250 or more 20,670 11,961 57.9
Total 113,239 55,872 49.3
Source: Construction Review, September/October, 1985
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Table 3.2.8 Assets of Corporate Firms in Contract Constrcution and
Various Other Industries: 1965
Industry Number of firms Total assets Assets per
(in millions) firm
All industries 1,427,606 $1,736,349 $1,316,000
Agriculture 27,582 6,765 245,000
Mining 13,326 19,560 1,468,000
Construction 113,403 ..26,794 236,000
Manufacturing 186,613 372,583 1,997,000
Transportation and
utilities 59,846 187,390 3,131,000
Trade 441,538 126,945 2,875,000
Finance, insurance and
real estate 389,634 965,042 2,477,000
Services 188,284 33,727 179,000
Source: Economics of Construction Industry
Table 3.2.9 Construction Receipts for Establishments With Payroll by
Location of Construction Work
1982 Total construction receipts
Construction work done by establishments
in the home states
Number
Construction receipts
Construction work done by establishments
in other states
Number
Construction receipts
1977 Total construction receipts
$312,178,494
446,389
262,458,787
78,355
49,719,707
214,844,319
Source: 1982 Census of Construction Industry
Note: in thousands of dollar
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Table 3.2.10 Rates of Entry of Firms in Contract Construction and Other
Industries
Industry 1946 1951 1957 1962
All industries 190.0 80.4 97.6 90.6
Construction 478.0 143.0 122.0 127.0
Manufacturing 238.0 87.0 75.0 79.0
Services 190.0 72.7 87.6 99.2
Retail trade 152.0 67.5 86.2 83.1
Wholesale trade 216.5 77.1 75.8 76.5
All other 127.4 88.7 88.5 87.4
Source: Economics of Construction Industry
Table 3.2.11 Rates of Discontinuance of Firms in Contract Construction
and Various Other Industries
Industry 1946 1951 1957 1962
All industries 64.3 68.0 82.2 81.5
Construction 130.5 116.4 122.4 133.2
Manufacturing 92.0 70.5 87.3 91.5
Services 71.5 63.6 65.4 73.0
Retail trade 49.9 62.0 71.1 78.1
Wholesale trade 54.6 50.3 56.1 61.1
All other 75.5 67.0 67.9 71.6
Source: Economics of Construction Industry
Note:
Discontinuance rate = Number of firms leaving the industry per 1,000
firms in operation
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Table 3.2.12 Number and Size of Contractor Failures
Type of contractors
U.S. total Gen. contractor Bldg. subcon. Other Const. total
Year Number Liab. Nunber Liab. Nunber Liab. Number Liab. Number Liab.
1976 9,628 3,011 716 262 940 137 114 30 1,770 429
1974 9,915 3,053 714 368 1,023 126 103 33 1,840 527
1972 9,566 2,000 513 92 777 86 85 16 1,375 194
1969 9,154 1,142 626 95 860 59 104 18 1,590 172
1967 12,364 1,265 867 239 1,243 71 151 13 2,261 324
Source: Quarterly Failure Report, Dun & Bradstreet Inc.
Table 3.2.13 Number of Business Failures and Value of Liabilities
Number of Failures liabilities ($ millions)
Industry 1967 1972 1976 1967 1972 1976
All industries 12,364 9,566 9,628 1,265 2,000 3,011
Mining & nanufacturing 1,832 1,576 1,360 326 767 1,122
Const. contractors 2,261 1,375 1,770 324 194 429
Wholesale trade 1,246 965 1,028 136 250 414
Retail trade 5,696 4,398 4,139 333 558 557
Commercial services 1,329 1,252 1,331 145 232 490
Source: Quarterly Failure Report, Dun & Bradstreet Inc.
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Table 3.2.14 Causes of 1,770 Construction Failures in 1976
Underlying causes Percent Apparent causes Percent
Neglect 1.0 Due to Bad habbits 0.2
Poor health 0.6
Marital difficulties 0.1
Other 0.1
Fraud 0.3 On the part of the Misleading name -
principals as False financial statement 0.2
reflected by Prehrediated overbuy -
Irregular disposal of assets -
Other 0.1
lack of experience in As evidenced by* Inadequate sales 43.2
the line 10.9 Peavy operating expenses 15.9
Lack of mrnagerial Receivables difficulties 15.1
experience 13.4 Inventory difficulties 0.8
Unbalanced experience* 23.4 Excessive fixed assets 2.6
Incompetence 44.4 Poor location 0.6
Campetitive weakiess 30.7
Other 0.8
Disaster 0.9 Such as Fire 0.1
Flood -
Burglary -
Fmployee's fraud 0.1
Strike
Other 0.7
Reason unknown 5.7
Total 100.0
Source: The Business failure Record 1976, Dun & Bradstreet Inc.
*Experience not well rounded in sales, finance, purchasing, and production on the part of
the individual in case of a proprietorship, or of two or more partners or officers
constituting a nanaganent unit.
mBecause same failures are attributed to a canbination of apparent causes, the total of
these apparent causes exceed the total of the corresponding percent column on the left.
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Table 3.2.15 Summary Statistics for Establishments With and Without Payroll by Legal Form
of Organization for Industry Groups and Industries: 1982
Industry group, Industry, and legal form
of organizatlon
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES
AND SUBDIVIDERS AND
DEVELOPERS
All establishments .............
Corporations ...--....................
Individual proprietorships .....--- ......
Partnerships ..-......................
Other -........................... ____
Numbers
1 389
349
988
50
All establishments
topdre-
tore and
working
partners
089 667
988 480
101 187
All fh-
ployees""
C
4 275 070
3 754 159
389 284
124 310
7 416
All
business
receipts
D
365 420
306 9941
39 624
18 369
433
Establishments without payroll
Number
932 608
34 771865 560
32 277
Propde-
tore and
working
partners
930 114
865 560
64 554
AlD
business
receipts
908 315
109 488
040 812
758 015
Establishments with payroll
Number
Proprie-
tors and
workingpartners
159 553
.%122 920
36 633
Al em-ployees**
4 275 070
3 754 159
389 284124 310
7 416
Table 3.2.16 Selected Statistics for Establishments With Payroll by
Organization, and Type of Operation: 1982
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES AND SUBDIVIDERS AND
DEVELOPERS
Legal form of organization and type of operation:
l establishments ..............................................
Corporations........-----------..............................
Individual proprietorships .....-----------......................
Partnerships -----...-----.....---............................
Other' ...............-.........-- -- . ......... _._____......
Establishments of multiunit companies .....................-......
Establishments of single-unit companies...................
Number of
establish-
ments'
A
456 701
315 008
122 920
18 316
466
11 627
445 084
Al emrn-
ployees"
B
4 275 070
3 754 068
389 284
124 310
7 416
1 009 619
3 265 460
Payroll. all
employees
C
78 685
73 112
3 519
1 913
120
25 111
53 553
Total
construction
receipts
D
312 178
287 090
15 307
9 358
422
97 949
214 229
Industry, Legal Form of
Payments
for
construction
work sub-
contracted
to others
E
78 911
74 392
1 724
2 697
95
29 543
49 367
Net
construction
receipts"
F
233 267 426
212 697 236
13 582 262
6 660 403
327 525
68 405 956
164 861 470
Value
added"
145 965 137
133 801 900
7 921 321
4 051 761
190 155
45 342 566
100 622 571
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, 1982 Census of Construction Industry
Note: Amounts in thousands of dollar
All
business
receipts
324 512
298 884
15 583
9 611
433
i
E
E
I
3.3 Operational Characteristics
It may be helpful to look at the operational characteristics
of the companies in construction industry to better underst-
and industry. By reviewing and comparing the operational
characteristics of the companies, some logical grouping of
firms by subsectors of the industry is necessary, even though
all of the firms do not necessarily fall easily into such
neat grouping as many of them (especially the bigger compan-
ies) offer services in diverse areas. The five types of firms
which will be examined include:-
-general (residential and nonresidential) building contr-
actors
-general heavy and highway contractors
-general process-plant contractors
-builder-developers
-electrical and mechanical subcontractors
These five groups do not precisely follow the SIC format for
contract construction. However, the categories were modified
to more closely reflect the typology actually existing in the
industry. We will examine the general operational charact-
eristics of each of five groups and review how these charac-
tristics are reflected to the ENR's Top 400 contractors'list-
ing as this survey also include the list of top 50 design-
constructors, top 75 program and construction managers, top
50 general building contractors and top 50 heavy contractors.
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3.3.1 The Heavy-Process Plant-Design Contractors
This group of firms engages in the construction of industrial
projects for manufacturing industries and electrical utilit-
ies. Projects built by firms in this group typically include
large and highly technical process plant complexes, such as
amnufacturing plants, both fossil-fuel and nuclear power pl-
ants and chemical process plants. Probably the most firms
do this type of work are design constructors. That is, they
do both the engineering and design for the facility, and also
perform the construction.
The engineering and design would include economic feasibility
studies,master planning and site location studies, construc-
tion cost estimates and analyses, and engineering and design.
In the construction phase, they may act as the prime contr-
actors for the project, performing a significant percentage
of the on-site work with their own forces, or they may act
as a construction manager, managing the major prime contrac-
tors, in addition to performing the purchasing, inspecting,
and expediting fucntions, and assisting the owner through
start-up and initial operations.
Most firms in this group consider themselves to be both pro-
fessional organizations, by virtue of their capability and
responsibility in the area of design and engineering, and
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construction organizations, in that they perform either the
construction or construction management functions. Projects
are often undertaken on a turnkey basis, whereby the firm is
given total responsibility over both the design and constr-
uction phases. Firms in this group will seldom take constr-
uction responsibility on a project for which they have not
also had design responsibility. In general, this is the only
sector of the construction industry in which design-build is
clearly the dominant mode.
Projects undertaken by firms in this group tend to be longer
in duration, higher in cost, and geographically more divers-
ified than in any other sector of the construction industry.
geographical diversification tends to be much more prevalent
for firms in this group. Many of them are multi-national
operations, and have operating subsidiaries or principal off-
ices in foreign countries. Their multi-national activities
account for a significant proportion of their total revenue.
Companies in this group take a large portion of ENR Top 400
listing and larger portion in the higher rank group such as
top 50.
3.3.2 The General Heavy Constructors
The firms included in this group generally preform very wide
range of construction activities as compared to other groups
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of firms. The greatest proportion of their work by volume
is concentrated in engineering construction, which is a very
broad category covering constructed facilities that are not
primarily architectural in nature but that involve predomin-
antly engineering projects. Typical project categories built
by these firms include highways, bridges, tunnels, pipelines
and other types of transmission lines, sewage and water treat-
ment facilities, marine structures and dams and associated
hydroelectric work.
Although most large firms in this category have in-house eng-
ineering capability, they are not design-constructors. Most
of the construction work performed by this group is designed
by professional consultants - architectural and engineering
firms - retained by the owner or agency responsible to the
owner. Firms in this group have traditionally generated the
greater proportion of their workload through the competitive
bidding system, both in the public and private sectors. As
compared to any other group of firms in the construction ind-
ustry, firms engaged in engineering construction tend to per-
form a larger percentage of their work for public sector
clients, since projects such as dams, hydroelectric facilit-
ies, airports, highways, and other facilities of this nature
are planned, financed, and owned by governmental agencies.
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3.3.3 The General Building Contractors
This category includes those firms that are primarily general
building contractors. Projects constructed by this group of
firms are for commercial, educational, institutional, light
industrial, recreational, residential and public sector
clients. Total aggregate dollar volume of work in this cat-
egory, when the volume of work performed by specialty trade
contractor is included, makes it the largest sector in the
industry. As a consequence, this category of contract cons-
truction is generally considered to be the mainstay of the
building industry.
General building construction tends to be the most localized
in nature. The geographical market of even some of the lar-
gest building constructors is concentrated in a particular
region, or a few large metropolitan areas.
The delivery system for general building project follows most
clo ely to what is considered the traditional or normative
mode. For the bulk of both private and public sector projects,
the work is designed by professional architectural and engin-
eering firms. These firms, under contract to the owner, plan
and design the configuration of the project. They then pre-
pare the contract documentso- the detailed plans and specif-
ications - which specify the construction materials to be
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incorporated into the facility, and frequently the construc-
tion methods to be used. For the general building projects,
the architect is considered the lead professional, and then
either subcontracts with, or uses in-house consultants to
design the structural, mechanical, and electrical phases of
the project.
It is usually only after the design phases of a proejct is
complete that the contractor enters into the picture. Either
through competitive bidding, or some form of negotiation, a
contractor is selected by an owner, often in consultation
with the architect or engineer. Once selected, the contrac-
tor, under contract to the owner, then becomes responsible
for all activities related to the physical execution of the
project: purchasing, subcontracting, overall control of the
on-site work, and actual performance of the work by his own
forces. In comparison to the other groups of general contr-
acting firms in the industry, therefore, it is the general
building contractors who have had the most limited role in
terms of their involvement in other than the construction
phase. Even during the period of construction activity, the
owner more often than not still retain architect or engineer
to perform periodic inspection of the work to insure compl-
iance with the contract documents and public regulations, and
to verify progress payments.
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During the actual construction, most general building contr-
actors subcontract the majority of their work. They normally
perform only the concrete work - foundation and superstruct-
ures - masonly, and carpentry by their own forces. All of
the other work, including the exterior and interior archit-
ectural, other types of structural, special foundation, and
site work, and mechanical and electrical, is usually performed
by specialty subcontractors.
3.3.4 The Builder-Developers
This group of firms, classified as operative builders, buil-
der-developers, or owner-builders, are distinguished not by
the types of projects they construct, but by their equity
investment in them. By building for their own account, they
serve as their own clients, at least for the construction
phase and in some cases, throughout the operational life of
the structure. These companies, then, fall somewhere between
the general contractor on the one hand, and the real estate
developer on the other. They are differentiated from the
general building contractors, for their equity investment in
the project they build, and from the pure real estate devel-
oper, by virtue of their construction capability. The build-
ing types constructed by these firms generally fall into two
areas: all types of residential buildings, from single-fam-
ily houses to large scale housing development, and nonresid-
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ential structures, primarily commercial and light industrial
buildings.
3.3.5 Electric and Mechanical Subcontractors
These firms comprise the only category which perform the maj-
ority of their work under contract to other contractors,
rather than under contract to the owner. However, these two
groups of contractors employ 22.4 percent of total construc-
tion employment in 1982 (12.1 percent by mechanical and 10.3
percent by electrical contractors), and rated as top two cat-
egories among top 10 contractor classification. Since elec-
trical and mechanical work in general building construction
can range anywhere from 25 to 40 percent of the total value
of the facility, their contribution to the end result is of
obvious importance and greater than any other specialty sub-
contractors. In recent years, with the advent of more soph-
isticated systems of environmental control, and greater dem-
and for electricity, the value of their work has been closer
to the higher end of that ratio. These firms do contract
directly with the owner, under certain circumstances. A num-
ber of states have statutes which require that separate mech-
anical and electrical contracts be awarded on publicly fin-
anced projects.
Their work cuts across almost every type of general and heavy
construction. As specialty subcontractors, they face a diff-
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erent set of managerial problems in most of their work, as
compared to prime contractors. For one, they do not generally
have the responsibility for the general coordination and dtr-
ection of the work among the different trades on a job site,
and their work only involves a very few trades. On the other
hand, they must work through the prime contractors for such
essentials as approvals of shop drawings, changes to work,
and the resolution of technical or contractual problems as
they contract generally with prime contractors.
As with the case of the general building contractors, very
few firms in this group have design-build capabilities. Due
to the highly specialized nature of this type of work, how-
ever, most firms do possess a reasonable level of technical
design competence. This is due to a number of reasons, the
most prominant being the lack of detail in the drawings and
specifications prepared by professional consultants. Whereas
architectural and structural phases of the work, all aspects
of the design are generally quite detailed and specific, this
is not as often the case with mechanical and electrical phases.
More and more often, especially on private work, performance
type specifications are written for the mechanical and elec-
trical work, thereby putting some degree of technical design
responsibility on this group of subcontractors.
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3.3.6 Comparison of the Groups
The similarities and differences in the operational charact-
eristics of these five groups of construction companies have
been discussed in the preceeding sections. However, it is
interesting to compare another aspect of their operations -
the geographic dispersion of the market for each of the group.
Most of the process plant design-constructors derive a sig-
nificant portion of their business from their multi-national
operations. More than any of the other four groups, the bus-
iness activities of this group are conducted throughout the
world, in highly industrialized, semi-industrialized, and
developing countries. This is in large measure due to the
highly technical nature of their work, the high level of exp-
ertise required, and the large number of trained and exper-
ienced personnel needed to design and build these large and
complex facilities. In contrast, general building construc-
tion, which covers a much wider range of types of facilities,
can be and is designed and built by architects, engineers,
and contractors indigenous to the locality. The only other
group in which firms with a significant amount of multi-nat-
ional operations are found is the heavy-highway group. The
market opportunity for these firms is more closely confined
to the less developed countries. There are very few companies
in the other three groups which can be called a multi-national.
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Although some of them had undertaken foreign construction
projects on a very limited basis, almost all of their revenues
flowed from projects built in the U.S.
ENR's annual survey of Top 400 listing also reports the top
50 in design-construct, top 75 program and construction man-
agers, top 50 general building contractors and top 50 heavy
contractors. The constituents of these four groups of comp-
anies are considerably different. If we divide the top 400
contractors into 10 groups each consisting of 40 companies
by the order of the size of annual contracts, the first 40
(group 1) accounts for 64.4 percent of total contracts of
$131 billion by the top 400 contractors in 1984. However,
the contribution of group 1 to domestic contracts of 54.7
percent (out of $100.3 billion) is considerably lower than
that to total contracts while their share of foreign contract
was 96.1 percent of total $30.9 billion international contr-
acts (see table 3.3.1). The larger companies' dependency on
foreign work is more conspicuous if we compare the companies
within the group 1. The top 10 companies contracted $26.3
billion foreign contracts in 1984 which is 85.1 percent of
total international contracts by U.S. contractors. Their
dependency on foreign contracts accounted average 48.1 per-
cent in 1984 while that of next 10 largest companies averaged
only 9.8 percent. The design-construct market is by and large
dominated by large interantional industrial and process plant
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builders. This is more visible if we look at the U.S. top
10 contractors. They are all design constructors and they
also perform design and construction management services(see
tables 3.3.2 and 3.3.3). As the larger companies tend to
diversify their services, some of top 10 contractors are also
listed in the top 10 general building contractors and heavy
contractors (Fluor Corp. is number 2 in general building con-
tracts and number 8 in heavy construction while Bechtel Group,
Inc. is number 2 in heavy construction in 1984). However,
general building construction and heavy construction are
mostly performed by the companies ranked below top 10 (see
tables 3.3.4 and 3.3.5).
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Table 3.3.1 Distribution of Contracts by Size Groups of Firms (1984)
Total Ibmestic Foreign Desig-construct Mmnagement
contracts contracts contracts contracts 2 contracts 3
Groupl$ million Pct. $ million Pct $ million Pct. $ million Pct. $ million Pct.
Total 131,227.5 100.0 100,328.4 100.0 30,899.1 100.0 27,317.8 100.0 34,268.8 100.0
1 84,521.8 64.4 54,832.9 54.7 29,688.9 96.1 21,450.5 78.5 25,871.0 75.5
2 13,458.6 10.3 13,112.0 13.1 346.6 1.1 1,896.4 6.9 3,520.2 10.3
3 8,723.9 6.6 7,733.9 7.7 99.0 0.3 1,302.8 4.8 1,435.4 4.2
4 5,892.6 4.5 5,738.7 5.7 153.9 0.5 564.7 2.1 891.9 2.6
5 4,623.6 3.5 4,524.8 4.5 98.8 0.3 525.2 1.9 587.9 1.7
6 3,831.6 2.9 3,830.2 3.8 1.4 0.0 503.3 1.8 741.0 2.2
7 3,230.2 3.2 3,203.2 3.2 27.0 0.1 156.1 0.6 358.4 1.0
8 2,807.5 2.1 2,807.5 2.8 0.0 0.0 337.9 1.2 112.1 0.3
9 2,465.0 1.9 2,431.7 2.4 33.0 0.1 250.8 0.9 494.1 1.4
10 2,122.2 1.6 2,113.5 2.1 8.7 0.0 330.1 1.2 255.8 0.7
Source: ENR/April 18, 1985
Note: 1. Group 1 is top 40 firms; group 2, second 40 finns, etc.
2. Design-construct shows damestic market only.
3. Estimated erected value of (M contracts.
Table 3.3.2 Top U.S. DesignConstructors: 1984
Design construct (in million dollar) Top
400
Rank Firms Total Foreign Desgn-aclylksgi-M rank Remarks
1. Kellog Rust, Inc. 9,065.0 7,085.0 910.0 6,510.0 1 XXX
2 Fluor Corp. 6,746.6 1,726.5 682.1 5,180.5 2 XXX
3 Stearns Catalytic Corp. 6,084.9 223.8 2,271.6 2,524.2 5 XXX
4 Bechtel Group, Inc. 5,625.0 2,415.0 722.0 3,131.0 3 XXX
5 The Parsons Corp. 5,553.7 1,546.5 4,340.1 1,058.9 4 XXX
6 Raymond Int'l, Inc. 4,515.2 1,717.0 4,324.9 43.2 10 XXX
7 Brown & Root, Inc. 3,323.4 1,251.1 2,664.8 203.0 6 XXX
8 Lumus Crest, Inc. 3,200.0 2,300.0 0.0 0.0 7 XXX
9 Forster Wheeler Corp. 2,649.0 2,120.0 236.0 316.0 9 XXX
10 Stone & Webster Engrg. Corp. 2,280.3 262.6 1,364.0 288.8 8 XXX
Source: ENR/April 18, 1985
Note: Based on design-construct, design-construction
valued at estineted cost of project.
XXX; First X for manufacturing plants, second X for power
chemical and process plants.
management and design only contracts
plants and third X for
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Table 3.3.3 Top U.S. Program and Construction Managers:
(management contract in millions of dollar)
1984
Top 400
Rank Firms Total Foreign rank
1 The Parsons Corp. 6,210.0 2,920.5 4
2 Bechtel Corp. 2,845.0 2,627.0 3
3 Kellog Rust, Inc. 2,700.0 2,200.0 1
4 Stone and Webster Eng. Corp. 2,000.0 2,000.0 8
5 Raymond Int'l., Inc. 1,789.3 17.6 10
6 HRH Const. Corp. 1,606.0 0.0 -
7 Gilbane Building Co. 1,598.6 0.0 18
8 Dillingham Const. Corp. 1,260.0 0.0 25
9 Barton-Malow Co. 1,149.5 0.0 20
10 Tishman Realty & Const. Co. 1,011.2 0.0 -
Source: ENR/April 18, 1985
Note: Based on the erected value of construction management contracts
for fee only plus contracts where the firm is exposed to financial
liability similar to a general contractor.
Table 3.3.4 Top U.S. General Building Contractors
(1984 contracts in millions of dollar)
Rank Firms Total Top 400 rank
1 Turner Corp. 2,120.5 11
2. Fluor Corp. 1,231.9 2
3. Jones Group, Inc. 1,011.3 14
4 Perini Corp. 883.3 19
5 Centex-Bateson-Rooney-Golden 861.9 23
6 BE & K, Inc. 773.5 16
7 HCB Contractors 671.0 31
8 CEI Const., Inc. 663.1 28
9 Blount Int'l., Ltd. 624.4 24
10 McDevit & Street Co. 612.8 37
Source: ENR/April 18, 1985
Note: Ranked by value of domestic contracts, excluding construction
management contracts, for general building and manufacturing
plants. Excludes process plants.
163
Table 3.3.5 Top U.S. Heavy Contractors
(1984 contracts in millions of dollar)
rank Firms Total Top 400 rank
1 Guy F. Atkins Co. 702.4 15
2 Bechtel Group, Inc. 650.4 3
3 S. J. Groves & Sons Co. 527.0 40
4 Peter Kiewit Sons, Inc. 487.2 27
5 Koppers Co., Inc. 337.8 50
6 Jones Group, Inc. 321.8 14
7 Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. 316.9 12
8 Fluor Corp. 308.0 2
9 Granite Const. Co. 292.4 -
10 Dillingham Const. Corp. 274.7 25
Source: ENR/April 18, 1985
Note: Ranked by value of domestic contracts, excluding construction
management contracts, for heavy and highway projects. Excludes
powerplants.
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3.4 Cotractual Arrangements
3.4.1 Type of Cotract
There are three general types of contracts in current use in
the construction industry. Although each has its own varients,
the types of contracts are:-
-Cost plus fixed fee contracts, which provide for a per-
centage or flat fee to the contractor over the actual cost
of construction. This provides greater safety for the cont-
ractor from a financial standpoint; on the other hand, it
limits profits.
-Lump sum and unit price contracts, by which the contractor
agrees to do work for a fixed lump sum or for fixed unit
prices. These methods place substantial risks on the contr-
actor, but offer opportunity under favorable circumstances
for greater profits.
-Guaranteed upset price or upper fixed limit of construct-
ion contracts, which combine the main features of the lump
sum, unit price, and cost plus fixed fee contracts. Under
this form of contracts, the contractor agrees to perform the
work for a price which includes a stated amount of fee. If
the costs of construction exceeds the guaranteed price, the
contractor usually absorbs the overrun, but if such cost plus
fee is less than the guaranteed price, the savings are shared
on a predetermined basis between the contractor and owner.
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These contracts place risks on the contractor but permit him
an opportunity for greater profits than cost plus fixed fee
contracts.
The cost plus fee contract in its simplest form is the anti-
thesis of the lump sum contract because the owner takes very
little, whereas in the lump sum contract the reverse is true.
In fact, these two kinds of contracts - the lump sum and the
cost plus fee - may be seen as the two ends of a scale of
risk distribution between owner and contractor as parties to
a construction contract (see figure 3.4.1). The three types
of contract mentioned above represent the conventional cont-
racting methods. In recent years, however, the relatively
high cost of short term financing, run away inflation of
costs and other such factors have intensified the need to
compress the construction time involved in the traditional
methods of contract. To meet these need, new approaches have
been developed, some of which are variation of old approaches
or application of old approaches to enw situations. The most
widely utilized new forms of construction agreements are fast
track, design build, and construction management.
-In fast track approach, the relationships among owner,
architect and contractor are mostly unchanged from the more
traditional approaches. The primary difference is that in-
complete construction and specifications are used for the
purpose of selecting and contracting with general contractor.
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The owner outlines for the architect of his selection of the
criteria for the project and architect prepares, in varying
degrees of detail, basic design documents, schematics, or
outline drawings for various building components. From these
incomplete drawings, the contractor attempts to estimate the
cost of construction for those items which are detailed as
well as for those which are not detailed but indicated. The
advantage of this approach is that the design and construct-
ion phases are overlapped which greatly reduces the total
time from conception to completion but it is only possible
by the genuine cooperation among the architect, the general
contractor and the owner.
-The design build concept is not new, but its wide spread
application to projects of various kinds is relatively new.
The basic idea of the design build arrangement is that a
single party or group of parties obligates itself to the
owner to produce the finished product from beginning to end.
Although there are a myriad of variations, the two basic app-
roaches to design build are a design build team by joint ven-
ture or design build by sole contractor.
-The construction manager is usually employed as an agent
of an owner to work in conjunction with the owner's other
agent, the designer, in designing and constructing the work
required by the owner. The primary function of a construct-
ion manager is to manage construction work for an owner; that
is to perform the management function previously performed
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by a general contractor. But a competent construction man-
ager can and usually does provide other services during the
design phase, and for this reason he should be appointed by
an owner at about the same time or before the designer is
employed.
3.4.2 Contractual Arrangements
Prices in the construction industry are usually set by comp-
etitive bidding or negotiated contract. In the public sector,
prices for the majority of construction projects are reached
by competitive bidding because of government procurement sta-
tutes. These regualtions are designed to prevent political
favoritism and corruption in awarding of contracts. Although
reliable statistics are not available for the private sector,
it is generally acknowledged that most construction is priced
by means of a form of competitivebidding. In recent years,
however, a growing proportion of private nonresidential con-
struction has been awarded by negotiation between owners and
contractors, utilizing several forms of cost plus fee arran-
gements. Most private residential construction is performed
by speculative builders, who build housing units on their own
account for resale. Finally, certain types of repair and
maintenance work and simple construction tasks are accompl-
ished by force account, that is, with the owner acting as
contractor and directly employing the labor. Many features
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of pricing process are representative of particular constr-
uction submarkets. Following are general contracting pract-
ices.
1) Competitive Bidding
Many construction contracts are awarded by means of compet-
itive bidding. In the public sector, the steps are carefully
delineated and strictly adhered to, while in the private
sector the owner has considerable latitude in setting the
rules. Neverthless, the basic features of the bidding proc-
ess remain the same in both. Detailed plans and specificat-
ions are formulated, which are then distributed to interested
contractors. In the public sector, statutes usually require
that all qualified contractors be allowed to compete for the
work on an equal footing, though they may undergo prequalif-
ication by the agency securing the bids. In the private sec-
tor, the owner can do as he wishes, with the options ranging
from an open competition for all interested parties to the
restriction of the bidders to a few favored firms. The con-
tractor's activities during the bidding stage are comparable
for both public and private buildings of similar complexity.
A quantity estimate of the type and amount of materials must
be made based on the plans and specifications. The final
bids are normally submitted on a lump sum or unit price basis,
with the former being used for most projects. Usually, unit
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price bidding is called for on projects where the uncertainty
about the quantity of materials needed or the labor involved
in certain key tasks is particularly pronounced.
A public awarding authority must generally award the contract
to the lowest responsible bidder. In contrast, a private
owner has autonomy, being bound only by the common law of
contracts. However, it is the usual practise for an owner
who has restricted a bid list to award the contract to the
low bidder. In both the private and public sector, once the
award has been made, the contract documents may be completed
quickly or may take a few months to finish. In the interim,
the owner or awarding authority will usually send the general
contractor a letter of intent, giving him notice to proceed.
The general contractor must then award the subcontracts as
soon as possible, to ensure that the subcontractors will hold
to their quoted prices. In several government jurisdictions,
statutes require the general contractor to award subcontracts
to those specialty contractors that were quoted in the winn-
ing bid, but in most states and in the private sector, the
general contractor is under no legal obligation to do so.
Virtually all construction projects entail owner initiated
changes and extras that occur during the construction period.
Once the contracts have been signed, subsequent price changes
are the subject of negotiation between the owner and the
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general contractor. Design changes often require the reorg-
anization of production tasks, and thus they entail addit-
ional costs. In the post award price negotiations, the con-
tractor and owner find themselves in a situation with many
characteristics of bilateral monopoly bargaining. Contractor
often view design modification as an opportunity to increase
profits.
2) Negotiated Contracts
Given the latitude of private owners to adopt any pricing
methods, many of them choose to award construction contracts
by means of negotiation with one or several contractors.
There are three major reasons for this:-
-An owner may contemplate building a project of large size
and great complexity. In such a case, he will prefer to hire
an experienced contracting firm that possesses a high degree
of managerial and technical expertise. Because of the proj-
ect's complexity and the fact that technology may be changing
during the several years of construction, it may be difficult
to describe the structure precisely in the plans and specif-
ications at the outset of the project, making the calculation
of a lump sum price very difficult.
-An owner may place great weight on the quality of the
workmanship that will go into his proposed structure. He may
therefore decide to engage the services of a contractor with
an excellent reputation for technical competence.
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-An owner may be both price conscious and knowledgeable and
wish to construct a building that is well defined and simple
in design.
Negotiated contracts generally fall into the cost plus cat-
egory, although occasionally a contractor will negotiate a
lump sum price. In most cost plus arrangements, only the
general contractor is hired on a fee basis. Subcontract
awards are made through the use of a competitive bidding sy-
stem, with the subcontracting firms bidding at the invitation
of general contractor, subject to the approval of owner.
3) Speculative Building
Another exception to the general rule of competitive bidding
in private construction is the speculative building. The
speculative builders are firms primarily engaged in the con-
struction of single family houses and other building on their
own account, for sale to others, rather than as contractors.
Typically, a speculative builder will build a few houses at
a time and set a price on each house according to what he
believes the market will bear. In contrast to many owners
who award project to a general contractor on a cost plus fee
absis and then rely on competitive bidding for subcontracts,
most speculative builders negotiate the prices directly with
their specialty trade subcontractors. The fairly standard
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and repititive nature of the tasks performed by the specialty
contractors appears to be responsible for the lack of a bid-
ding system in the letting of subcontracts by speculative
builders.
4) Force Account Construction
The last important category of private construction that does
not use a competitive bidding process is a force account work.
A substantial amount of construction is performed by an owner
with his own forces and not by contract with outside workers.
Force account work is ordinarily limited to repairs, mainten-
ance, and simple construction tasks. More complex work inv-
olving several specialty trades and/or specialized manpower
is usually accomplished by securing the services of specialty
contractors, with either the owner or a hired firm acting as
general contractors.
3.4.3 Some Legal Aspects in Public Construction
Government at all levels transact most of their procurement
business on a competitive bidding basis regulated by statutory
requirements. These bidding statutes have several objectives,
including: the prevention of collusion among firms and wrong-
doing by public official; the placing of all businesses des-
iring to sell goods and services to the government on an equal
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footing; and the securing of goods and services at the lowest
possible price consistent with acceptable quality. Since
large amounts of public funds are controlled by officials of
public agencies, sound public policy dictates that safeguards
be instituted to avoid favoritism and fraud. These consider-
ation apply generally to all governmnets activities, but
because of the high dollar value of public construction, the
application of competitive bidding procedures to public con-
struction projects is particularly important in its impact
on the disbursement of public funds.
In awarding of public contracts, government agencies must
make certain that their procedures coincide with the broad
social policies promulgated by the legislatures. One example
of the implementation of such a government policy in the
awarding of construction project is the :prevailing wage"
requirements that appear as a condition of project awards in
federal and in many state contracts. These requirements are
in keeping with the dictates of the federal Davis-Bacon Act
and the state statutes modeled after it. The Davis-Bacon Act
requires that the minimum wages of workmen on a government
construction project shall be based on the wages that will
be determined by the secretary of labor to be prevailing for
corresponding classes of workmen employed for similar work
on similar projects in the area in which the work is to be
performed. Since prevailing wage rates are heavily influenced
by union wage scales in most metropolitan areas, the Davis-
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Bacon Act and similar state laws have the effect of underwr-
iting the payment of union wage levels on government projects.
In the same way, public awarding authorities can attempt to
exercise leverage in the guarantee of equal employment opp-
ortunity on government construction projects. Effecting this
goal is considerably less amenable to administrative fiat
than the setting of prevailing wage rates since the issue
involves the availability of sufficient numbers of qualified
minority craftman. Consequently, any attempt to attain equal
employment opportunity in construction requires the coopera-
tion of employers, unions, and government, and several diff-
erent approaches to the problems are being pursued. While
it is not ordinarily the responsibility of awarding author-
ities to formulate or enforce such plans, they can exert con-
siderable influence in encouraging contractor compliance.
In this respect, public awarding authorities differ from
private owners, who are not constrained to further the goals
fo public policy in awarding contracts despite governmental
and community pressure to do so.
Filed Subbid Law
Since the most construction projects involve the work of sev-
eral specialty contractors in addition to the general contr-
actor, the question arises whether government procurement
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agencies should try to ensure equal access to public constr-
uction work for specialty contractors as well as general con-
tractors. Most statutes at all government levels provide
only for single contracts - the awarding of construction con-
tracts to general contracting firms. In the case of single
contracts, the general contractor can hold the subcontractors
on whom he relied in preparing his bid to their quoted prices
while the subcontractors cannot force the winning general
contractor to use them on the project. The asymmetry of this
structure leads to the practices known as bid shopping and
bid peddling. Although single contract awards are the rule
in most governmental jurisdictions, several state governments
have taken a different approach. Ten states require the sub-
mission of filed subcontractor bids. A major intent of filed
subbid laws is the prevention of bid shopping by general con-
tractors as a means of increasing their share of the profits
at the expense of subcontractors. The filed subbid laws
differ in their provisions, permitting varying degrees of
latitude on the part of the general contractor in choosing
his subcontractors. Three distinctively different statutory
bidding procedures can be identified. These alternatives may
be represented by the bidding laws in the state of Massach-
usetts, California and Rhode Island.
Massachusetts has the most complex law, a two tiered system
requiring separate competitions for general contractors and
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specialty subcontractors. The statutes lists eighteen diff-
erent categories of subcontract work. The subbidders must
submit their bids to the awarding authority approximately one
week prior to the closing date of general contractor bids.
The sealed subbids are opened publicly immediately after the
announced deadline, and a list of the subbidders and their
bids is furnished to the general contractors competing for
the work. A general contractor must choose one of the sub-
contractors on the list in each specialty category and carry
him at the listed price. There are two additional statutory
rpovisions to permit some freedom of choice in this process.
First, a subbidder is allowed to restrict his bid from use
by a particular general contractor, or alternatively, to
stipulate that his bid may be used only by the specific gen-
eral contractors which he enumerates. Second, a general con-
tractor can refuse to carry a particular subcontractor in his
bid, simply because he does not wish to work with the firm
even though that firm may be the low bidder. The provision
that allows the restricting of a subcontractors' bid to a
particular contractor also permits a general contractor to
submit a bid in the subcontractor competition if he wants to
use his own forces for the work in a specific subcontractor
category.
California's filed subbid law is somewhat simpler. Only one
bidding competition is jeld, for general contractors. Each
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general contractor must list the subcontractors that are to
perform work amounting to more than 0.5 percent of his total
bid. If the general contractor wishes to perform work in a
subcontractor specialty, it must be listed in the appropriate
category. As in Massachusetts, the winning general firms
must use the listed subcontractors, unless it can be demonst-
rated to the awarding authority that subcontractor has sub-
sequently become unwilling or unable to perform the work for
the price listed in the general contractor's bid.
Rhode Island's filed subbid statute requires only that the
general contractor submit a list of his subcontractors after
he has received a contract award.
The Separate Contract Statutes
Nine states require the awarding of separate contracts to a
general contractor and several specialty contractors - usually
including specialties such as plumbing, heating, and electr-
ical work. The separate contract statutes protect a few cat-
egories of specialty contractors against bid shopping and bid
peddling by granting them prime contractor status, but allow
the practices to continue with respect to all other specialty
contractors. These laws vary in the particular specialty
trades that are protected and in the categories of projects
to which they apply.
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New York's competitive bidding statutes is illustrative of
such laws. It requires four separate bidding competition for
building projects whose estimated cost exceeds $50,000. In
addition to the general contractor's portion of the work,
separate sealed bids are required for plumbing and gas fitt-
ing; heating, ventilating , and air conditioning; and elect-
rical work.
New Jersey's bidding statutes permit the awarding authority
to accept bids both the single and separate contract systems.
The bids are then compared, and the decision to award a single
contract or separate contracts depends upon which method
result in the lowest overall project bid price.
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Figure 3.4.1 A Scale of Contractual Risk Distribution
NOTES
(1) Only slight risk to owner.
(2) Some changes in contract change nature of lump-sum contract and introduce more risk of loss for owner.
(3) Many changes in contract may alter nature of contract and risk distribution considerably.
(4) Theoretical (not practical) distribution of risk about equal (50/50).
(5) Variation in risk distribution depends on many things, including level of maximum cost, distribution in
sharing of savings/losses, etc.
(6) Some risk to contractor. (i.e. is fixed fee adequate if scope of contract increases?)
(7) Only slight risk to contractor. (i.e. is percent fee adequate?)
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3.5 Labor Relations
3.5.1 Collective Bargaining
The peculiar characteristics of the product, of its pricing,
andof firms have major effects on the characteristics of
employment in construction. Table 3.5.1 lists several asp-
ects of costruction employment that taken as a whole, cause
the construction industry to have a unique place in the U.S.
economy. Especially important is the assembling of contrac-
tors and subcontractors with various specializations for the
building of a aprticular project, with the resulting special-
ization of the work force and intermixing of the employees
fo different employers.
1) The Employers
Most firms hire employees in only one or two trades, although
general contractors may hire in as many as five or six trades.
The average firm in construction has fewer than 10 employees,
and of these most are temporary in that they do not work for
a simgle employer for a full year, but move from employer to
employer as the availability of work dictates. In order to
deal with the union that represents the wirkers in a trade,
the employers ordinarily join together in an association.
The association is governed by its bylaws and ordinarily
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negotiates an agreement with a local union. The associations
are not limited to labor relation activities, but also lobby
with governmental agencies on behalf of their members, prov-
ide legal services, promote constructio, and handle public
relations and similar functions. Local employer associations
are often affiliated with national bodies.
Because of peculiar economic conditions and characteristics
of employment in construction, employers and unions are
placed in a much more intimate relationship thqn what is
usually found in other industries. Contractors and unions
must negotiate not only wages and working conditions, but
also hiring and training practices. A special provisions of
the National Labor Relation Act permits unions and contract-
ors to sign prehire agreements, by which an employer agrees
to recognize a union to represent its employees before it
hires employees. Also, in an unstable industry, the develop-
ment and retention of skilled labor force require that empl-
oyers and unions agree to practices to preserve the job opp-
ortunities of craftmen.
2) Open Shop Segment
Not all crafts, branches of construction, or geographic area
are unionized at all or same degree. But all contractors,
union or nonunion, are influenced by the labor relations
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policies of the others. Wages in the union segment influence
what nonunion contractors must pay. Frequently, nonunion
wage scales are below union scales, but union workers are
often considered better mechanics. The segment of consrtuc-
tion industry that is not governed by collective bargaining
agreement has usually been pictured as a fringe arround the
unioized segment of the industry. However, the segment of
the industry outside of collectivebargaining has apparent
been growing rapidly relative to a whole industry. Further-
more, significant parts of this segment are becoming struct-
ured and its industrial relations formalized - not under
labor agreements, but under policies adopted by nonunion emp-
loyer aasociations. The industrial relations arrangements
of construction now operate in three forms, which are in com-
petition for dominance in the future:-
-The system under collective bargaining agreements
-Open shop arrangwments under national or local policies of
contractor associations (the merit shop)
-The sector of individual enterprises pursuing policies
apart from either collective bargaining or a formal organiz-
ation of contractors (the truly unorganized sector)
In a sense, the merit shop associations have adopted many of
the substantive industrial relations policies and procedures
of collective bargaining (such as apprenticeship programs,
health and welfare programs, etc.). But decision making is
under the control of a local or national employers' associat-
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ion without union involvement or praticipation.
The exact proportion of open shop construction activity is
not known. There are no reliable statistics on the degree
of organization in construction, although superficial surveys
are sometimes taken. A relatively larger proportion of con-
tractors than employees is in the nomunion sector (i.e., the
average number of workers employed by nonunion contractors
is smaller than the average number employed by union contr-
actors). For example, in the housing industry, a major emp-
loyer association estimates that more than half of the empl-
yers are nonunion and some 70 percent or so of all housing
is constructed by nonunion builders. Nontheless, many large
metropolitan areas have a majority of housing done by union
builders. Much industrial and power plant construction are
unionized while commercial and office building is more often
nonunion. In any cases, less than half of construction emp-
loyees are represented by unions.
3) The Unionized Segment
The building and construction labor force comprises more than
20 crafts and many more specialties. In the union sectors,
a group of 18 or 20 national unions represent workers. Con-
tractors who operate in the.unionized segment of the industry
are ordinary a party to legally binding collective bargaining
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agreements with one or more of the unions of the building and
construction trades. These agreements obligate the union
contractor to observe in one way or another the work jurisd-
ictions of the various unions. In some branches of the ind-
ustry, arrangements also obligate an employer to hire empl-
oyees through a union operated referral system. These two
aspects of the unionized sector are absent in the unorganized
sector, and constitute major differences between the two.
Referral wechanism operated by labor organizations in the
construction industry differ widely. In extreme cases, many
locals operate no referral system at all, while others main-
tain an exclusive hiring hall. An exclusive hiring arrange-
ment obligates the contractor, by virtue of his collective
bargaining agreement, to hire journeymen only through the
union hiring hall, unless the union has been unable to furn-
ish journeymen in 24 or 48 hours depends on the agreements.
In any cases, contractor may contact the union as a central
source of job applicants, even when no hiring provision exists
in the collective bargaining agreement. Regardless of the
formal nature of the hiring hall, the union is often a rapid
and dependable source of mechanics for the contractor when
he moves from the territory of one local into another, and
where his labor requirements on a project vary from day to
day.
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4) The Building Trade Union
In the organized building trades sector of the construction
labor force, the primary unit of organization is the inter-
antional union, which is an association of local American and
Canadian unions. Groups of locals in various trades partic-
ipated in the foundation of internationals in order that the
standards of the organized portions of the trade not be und-
dercut by unorganized areas. The internationals were founded
with the power to issue charters, to organize locals, to com-
bine locals (under normal provisions), and to remove charters.
An international labor organization is headed by a general
president and a general executive board. Regional vice pres-
idents are elected by the convention of the labor organizat-
ion which meets at periods of two to five years. The inter-
national organization is governed by a constitution adopted
and amended by the convention (which is the supreme body of
the international union). The general president is normally
in charge of the work jurisdiction of the union. The general
president rarely takes part in collective bargaining apart
from his participation in developing national agreements,
and he rarely intervene in the operation of local unions
except where matters of general policy are in question. In
many international unions, an intermediate structure exists
between the international union and local union. Normally,
there are regional vice presidents, and perhaps regional
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councils, and district councils in metropolitan areas, which
may exercise authority in the affairs of the local unions.
Representatives of the international unions are stationed in
the regions to represent the national officers and to assist
locals in collective bargaining and other functions.
Local unions, closest to the rank-and -file membership, owe
their existence to charters from the international union,
despite the fact that many local unions were formed before
international union was formed. The charter of the local
union defines both a geographic and work jurisdiction for
local. Local unions in the building trades have preserved,
for the most part, a considerable degree of autonomy in the
conduct of their affairs. The negotiation of collective bar-
gaining agreements, their provisions, and the enforcement of
the segments are largely matters of local authority, subject
only to general supervision from the international union.
The local union usually elects a president and vice president
and others, some of whom are salaried, and business agent,
who is almost always a fulltime salaried representative of
the local union. The roles of the president and the vice
president of the local union are generally restricted to int-
ernal parliamentary matters. Their roles are less important
to industrial relations than that of the business agent, who
has perhaps the most critical administrative role at any
level of the building trades union organization. The business
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agent is a full time salaried official of the local union and
elected in every one, two, or three years, depending on the
local union. The business agent, along with other officers
or an elected committee, represents the labor organization
in negotiations with employers'and their representatives.
He handles grievances on the job site, representing the views
of his membership and the interests of the labor organization.
He directs strikes, boycotts, or whatever concerted activit-
ies are undertaken by the local union; he watches and defend
the jurisdiction of the local union from encroachment by other
labor organizations or by employers. Business agents attend
the international union convention and are to a large extent
the constituency of the general president and executive board
of the international union. In many respect, the most imp-
ortant function of both business agents and international
union officials and representatives is what may be called
policing the trade.
5) Structure of Collective Bargaining
The structure of collective bargaining in construction is
extraordinarily complex. There is a considerable variation
by branch of the industry, geographic location, and craft.
There are some 5,000 to 7,000 collective bargaining agreements
in the industry, most engotiated between local unions and
employer associations. The agreements run for 1 to 5 years
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generally include something on training and hiring procedure
as well as more usual topics of wages, fringes, and other
working conditions. These additional provisions are necess-
ary in construction because the worker is tied to his occup-
ation rather than employer, and thus both contractors and
unions often participate in training (e.g., apprenticeship
programs), and union refers workers at contractors' request
(e.g., through the hiring hall). Even so, these contracts
are generally shorter than those in manufacturing, since they
can not possibly go into the detail on working conditions
that a single company agreement can.
Table 3.5.2 summarizes bargaining structures in various bran-
ches of the industry. The only branch in which all trades
are involved in negotiations is building construction, and
this branch is described in detail in table 3.5.3. In the
pipeline construction, each of four trades listed negotiates
a national agreement with the pipeline contractors associat-
ion, and four unions and association maintain a policy comm-
ittee to resolve disputes. In the industrial construction,
the individual companies and an association (The National
Contractors Association) negotiate national agreements with
the union listed, but the companies also apply, in most inst-
ances, many terms of the building agreements generally in
effect where a project is located. Table 3.5.3 lists the
major national employer associations in the building constr-
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uction, the principal unions which they deal, and the usual
geographic coverage of agreements. The five trades with the
Associated General Contractors (AGC) negotiate are called the
basic trades. Electricians, pipefitters, and sheet metal
workers are members of the mechanical trades.
6) Jurisdictional Disputes and Problems in Collective
Bargaining
Jurisdictional disputes are unavoidable element of an indus-
try in which wage rates and other work conditions are diff-
erent by occupation and workers are organized into labor
unions and craft lines, and production processes and materials
are keep changing. The objective of contractors and industry
has been to adopt means of handling these disputes and mech-
anisms for dispute resolution that minimize the disruption
fo production and efficiency caused by jurisdictional disputes.
Jurisdictional strikes are an unfair labor practice under
Labor Management Relation Acts and procedures for handling
of such cases by the National Labor Relation Board (NLRB) are
spelled out in the act. In adjusting a jurisdictional disp-
utes, the NLRB is required to make a positive assignments of
work to a particular craft. But NLRB has little expertise
in dealing with jurisdictional disputes and its procedures
are lengthy and cumbersome.. As a result, contractors and
unions have sought to establish a voluntary mechanism within
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the industry to adjust these disputes. Federal law always
allows the NLRB to dismiss charges of an unfair labor pract-
ice when voluntary adjustment is attempted. The most impor-
tant mechanism for voluntary adjustment currently existing
is the Impartial Board for Settlement of Jurisdictional Dis-
putes. Most collective bargaining contracts in construction
specify that disputes over work assignment are to be submit-
ted for resolution to the Impartial Board, which is composed
of three neutral members and is located in Washington D.C.
There are many problems in the collective bargaining struct-
ure and the various reform proposals are being discussed in
the industry. The following are the problems in present
collective bargaining system identified during the observat-
ion presented above:-
-In many localities and branches of the construction indus-
try the geographical scope of bargaining is too narrow.
Workers and contractors operate over wider area than before
because of modern transportation system and more widespread
business competition.
-It could be beneficial to all parties, and be in the public
interest to provide separate wages for different branches of
the construction industry in some localities and branches of
the industry. Such differences prevail in some localities
and not in others.
-The machinery for the settlement of collective bargaining
disputes in the industry is inadequate. It cannot meet the
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requirements of the decentralized and localized structure of
bargaining, nor resolve the complex issues that bargaining
confronts today.
-The succession of contract termination dates, coupled with
traditional rivalries among the crafts, has created a pattern
of leapfrogging settlements. Each craft may seek to better
the settlements achieved by the other.
-The information available to negotiating parties and their
national leaders is often inadequate to the needs of effect-
ive problem solving through collective bargaining. Accurate
information about manpower availability and future needs is
often nonexistent. In the absence of information, collective
bargaining may become no more than an argument over the mat-
ters that could largely be resolved by the presentation of
factual evidence.
3.5.2 Comparison between Union and Nonunion Wages and Labor
Management Practices
Managers of construction firms have the right, under U.S.
labor law, to unilaterally decide whether they will operate
a union or open shop. In contrast to their peer in large
manufacturing industries, construction managers may sign pre-
hire agreements with building trade unions to represent their
workers, or alternatively, they may hire workers directly and
negotiate wages and working conditions individually. Accord-
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ing to the survey by Raymond Levitt on union and nonunion
construction in 8 metropolitan areas for U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development in 1976, some interesting points
can be identified. In all 8 areas, most of the union firms
that responded identified themselves as doing a majority of
their work in either commercial/industrial or heavy and high-
way construction. In contrast, the open shop firms were
primarily engaged in residential or commercial/industrial
owrk, or both (see table 3.5.4). In all areas surveyed, open
shop firms were found to be considerably smaller than union
firms doing similar types of constrcution, although there
are a few very large open shop firms, both general and sub-
contractors, in most of the areas surveyed.
Unions tend to dominate the medium-sized projects, whereas
nonunion firms are strong in very small and very large-scale
construction. The rationale for this is that the small-scale
projects are more efficiently performed by broadly trained
and utilized workers. The union occupational structure, which
breaks all construction tasks down into more than 20 trades
is too narrowly specialized for small-scale projects. The
union jurisdictional boundaries, if enforced on small projects
resulted in standby labor or constant turnover of workers
within each craft as their work is completed. Nonetheless,
nonunion firms enjoy more flexibility to use and train jour-
neymen on small-scale consrtuction projects - especially on
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multicraft tasks such as pouring foundations - with attendants
increases in efficiency. At the other end of the size spect-
rum, multi-billion dollar industrial projects employing
thousands of onsite workers permit the economical use of
highly specialized workers without standby inefficiencies.
In the intermediate size project range - large buildings and
heavy construction projects - the union jurisdictions define
an occupational breadth that is appropriate to the scale and
technological complexity of projects. Union firms are, there-
fore, able to use their journeymen efficiently. In addition,
hiring halls permit union contractors to quickly assemble
work crews for individual projects. The combination of these
two factors results in a domination of this sector of this
sector of the industry by union construction firms, even in
parts of the country that have relatively low levels of
unionization (see table 3.5.5).
There are considerable variation in skills and productivity
of individual journeymen, even though employers were required
to pay all the same minimum hourly rate. Contractors respond
to this by keeping the most productive journeymen and firing
the least productive; despite the myths of the "restrictive
hiring hall", union hiring and referral practices are gener-
ally described as being flexible enough to permit this. In
contrast, open shop contractors vary wage levels on the basis
of individual differences in worker characteristics. They
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feel this provides a better incentive for workers to become
and remain productive. In fact, these two approaches may
result in equivalent incentives for workers to become and
remain productive, i.e., union firms adjust the worker to the
wage, whereas nonunion firms adjust the wage to the worker.
The average open shop wage is substantially lower than the
union rate in all cases. However, the distribution of open
shop wage is generally so wide that the wage level of nonun-
ion leadman or foreman is higher than union journeymen rate
for that trade. The substantial differences between union
and average nonunion rates may be partially explained by the
different types of work performed by union and open shop firms
- the former concentrating for the most part on larger comm-
ercial/industrial and heavy and highway projects and the lat-
ter on residential and smaller commercial work - as well as
by union bargaining power. The construction performed by
open shop segment of industry is apparently increasing rapidly
and this phenomenon can be understood by focusing on various
short term and long term conditions and changes in the ind-
ustry.
In most cases, both types of firms hire through a network of
informal contacts maintained by their foremen and key journey
men. Open shop firms supplement this by use of various other
sources such as newspaper advertisements or local public
employment services; union firms rely on the hiring hall,
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especially for assembling large crews quickly. As open shop
firms have grown in size and activity in various areas, they
have come to see the need for a central referral system, both
as a means of hiring new workers and in placing those laid
off, and local associations of ABC and AGC are operating some
referral centers for nonunion workers and member firms.
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Table 3.5.1 Characteristics of Employment in Construction
Considerable shift of employees between work sites.
Considerable shifting of employees between employers.
Identification by employee with a craft or occupation, not with an
employer.
A relatively large portion of skilled workers.
Much self-supervision.
Very unstable employment opportunities.
Dangerous and often difficult work conditions.
Intermixing of employees of different employers at a single project site.
Construction of nonstandard (i.e., custom-designed) products.
Intermixing of members of different unions at a single project site.
Source: Daniel Quinn Mills, Labor Management Relations, McGraw-Hill, 1986
Table 3.5.2 Branches of Construction Industry, Principal Unions, and
Geographic Coverage of Agreements
Branch
Highway construction
Pipeline construction
Electrical transmission
lines
Industrial and power
plant construction
Principal unions
Carpenters
Laborers
Operating engineers
Cement masons
Teamsters
Pipefitters
Operating engineers
Laborers
Teamsters
Electricians (IBEW)
Geographic coverage
of agreements
Local
National
Local
Pipefitters National and local
Ironworkers
Electricians (IBEW)
Boilermakers
Millwrights (United
Brotherhood of Carpenters)
Carpenters
Laborers
Source: Daniel Quinn Mills, Labor Management Relations, McGraw-Hill, 1986
Note: For building contractors, see table 3.5.3
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Table 3.5.3 Bargaining Structure in Building Construction: Major
Employer Associations and Unions
Geographic coverage
Employer associaticn Principal unions
Associated General Contractors
(AGC)
National Association of
Homebuilders (NAHB)
Mason Contractors Association
of America (ICAA)
National Electrical Contractors
Association (NECA)
Elevator Constructors Fmployers
Association
Mechanical Constructors of
America (ICA)
Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning
Contractors National
Association (SMACNA)
National Erectors Association
International Association of
Eall and Ceiling Contractors
(IA&C)
National Insulation Contractors
Association (NICA)
Painting and Decorating
Contractors Association
(PDCA)
National Roofing Contractors
Association (NRCA)
mPlnbing, heating, and Cooling
Contractors National
Association (P~HINA)
Carpenters
Laborers
Operating engineers
Teamsters
Iranworkers (rod workers)
Carpenters
Laborers
Bricklayers
Bricklayers
Electricians (IBEW)
Elevator constructors
Pipefitters
Sheet metal workers
Ironworkers (Structural)
Plasters
Asbestos workers
Painters
Roofers
Plunbers
oIcal or state
Local or state
Local
Local
National (except New
York City)
Local
Local
Local
Local
Local
Local
Local
Local
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Source: DAniel Quinn Mills, labor Management Relations, Gkraw-Hill, 1986
Table 3.5.4 Percentage of Union and Openshop Employment by Product Market
Union as a percentage Openshop as a percentage
Residen- Cammercial/ Heavy & Residen- Cmercial/ Heavy &
Area tial industrial highway tial industrial highway
Boston 11.0 72.0 17.0 55.0 41.0 4.0
Baltimore 2.0 63.0 35.0 49.0 46.0 5.0
Atlanta 0.6 91.0 8.4 26.0 65.0 9.0
New Orleans 0.5 92.0 7.5 16.0 82.0 2.0
Grand Rapid 1.0 48.0 51.0 48.0 49.0 3.0
Kansas City 7.0 61.0 32.0 68.0 32.0 0.0
Denver 6.0 73.0 21.0 68.0 29.0 3.0
Portland 11.0 72.0 17.0 67.0 24.0 9.0
Source: Raymond Levitt, Union versus Nonunion Construction in the U.S.,
ASCE Journal of the Construction Division, Vol. 105, C04,
December, 1979
Note: Based on the survey of 2560 companies in 8 metropolitan areas
Table 3.5.5 Map of Industry with Rough Assessment of Openshop Activitj
Size
Small Medium Large
Sector -$2 mill. $2-10 mill. +$10 mill.
Residential
Single family N M M
Garden apartment N M U
High rise M M U
Commercial
Stores/shopping centers N M U
Offices N M U
Manufacturing M U M
EduchiloeAl M U U
Medical U U U
Heavy
Utilities M U U
Transportation M U U
Water/sewage M M U
-------------------------------------------------------- --
Source: Raymond Levitt, Union versus
Note: U; union N; nonunion M; mixed
Nonunion Construction In the U.S.
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CHAPTER 4
COMPARISON BETWEEN U.S. AND KOREAN CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
In the preceeding chapters, various aspects of the construc-
tion industry in both U.S. and Korea were reviewed. Before
jumping into the conclusion, it may be worthwhile to compare
a few outstanding characteristics of the industry in both
countries. In this chapter, the characteristics of the two
countries' construction industry will be compared in the
areas of scale and economic characteristics, structure of
the industry, mode of operation, market sectors and others.
It is well known that the U.S. construction market is the
largest and the most advanced in the world. Although Korea
has shown remarkable performance in the international const-
ruction market especially in the Middle East, it is still a
developing country and the size of the local market is very
small compared to that of the many developed countries part-
icularly to U.S. The size of Korean domestic construction
market is a little more than $10 billion, and about $20 bil-
lion including its overseas construction. As the size of the
markets in two countries are dufferent in scale, there should
be some generic differences which cannot be compared only by
the statistical numbers. However, the comparison based on
the statistics may also reveal some meaningful indicative
characteristics of the'construction industries in both coun-
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tries.
Since the U.S. construction market is one of the few promish-
ing markets in the developed region of the world for Korean
contractors, it may be helpful if we could compare the stat-
istics of the U.S. as well as other developed countries'
construction industry as available. In general, Korean ind-
ustries have been influenced greatly by the Japanese indust-
ries -- the construction industry is not an exception. In
the course of comparing Korean construction industry with
that of U.S., it may be beneficial to look at the Japanese
construction industry as well since Japan has been active in
the U.S. construction market for the last few years. In
fact, the U.S. has become the largest Japanese international
construction market in 1984.
4.1 Scale and Economic Characteristics
According to "Historical Statistics of OECD", the total size
of the construction market of OECD countries is about $924
billion in 1983. Among them, the U.S. accounted for $307
billion (33.1 percent), Japan for $215 billion (23.3 percent),
total of EEC countries for $249 billion (26.9 percent) and
the rest of the OECD countries accounted for $152 billion
(16.5 percent). No exact statistics of the size of the con-
struction market for the rest of the world is available but
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it is generally estimated to be about $300 billion. The size
of construction market in the developed region is overwhelm-
ingly larger than that of the developing countries. Unlike
the developing region, however, the market in the developed
countries did not attract much attention of international
contractors because their demands have largely been satisfied
by their own construction capacity.
The contribution of construction industry to nation's GDP is
similar in both U.S. and Korea as U.S. construction accounted
for 9.4 percent whereas Korea reached 9.9 percent in 1983.
However, these numbers are much lower than the average of all
OECD or EEC countries. The Japanese construction industry's
contribution to GDP is especially high as their number reached
to 18.6 percent in 1983 and they used to be higher than 20
percent for the last decade or so (see figure 4.1). The pro-
portion of Japanese construction in their national economy
is much larger than that of other countries. Indeed the
growth of Japanese construction industry has been sustained
by the growth of its economy since World War II. This may
explain why Japanese construction firms did not enter the
overseas market until recently and still their dependency to
overseas market compared to domestic market is much lower
than that of other countries.
Construction industry is known to be the one of the most
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cyclical in nature among many industries. The housing sector
is generally recognized as countercyclical, as this sector
is greatly influenced by the government monetary policy.
However, the construction industry in general follows the
the cycle of overall economy although its amplitude of fluc-
tuation is significantly larger than that of overall economy.
In Korea, construction has played major role in their econ-
omic development. If we compare the growth rates of GNP and
construction in Korea, the growth differentials between these
two areas have been fluctuating widely but construction has
been growing faster than GNP in general. In the case of the
U.S., construction has not kept up with the growth of GNP
(see figure 4.2). While the growth of construction industry
is behind that of overall economy, the composite cost index
of construction industry has been growing faster than that
of producer price index and average hourly earning of const-
ruction workers.
In 1984, the total volume of U.S. construction was $344 bil-
lion of which $313 billion was in the domestic market and
$31 billion overseas. This means U.S. construction industry's
dependency on international market is about 9 percent although
they are number one in international construction. In the
case of Japan, their dependency rate is even lower than that.
The total value of construction in Korea reached about 16.2
trillion won in 1984 of which 7.4 trillion won was achieved
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by overseas construction activities. This means Korean con-
struction depends about 45 percent of their total construct-
ion on overseas activities. This percentage is much lower
than that of the last 10 years, as their overseas activities
have been reduced significantly while the domestic activities
have been increased constantly. Korea's heavy dependency on
overseas construction may mean that the Korean construction
industry has expanded disproportionately over the size of its
overall economy. In another point of view, the smallness of
Korean domestic market compared to the size of construction
industry has made the industry vulnerable to the international
market condition.
The U.S. construction industry employs about 5.2 million
people which is about 5 percent of the nation's total labor
force whereas the Korean construction industry employs
903,000 people in 1984, about 6.3 percent of its total 14
million labor force. The Japanese construction industry emp-
loys about same number of people as U.S. Considering the
large difference in the value of construction between U.S.
and Korea (U.S. construction is more than 15 times larger
than Korea's total construction including overseas activity),
the number of employed persons of 5.2 million in U.S. is less
than 6 times that of Korea. Korea's construction industry
is much more labor intensive than that of U.S. and Japan.
Aside from the differences in productivity, this might have
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caused the fundamental differences in the perception of the
industrial pattern.
4.2 Structure of Construction Industry
The construction industry in general is fragmented, being
made of a large number of small and specilaized firms. The
fragmentation of U.S. construction industry seems to be more
noticeable. One distinctive aspect of the fragmentation of
the U.S. construction industry is the establishments without
employees which accounted for 67.1 percent of all 1.4 million
construction establishments in the U.S. in 1982. As a result,
93.8 percent of all the U.S. construction establishments are
being operated with less than 10 employees. If the establ-
ishments without payroll are excluded from the U.S. statist-
ics, 81.1 percent of all 456,701 establishments with payroll
still employ less than 10 employees. These numbers are much
higher than comparable numbers of Japan and Korea. Only 54.1
percent of all Korea's 10,602 firms and 50.6 percent of all
Japanese establishments of half a million are operated with
less than 10 employees (see figure 4.3).
The large number of small firms perform a disproportionately
small value of construction. In 1982, establishments in the
U.S. with less than 10 employees accounted for 28.2 percent
of all business receipts that year. If we count only the
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establishments with payroll, the percentage is reduced to
19.2. In case of Japan, firms with less than 10 employees
performed 4.3 percent of total Japanese construction. The
comparable number of the Korean construction establishments
is only 1.0 percent (see figure 4.4). Most of Korea's small
firms are basically involved in specialty trade contractors
whereas the U.S. and Japanese small firms are either specialty
trade contractors or small scale general building contractors.
The difference may be due to the presence of the large number
of single family housing contractors in the U.S. and Japan.
Those numbers are counted in the U.S. and Japanese statistics,
but not in Korea as significant portion of the single family
housing construction in Korea has been covered by the informal
sector of construction (see figures 4.5 and 4.6). The large
portion of informal construction sector is a typical charact-
eristic of the construction industry in the developing count-
ries.
On the other end of size scale, a very small number of large
firms dominate a considerable portion of construction market
of each country. The degree of domination is different by
country. In 1982, 4,175 firms with more than 100 employees
(0.3 percent of all establishments) accounted for 31 percent
of all business receipts in the U.S. The equivalent numbers
in Japan were 3,516 firms (0.7 percent of all establishments)
and 39.5 percent of all business receipts in 1983. The dom-
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ination of large firms in Korea is the most remarkable as 904
companies with more than 100 employees (8.5 percent) accounted
for 90.5 percent of all business receipts and 88 companies
with more than 1,000 employees (0.8 percent) were responsible
for 66.8 percent of business in 1984. In the U.S., the con-
struction market is shared by five different size groups of
establishments i.e. the establishments with no employees,
with less than 10 employees, with 10 to 49 employees, with
50 to 99 employees and with more than 100 employees as pres-
ently sharing 11.1, 17.1, 28.7, 12.1 and 31.0 percent of the
market respectively. The Japanese construction industry is
represented by two distinctive groups, one with 10 to 49 emp-
loyees which may be called as medium size firms and the firms
with more than 100 employees, and each group shares 49.3 per-
cent and 39.5 percent of 1983 Japanese construction market.
In Korea, however, there is no real competition among the
different size group of companies as 88 companies with more
than 1,000 employees accounted for 66.8 percent of the market
and companies with more than 100 employees represented for
90.5 percent of the market. As in other industries, the num-
ber and market share of small and medium size companies' in
the Korean construction industry is less than what it should
be by the standard of other countries. This unbalanced dis-
tribution of market share may have been the result of Korea's
extraordinarily fast growth of overseas construction. The
growth of the large companies have been mostly due to their
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overseasconstruction activities. This is a kind of oligopoly
and might have helped Korean construction industry competit-
ive in the international construction market as compared to
the size of its own construction industry as a whole but this
can also mean that Korean construction industry lacks the
support from the broad base of small and medium firms.
4.3 Mode of Operation
The top U.S. contractors, especially the top 10 contractors,
are the design constructors with expertise in design and
construction of process plant and other industrial facilities.
As the only sector of the construction industry in which des-
ign -build is the dominant mode is process and industrial
plant construction, the design constructors (especially for
the top 10 contractors) naturally mean the the process and
industrial plant builders. Typical characteristics of these
firms are geographical diversification. Most of them are
multi-national operations, and have operating subsidiaries
or principal offices in foreign countries. Naturally they
rely large portion of business on foreign markets. Their
business activities are conducted throughout the world, in
highly industrialized, semi-industrialized, and developing
countries. This is in large measure due to the highly tech-
nical nature of their work, the high level of expertise req-
uired, and the large number of trained and experienced per-
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sonnel needed to design and build these complex facilities.
The top 10 companies contracted $26.3 billion foreign projects
in 1984 which was 85.1 percent of the total international
contracts by U.S. firms. Their dependency on foreign contr-
acts averaged 48.1 percent in 1984 (see table 4.1). The top
10 contractor's dependency on foreign contract is now decr-
easing due to the decrease of international construction and
increase of U.S. domestic costruction.
General building construction tends to be the most localized
in nature. The geographical market of even some of the lar-
gest building contractors is concentrated in a particular
region or a few metropolitan areas. Some of high ranking
heavy contractors tend to have multinational operations gen-
erally in the developing countries. However, they have to
compete fiercely with the contractors from developing count-
ries like Korea. A large portion of the top contractors next
to the top 10 is composed of the general building contractors
and heavy contractors. As mentioned before, these companies
are doing most of the business in the domestic market. The
dependency on foreign contracts of the second 10 largest
companies accounted for only 9.8 percent and the third larg-
est 10 largest companies for 14.8 percent.
The Japanese top ranking contractors are generally special-
izing in building or civil engineering work or both but few
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general contractors do plant construction works except for
building or civil engineering portion of the plant construc-
tion as there are some companies specilizing this area. The
size of the Japanese top 10 contractors are somewhat smaller
than U.S. top 10 but larger than the second 10 largest comp-
anies (see table 4.2). Since the top 10 U.S. companies are
mostly plant constructors, Japanese top 10 contractors and
U.S. contractors below top 10 are comparable in terms of type
of construction they specialize. In this regard, the Japanese
top 10 contractors are bigger in size and somewhat more div-
ersified as they are more vertically integrated.
Except for a few, Korea's top 10 contractors are much smaller
in size than their U.S. or Japanese counterparts (see table
4.3). Because the Korean domestic market is small, smaller
companies (compare to U.S. and Japanese top contractors) had
to go abroad whereas the companies of similar sizes in U.S.
and Japan stay in the domestic market unless they can offer
some differentiated services. Although they were not equipped
with high level expertise and experiences, they could be com-
petitive in infrastructure construction which they had accum-
ulated substantial experiences through the domestic constr-
uction. Since the mid 1970s, there was plenty of demand for
infrastructure work in the Middle East and they could also
bring their own inexpensive and well disciplined labor force
there which was not normal in other international construct-
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ion market. As a result, more than 80 percent of Korea's
overseas construction was achieved by the building and civil
engineering projects. Although Korea's top contractors have
constructed some sizable plant facilities and accumulated
considerable experiences in the plant construction, they are
primarily the general building and heavy contractors and their
strength is in the construction of buildings and civil engin-
eering projects. This means the characteristics of top
Korean contractors are similar to that of Japan although
Korean companies are more flexible in scope of services.
However, the size of the top Korean contractors are smaller
than comparable U.S. top contractors unlike the case of Japan.
However, the size of business receipts alone can not fully
explain the strength of the contractors as general building
contractor's localized nature. There are many general build-
ing contractors of smaller size in terms of total business
receipts than top class Japanese or Korean general contract-
ors, who can provide much more efficient and comprehensive
services as the concentration of their business in the certain
locality.
As mentioned in the previous chapters, Korean contractors
tend to be maintaining more self-contained structures as they
lack the support from the broad base of small and medium
firms, and other related industries due to lack of research
and industrial substructures. Whether the vertical and hor-
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izontal diversification caused by this industry's structural
deficiency will work favorably in the U.S. market remains to
be seen.
4.4 Labor Relations
Labor union activity in the Korean construction industry,
like most of the other industries, is virtually not existent.
There is no concept of trade unions in Korean consrtuction
industry. The prevalent types of union is a union of all
trades in the company. However, the union activity, if it
exists, is only nominal and severely limited. They cannot
go on strike under present labor regulations. Instead of
labor unions, there are some alternative mechanisms called
labor-management committees that are being operated, but
their activity is very limited. In this regard, there are
not enough mechanisms in the Korean construction industry
(industry in general) for resolution of workers grievances.
In other words, Korea's management, instead of its workers,
are working in a very protected environment. This environ-
ment provides the managements great flexibility in business
operation. The operational characteristics of the Korean
construction companies, though not a union, are much differ-
ent from that of open shop companies in the U.S. Although
open shop companies in the U.S. are being operated without
unions they are significantly influenced by the union shop.
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In many ways, they are in competition with each other. The
presence of both union and open shops provides an ideal check
and balance for the operation of construction industry in
general. As this mechanism does not exist in the Korean con-
struction industry, there is some room for unacceptable labor
practice of Korean construction industry by the American
standard. Nonetheless, the absence of union activities in
Korea has contributed, to some extent, the competitiveness
of KOrean contractors in the international construction mar-
ket. By this reason, Korean management is, by and large, not
familiar with the concept of the collective bargaining. This
can be one of the important disadvantages for Korean contr-
actors in managing the projects in the U.S. if they get the
projects.
4.5 Market by Sectors
In the U.S., the share of private construction is increasing
constantly while that of the public construction is decreas-
ing. In 1984, only 17.6 percent of total new construction
was for public sector while the remaining 82.4 percent was
for private sector construction. The size of U.S. private
residential construction market is impressive as it accounted
for 46.4 percent of total construction. In Japan, the port-
ion of the public construction is larger than that of U.S.
accounting for 39.7 percent of the market but the private
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sector is still the dominant market. In Japan, the public
sector's contribution to civil works is remarkable as it
accounted for 30.6 percent of the total construction in 1980
whereas the public sector's contribution to the residential
buildings was negligeable. The domination of private sector
construction is typical in construction market of industrial
market economy. As the private residential construction's
share of the market is significant and the mortgage is the
primary source of financing in this sector, the government
monetary policy can impact greatly on the market mechanism.
Unlike the U.S. and Japan, the larger portion of the constr-
uction market is taken by the public sector in Korea. In
1984, the public sector construction accounted for 51.4 per-
cent of total value of construction. Among the public sector,
the share of the public corporation is significant accounting
for 17.9 percent of total construction. Instead of market
mechanism, the government's direct leverage in construction
market is greater in Korea (see figure 4.7).
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Figure 4.1 Construction as a Percentage of GDP for Various Countries
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Source: OECD, Historical Statistics, Paris, 1985
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Figure 4.3 Number of Establishments by Employment Size Class
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Figure 4.4 All Business Receipts by Employment Size Class
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Figure 4.5 Establishments by Type of Works in the
Establishments with or without payroll
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Figure 4.6 Establishments by Type of Works in Korea and Japan
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Table 4.1 Top U.S. Contractors: 1984
(millions of dollars)
Total Percent of
Rank Firms contract foreign
1 Kellog Rust Inc. 10,855.0 79.5
2 Fluor Corp. 8,353.3 18.3
3 Bechtel Group Inc. 8,220.0 59.7
4 The Parsons Corp. 7,514.7 40.1
5 Stearn Catalytic Corp. 4,932.3 11.1
6 Brown & Root Inc. 3,883.9 33.2
7 Lummus Crest Inc. 3,200.0 71.9
8 Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. 2,923.2 69.0
9 Foster Wheeler Corp. 2,413.0 80.1
10 Raymond International Inc. 2,347.3 6.0
11 Turner Corp. 2,154.0 1.5
12 Morrisson-Knudsen Co., Inc. 2,086.7 22.2
13 Ebasco Service Inc. 1,580.5 8.5
14 Jones Group Inc. 1,535.4 0.2
15 Guy F. Atkinson Co. of California 1,498.7 25.6
16 BE & K Inc. 1,255.0 0.0
17 Dravo Corp. 1,231.7 30.6
18 Gilbane Building Co. 1,149.1 0.0
19 Perini Corp. 1,139.3 43.4
20 Barton-Malow co. 1,126.2 0.0
21 Walbridge Aldinger Co. 1,021.6 36.8
22 George A. Fuller Co. 1,021.6 27.8
23 Centex-Bateson-Rooney-Golden 1,014.0 0.0
24 Blount International Ltd. 1,006.3 1.5
25 Dillingham Construction Corp. 860.9 33.5
26 McCarthy 805.0 1.7
27 Peter Keiwit & Sons' Inc. 776.2 14.0
28 CEI Construction Inc. 753.5 0.0
29 Hubber, Hunt & Nichols Inc. 748.4 0.0
30 Ford, Bacon & Davis Inc. 729.0 25.5
Source: ENR/April 18, 1985
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Table 4.2 Top Japanese Contractors: 1985
(millions of dollar)
Total Percent of
Rank Firms contract foreign
1 Taisei Construction 4,191.9 6.8
2 Kajima Construction 4,034.9 6.9
3 Shimizu Construction 3,998.0 8.9
4 Ohbayashi-Gumi 3,317.4 5.3
5 Takenaka Komuten 2,971.7 7.4
6 Kumagai-Gumi 2,660.1 21.0
7 Fujita-Kogyo 1,893.6 5.1
8 Hazama-Gumi 1,540.0 17.2
9 Toda Construction 1,488.5 2.8
10 Tobishima Construction 1,362.3 4.3
11 Maeda Construction 1,360.2 4.2
12 Nishimatsu Construction 1,228.1 13.6
13 Goyo Construction 1,186.4 32.1
14 Tokyu Construction 1,170.5 4.7
15 Sato-Kogyo 1,167.1 11.0
16 Mitsui Construction 1,064.5 2.0
17 Kohnoike-Gumi 990.7 1.8
18 Okumura-Gumi 981.8 1.3
19 Sumitomo Construction 837.6 2.9
20 Hasegawa Komuten 837.1 0.0
Top Japanese Design-Constructors; 1985
Chiyoda Chemical Const. 1,321.6 82.0
Nikki (JGC Corp.) 1,313.6 58.0
Toyo Engineering Co. 747.9 86.0
Source: Yoshimitsu Nakamura, Construction Industry, Kyoiku-sha, Tokyo,
1985
Japan Company Handbook, Toyo Keizai Shipo Sha Ltd., Tokyo, 1985
Kensetsu-Kogyo Shinbun, June 28, 1985
Note: Exchange rate; $1 = 231.0 yen (average in 1985)
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Table 4.3 Top Korean Contractors: 1984
(millions of dollar)
Total Percent of
Rank Firms contract foreign
1 Hyundai Engineering & Construction 3,016.8 82.6
2 Daewoo Corp. 1,056.0 64.1
3 Daelim Industrial 924.0 80.3
4 Hanyang Corp. 856.4 51.0
5 Samsung Construction 445.0 52.6
6 Samwhan Corp. 392.4 49.5
7 Lucky Development 367.7 54.0
8 Korea Development Corp. 322.2 58.9
9 Hanil Development Corp. 296.9 58.7
10 Samho International 295.6 49.5
Engineering News Record, July 18, 1985
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Figore 4.7 Structure of Construction Market
U.S. (1984)
Public Sector (17.6 %)
Japan (1980)
Public Sector (39.7 %)
Private Sector (82.4 %)
Korea (1984)
Public Sector (51.4 %)
Private Sector (48.6 %)
Source: 1984 Report on Construction Work Survey, EPB of Korea, 1985
Construction Review, Sept/Oct. 1985, U.S. Dept. of Commerce
Survey of Construction, Ministry of Construction of Japan, 1985
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY, STRATEGY IMPLICATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
FURTHER RESEARCH
The construction industry in developed countries has grown
relatively fast since World War II with the demand created
as a result of war and rapid modernization of industry as
well as society. The construction capacity developed during
this period became greater than the demand during the past
20 years. This excess in capacity has been mostly absorbed
by the developing countries where the demand has largely
exceeded the capacity of the local construction industry in
both physically and technologically. The excess demand came
from the economic development of the developing countries
and this demand was further accelerated by the oil shock
which enabled the countries in the Middle East accumulate a
large amount of investment resources. For the past few years,
however, the demand from the developing countries especially
from the Middle East has been reduced significantly. This
decrease is mainly due to the decrease in construction demand
from the Middle Eastern oil exporting countries which accoun-
ted for more than one-third of the international construction
market. This lessened demand is due primarily to in oil
prices. The large excess capacity of construction in the
developed countries which cannot be absorbed fully by the
market in the developing 'countries is bound to spill over
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each others market of the developed countries. To sell the
products or services to the saturated market, seller must
have comparative advantages backed up by the differentiated
services or products with competitive price. Higher produc-
tivity and differentiated products can be achieved by the
development of new materials, innovative management or tech-
nology.
The U.S. market is not viewed as an easy pickings by any
means, with its confusing array of building codes, government
regulations, labor laws and traditions. But because it is
viewed as a huge, and stable market, many international con-
tractors tried this market and succeeded. In 1984, 66 of the
international contractors performed $5.9 billion worth of
work in the U.S. It is a significant increase from 1983's
$3.6 billion by 35 contractors. Europeans by far the great-
est share of the U.S. work going to overseas firms but the
performance of Japanese firms was also impressive as contr-
acting $0.8 billion which made U.S. the largest Japanese
overseas construction market.
Throughout the previous chapters, a number of issues and cha-
racteristics of construction industry in both U.S. and Korea
have been reviewed and compared. Many differences as well
as similarities have been observed. In this chapter, what
what have been observed and discussed will be summarized.
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Then the conclusive implications on how the Korean internat-
ional construction industry should do to participate and con-
tribute in the markets of the developed countries especially
that of U.S. will be presented. Since all the aspects of the
related subjects cannot be accommodated in this thesis, some
of the interesting areas are left for the further researches.
5.1 Summary of Construction Industry in Korea and U.S.
5.1.1 Korean Construction Industry
Korean construction industry has grown and contributed much
to its national economy with the help of the factors unique
to Korea such as: rehabilitation from the war destruction;
construction of U.S. military projects in Korea; large cons-
truction demand for the economic development mostly financed
by the foreign agencies. These factors contributed to the
growth of Korean industry greatly. The growth of construct-
ion industry in turn contributed much to its national economy.
These strengths of Korean construction industry grown domes-
tically worked well in the Middle Eastern market as:-
-The unprecedented magnitude of demand for building and
infrastructure construction which Koreans are familiar with
-Middle Eastern countries, though rich in financial resour-
ces, were largely in short supply of resources such as skil-
led manpower, technology and management capability for cons-
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truction
-On the other hand, Koreans were able to provide their sur-
plus resources which could ideally supplement what Middle
Eastern countries needed such as, labor force, technical and
managerial capability in very economical term.
This was a very unusual setting in favor of Korean construc-
tion industry. The Korea's competitive advantages in this
market was further backed up by the Korean government which
needed foreign currency to ease the current account deficit.
However, their competitive advantage brought limited success
in other regional market as the characteristics of the markets
were different from that of unique Middle Eastern market,
such as:-
-There existed a cheaper labor and many restrictions to the
entry of foreign labor
-Unlike Middle Eastern countries, they are mostly capital
poor developing countries requiring competitive financing
packages as well as technical assistance to local establish-
ments
-More technology intensive projects are offered for the
international contractors
As oil price started to decline, so did the demand for inter-
national construction particularly from the Middle East.
Koreans were one of the hardest hit from this reduced demand
from the Middle East as:-
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-Excessive concentration of the overseas construction act-
ivities in the Middle East.
-Excessive dependency on the low technology content project,
such as building and infrastructure works while the infrast-
ructure constructions were nearly complete in some countries
in the Middle East.
-Excessive dependency on overseas construction as inter-
national construction accounted more than a half of Korea's
construction. Furthermore, the following factors have wors-
ened the performance of Korean international construction:-
-Increasing localization of the construction activities by
the ordering countries.
-Challenge from other developing countries with the lower
wage levels than that of Korea.
These challenges are mostly in the building and infrastruct-
ure construction area which Koreans are considered competit-
ive. Moreover, the nature of international construction is
shifting to high technology content projects but Koreans are
not well equipped to switch their market to the construction
of the high technology content projects. Other issues pres-
ently facing the Korean construction industry include:-
-Lack of basic engineerig skills although the capacity to
do detailed engineering has increased substantially.
-Lack of financing capability.
-Lack of backward linkages with domestic suppliers of mat-
erials and equipments in international construction.
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However we can still identify several demonstrated strengths
of the Korean construction industry which include following:-
-Although Koreans are not particularly competitive in the
plant construction, they are still maintaining the strength
in the building and infrastructure construction.
-Their basic design capability still remains in the earlier
stage of development but they have established a substantial
strength in the detailed engineering area.
-Compared to the engineering and management in the developed
countries, the wage levels for technicians, engineers and
managements are much lower in Korea - even after adjusting
for skills and productivity differences.
5.1.2 U.S. Construction Industry
U.S. is the largest construction market in the world. The
new domestic construction put in place amounted to $314 bil-
lion in 1984 and probably reached close to $400 billion if
the maintenance and repair constructions were included. How-
ever, the U.S. construction market is different in many ways
from other regional markets and those differences include:-
-Unlike other regions, it is the most developed country and
itself is the leader of the international construction.
-Its construction technology is the most advanced.
-U.S. is the dominant force in engineering and construction
management in international construction market although its
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leadership in technology seems to be deteriorating in recent
years.
-Although the local labor is expensive, bringing in the low
wage labor from foreign countries is not permissible under
present immigration regulation.
-The existence of labor union and its influence on nonunion
sector.
-Numerous and confusing building codes and regulations.
U.S. construction seems to have grown fast in recent few
years since 1982, but has grown slower than GNP in constant
price for the past 20 years. However, the construction cost
has grown faster than the construction material price and
wage. Although the average earning of construction workers
hasgrown slower than that of manufacturing, unit labor cost
has increased probably due to the declining productivity.
There are some questions, however, about whether the product-
ivity is realy as low as reputed because of the difficulty
of measuring this index with accuracy. Even though we accept
the most of the arguments about the reliability of product-
ivity indexes, still those arguments cannottfullylacc'urnt for
the decrease in productivity. The economic conditions of the
construction industry and the financial performance of firms
in the industry are to a large extent depend upon the factors
external to both industry itself and to construction process.
The wide fluctuation in market demand exists for a number of
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economic reasons; variety of demand composition, conditions
in the capital markets, the states of the national economy,
the seasonal nature of construction and the local nature of
the markets. This coupled with the impact of the government,
in its role as economic policy maker, purchaser, and financ-
ier of construction, creates a climate of economic in all
sectors of the industry.
The fragmented nature of construction industry is the most
visible in the U.S. More than 90 percent of 1.4 million
establishments in construction industry is operating with
less than 10 employees. However, this figure can be mislead-
ing as this number include 930,000 establishments without
employees which is equivalent to 67 percent of total number
of the construction establishments. This is one of the unique
features of the U.S. construction industry and should be con-
sidered specially if we compare the U.S. construction ind-
ustry to that of other countries. With the fragmented nature
of the industry, the small number of large firms account for
the considerable portion of the market. However, the market
is distributed in a more balanced manner as compared to that
of Korea as U.S. market is shared by the five different size
groups of establishments.
Contractors are generally classified into three categories
such as the general contractors, heavy and highway contract-
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ors, and specialty trade contractors by specialization. We
have divided the general contractors further to the general
building contractors and general process plant contractors
for the convenience of comparison. The general process plant
construction is the only sector of construction industry in
which design-build is the dominant mode. Most of the large
process plant design-constructors derive significant portion
of their revenues from their multi-national operations. A
large proportion of the business activities of this group are
conducted throughout the world, in industrialized and devel-
oping countries. This is a large measure due to the highly
technical nature of their work, the high level of expertise
required, and the large number of trained and experienced
personnel needed to design and build those large and complex
facilities. U.S. is a dominant force in this field in inter-
national construction market and the top 10 U.S. construction
companies are all in this category. In contrast, the general
building contractors, which covers a much wider range of
types of facilities, can be and is designed and built by
architects, engineers and contractors indigenous to the loc-
ality. The general building contractors subcontract the maj-
ority of their work. The share of work subcontracted to
others tend to increase with the size of the establishments.
In this group, the locality of the contractors play a sign-
ificant factor to the competitiveness as local contractors
have better local business contacts and better knowledge of
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local construction labor market. Furthermore, the variations
in building codes and lack of reciprocity among jurisdictions
in licencing requirements help the geographic concentration
of the general building contractors. A large portion of
heavy construction work by nature is for public sector cons-
truction. Firms in this group have traditionally generated
the greater proportion of their workload through the compet-
itive bidding system, both in the public and private sectors.
Although most large firms in this category have in-house eng-
ineering capacity, they are not design-constructors as the
design works of heavy construction projects are mostly done
by the professional engineering firms retained by the project
owners. They do some international construction but mostly
in the developing countries.
There are three general types of contracts in use, i.e., cost
plus fixed fee contracts; lump sum and unit price contracts;
guaranteed upset price or fixed limit of construction contr-
acts. However, the relatively high cost of short term finan-
cing, inflation etc. intensified the need to compress the
construction time and as a result, the new approaches have
been developed, some of which are variation of old approach
or application of old approaches to new situation such as the
fast track approach, wider application of the design-build
contracts and construction management. Four types of contr-
actual arrangements can be identified each depend upon the
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type of project and operational characteristics, and those
are; competitive bidding; negotiated contracts; direct neg-
otiation between the owners and the subcontractors in spec-
ulative building construction; force account construction
for repairs and maintenance or simple construction tasks.
Governments at all level transact most of their procurement
business on a competitive bidding basis regulated by statut-
ory requirements. But in the private sector, the owner can
exercise a substantial degree of his own discretion in award-
ing the contracts. In public sector construction, there are
several additional requirements the contractors should follow
such as the prevailing wage requirements and the equal empl-
oyment opportunity provision. To avoid bid shopping and bid
peddling, ten states including Massachusetts, California and
Rhode Island require the submission of filed subcontractor
bids. However, the filed subbid laws differ in their prov-
isions, permitting varying degrees of lattitude on the part
of the general contractor in choosing his subcontractors.
Aside from ten states with the filed subbid laws, nine states
including New York and New Jersey require the awarding of
separate contracts to a general contractors and several spec-
ialty contractors to ensure equall access to public construc-
tion.
Because of peculiar economic conditions and characteristics
of employment in construction, employers and unions are in a
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much more intimate relationship than what is usually found
in other industries. Contractors and unions must negotiate
not only wages and working conditions, but also hiring and
training practices. However, not all crafts, branches of
construction, or geographic areas are unionized at all or same
degree. But all contractors, union or nonunion, are influen-
ced by the labor relations policies of the others. The ind-
ustrial relations arrangements of construction now operate
in three forms, which are in competition for dominance :-
-The system under collective bargaining agreements.
-Open shop arrangements under policies ofcontractor assoc-
iations (the merit shop).
-Unorganized sector.
In a sense, the merit shop associations have adopted many of
the substantial industrial relations policies and procedures
of collective bargaining. No reliable statistics are avail-
able but it is estimated that about 65 percent or more of the
construction in U.S. is done by the nonunion sector. But
there are more union builders around the metropolitan areas.
In metropolitan areas, most of the union firms are said to
be doing a majority of their work in either commercial/indus-
trial or heavy construction while the open shop firms are
primarily engaged in residential or commercial/industrial
work or both. Union tend to dominate the medium-sized proj-
ects, whereas nonunion firms are strong in very small and
very large scale construction. The rationale for this is
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that the small-scale projects are more efficiently performed
by broadly trained and utilized workers whereas the union
jurisdictions define an occupational breadth that is very
appropriate to the scale of technological complexity of proj-
ects.
5.2 Strategy Implications
5.2.1 Generic Competitive Strategies
Michael E. Porter, in his book "Competitive Strategy", delin-
eated three potentially successful generic strategic appr-
oaches to outperforming others in an industry:-
-Overall cost leadership
-Differentiation
-Focus
Korea's traditional competitive advantage in international
construction, like in other industries, has been largely a
cost leadership based on a cheap but highly productive labor.
This advantage is not attainable in the U.S. market as they
cannot be brought into the U.S. market. This is not a prob-
lem Koreans have encountered only in the U.S. market. Now-
adays, Korean can bring only limited labor forces to most of
the international construction markets except for the Middle
East where the restriction to the foreign labor is also
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starting to become tight. In this context, Koreans cannot
enjoy the labor based competitive advantage any more even in
other traditional international construction markets. Furth-
ermore, the wage rate of Korean labor is already higher than
that of many other developing countries while the higher labor
cost does not necessarily accompanied by the same degree of
increase in productivity. Although the contribution of eff-
icient labor force has been cited significantly as the basis
of the growth of Korean construction industry, the contribut-
ion ion of the engineers and management staffs have largely
been ignored. This is partly because their level of exper-
iences and expertise is not comparable to their counterparts
in the developed countries. However, their wage level has
been far less than that of their counterparts in the developed
countries even after adjusting for the differences of skills
and productivity. Aside from these factors, it is logical
to consider the change of competitive strategical basis from
the physical labor to the manpower with higher qualifications
such as engineers and management personnel as Korean industry
develops. By using inexpensive engineering and management
manpowers effectively in the U.S. market, Korean contractors
may be able to save the cost of the projects to some extent.
Since the Korea's traditional competitive strength has been
the cost, they have not established a differentiated image
of the Korean products and services in the international
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market. Recently Korean industry has grown to produce and
sell a number of differentiated and high quality goods but
buyers of Korean goods do not yet appreciate those changes
as the image of Korean made goods have long been associated
with the cheaper price and moderate quality. This is due
primarily to the fact that Korea has long been a recipient
of technology. Their marketing strategy has been to penetr-
ate existing market with existing products and this strategy
has been proved successful. However, Korea has now reached
to the point that they have to develop indigenous technology
to compete with the advanced countries in the areas where the
technology is still evolving. Based on the present level of
technology, it looks unlikely that Koreans are able to prov-
ide dufferentiated services in the U.S. construction market.
At present, it seems to be more appropriate to try to provide
undifferentiated services in this market. At the same time,
Koreans have to pursue rigorously to achieve differentiation
through R&D and innovative management etc. It may be approp-
riate to quote the requirement to produce differentiated goods
which Porter summarized in his book "Competitive Strategy".
The requirements to produce differentiated goods can be
viewed in two categories, i.e., skills and resources require-
ments and organizational requirements. The commonly required
skills and resources include:-
-Strong marketing abilities
-Production engineering
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-Creative flair
-Strong capability in basic research
-Corporate reputation for quality or technological leader-
ship
-Long tradition in the industry or unique combination of
skills drawn from other business
-Strong cooperation from channels
The common organizational requirements are:-
-Strong coordination among functions in R&D, product devel-
opment and marketing
-Subjective measurement and incentive instead of quantitive
measure
-Amenities to attract highly skilled labor, scientists, or
creative people
The low cost and differentiation strategies are usually aim-
ed at achieving their objectives industry-wide. The focus
strategy is built around serving a particular target very
well and each functional policy is developed with this in
mind. The focused target can be a particular buyer group,
segment of product line, or geographical amrket. The strategy
rests on the premise that the firm is thus able to serve its
anrrow strategic target more effectively than competitors who
are competing more broadly. As a result, the firm achieves
either differentiation from better meeting the needs of the
particular target, or lower costs in serving this target or
both. Even though the focus strategy does not achieve low
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or differentiation from the perspective of the market as a
whole, it does achieve one or both of those positions vis-a-
vis its narrow market target. The focus strategy is partic-
ularly recommended for Korean contractors to compete in the
U.S. market which is very large and diverse.
5.2.2 Strategy by the Category of Construction Specialty
As discussed before, the major classifications of construct-
ion firms based on the specialization of the contractors are
general contractors, heavy and highway contractors, and spec-
ialty trade contractors. As the general contractors cover
very large area of the specialization, we further divided
this into two categories, the general building contractors
and the general plant design-constructors. As the most of
the Korea's international contractors are the general contr-
actors specializing in the buildings, civil engineering and
some plant facilities construction, we will concentrate in
these three categories in discussing Korean contractors bus-
iness in the U.S. construction market.
1) Plant Construction
U.S. is a dominant force in design and construction of the
process and industrial plants in the international construc-
tion market. U.S. leadership in construction technology has
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contributed in large part by this segment of industry. Korean
construction companies, in numerous occasions, cooperated
with the U.S. firms in this area to supplement their capab-
ility in design and construction of the plant facilities in
the international construction market. Moreover, a large
portion of plant facilities in Korea had been built by the
U.S. contractors. This category of construction is in large
part performed by the top ranking contractors in the U.S.
equipped with high level expertise, and a large number of
trained and experienced personnel. In this context, it seems
unlikely that Korean contractors be competitive in this seg-
ment of the U.S. market. The competition in this category
of work is particularly intensive because of the large scale
of the proejcts and the scarcity of the projects. Implement-
ation of these projects is very sensitive to the external
economic conditions. The large scale contractors in this
category depend a large portion of their workload on inter-
national market and the reduced international market in these
days intensified the competition in the U.S. domestic market
further.
Design and engineering which account for a significant port-
ion of the project cost require a lot of high level engineer-
ing expertise but the basic design and engineering work req-
uiring high level expertise and creative engineering efforts
accounts only for 20 to 40 percent of the total engineering
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efforts. Remaining 60 to 40 percent of the work is routine
design. This is an area which may offer a good opportunity
for Korean engineering and design firms or integrated const-
ruction companies with design capability to penetrate the
U.S. market. Currently, a man-hour of an experienced design
engineer in the U.S. costs $50-60 (including overhead and
profit). The comparable figure in Korea is around $12-15
per hour. Given such a high cost differential, it makes
utilization of Korean engineering capability economically
attractive to U.S. engineering and design firms. The mech-
anism that seems to emerge is for U.S. firms to receive the
contract, and then to farm out the detailed engineering and
design portion of the project to its Korean design counterpart
firm. Considering the proportion of the routine design, in
total design and engineering work, this will provide a sub-
stantial incentive for the American firms to acquire this
service at a low cost. This will free the American firms of
having an expensive permanent design staff. While this will
allow them to concentrate on sophisticated high-end technol-
ogy, the Korean firms will also benefit in several ways; they
provide a steady job for their staff; it makes them familiar
with more advanced design technology; and it will give them
opportunity to familiarize themselves with the American market.
Existence ofmodern communications and data transmissions al-
most eliminates any need for physical presence of Korean
personnel in the U.S. As the plant construction capability
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especially the design area is strategically important for
Korean international construction, this arrangement may be
used as a stepping stone to enhance Korea's competitiveness
in plant construction in the international construction market
outside the U.S.
2) Heavy Construction
As compare to any other groups of firms in the construction
industry, firms engaged in heavy construction, by nature,
tend to perform a larger percentage of their work for public
sector clients. These firms have traditionally generated the
greater portion of their workload through the competitive
bidding system, both in the public and private sectors.
Although there are a few additional regulatory or statutory
requirements, the public sector bidding may be easier for
Korean contractors to deal with as the rule of game in the
bidding is more visible. Korean international construction
industry's strength has been mostly in the heavy construction
area as their performance record has indicated. The techn-
ologies engaged for this category of work are mostly conven-
tional which Korean contractors have already mastered and
there are not much technological gap between U.S. and Korean
contractors. The heavy contractor's market opportunities in
the U.S. tend to be-geographically diversified, in that a
large proportion of the types of the projects performed by
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contractors are large in dollar volume but are built much
less frequently than "general" construction. Those segment
of the industry with higher than average capital investment
per construction worker operate over a wider geographic area
in order to minimize the adverse effects associated with idle
machinery and equipment. As this category of construction
need more commitment in resources, Korean contractors, if
they want to get the work, must seek some kind of cooperation
with the U.S. contractors to reduce the risks involved in the
operation covering wider geographical area. Although Koreans
have demonstrated their strength in heavy construction in
other international construction markets, they do not have
any decisive competitive advantage over U.S. counterpart as
the most of the technologies Koreans mastered are conventional
and in fact mostly acquired through the companies in the U.S.
To be successful in this market, Koreans have to come up with
new technology or method which can save time and cost subst-
antially without sacrificing the quality. Hereagain, the
R&D efforts basedon the long term objective is recommended
for Korean construction companies. The cases of the Japanese
company Ohbayashi-Gumi's San Fransisco sewage tunnel project
and Austrian company Il Bau Ag's Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority project can be good examples of success in
the U.S. by using innovative construction method and equip-
ment.
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3) Building Construction
Total dollar volume of general building contractors, espec-
ially when the volume of work performed by the specialty
trade contractors is included, makes it the largest sector
in the construction industry. The building construction
tends to be the most fragmented and localized in nature.
The geographic market of even some of the largest building
contractors is concentrated in a particular region or a few
large metropolitan areas. This geographically concentrated
nature of building construction makes out-of-area establish-
ments disadvantaged competing with local firms which have
better local business contacts and better knowledges of local
construction labor market. Considering the localized nature
and high percentage of subcontracts, there seems to be not
much room for foreign contractors being competitive in this
segment of the market. In this respect, what the Japanese
construction companies are doing in this segment of U.S. con-
struction market can be a good reference for Korean contrac-
tors inplanning to enter into this market. Japanese constr-
uction companies are mostly doing the construction of spec-
ulative buildings either in the form of the real estate dev-
elopment or doing a real estate development teaming up with
the local real estate developers. This seems to be based on
the premise that building construction activity alone can not
be profitable for foreign contractors as a number of factors
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exists in favor of the local construction establishments.
Foreign companies like Japanese provide a tital package inc-
luding financing and design to the actual construction. By
doing that, they can eliminate large amount of the margins
involved in engaging the large number of outside participants
and make the project profitable as a whole.
When we discuss interantional construction, the subject of
single family housing is usually excluded from the discussion
as this is the area mostly covered by the small establishments
of the local area and the economy of scale in this segment
of the market is hard to achieve. However, it is also true
that the number of the single family house construction is
so large that the total volume of this segment of the market
is one of the largest in the industry. This market can be
seen as one of the potential market with the help of innov-
ative material or building technology. The case of Misawa
Home of Japan can be a good example. They developed the new
material called PALC (Precastable Autoclaved Lightweight Slab)
made of wastes from factories but has all the advantages of
the convential materials such as wood. Houses built of PALC
are several times stronger than their U.S. counterpart, yet
no more expensive expensive per square foot. With this kind
of innovative material or patented technology, this largely
untouched market by the foreign contractors can be transformed
into one of the largest markets ever because of the large
247
number of the single family housing like automobile.
5.2.3 Marketing Policy Implications
Korean international construction industry is now in deep
trouble because of the decreased orders and serious losses
due to many underbid projects and tight payment conditions.
To make the matters worse, many projects in the Middle East
were contracted to the barter trade arrangement for oil.
With the plummeting oil price due to the excess supply of
world oil, it is not easy to sell the oil to the international
spot market without loss. Although many larger construction
companies in Korea have their own trading companies, Koreans
are not known to be an expert in selling oil than buying not
to mention present upheaval of world oil market.
Although the contribution of Korean international construct-
ion to the overall economy during the 1970s and early 1980s
had been tremendous, it has become a big burden to the nat-
ional economy especially to the Korean financial institution
who guaranteed the contractors for the payment nowadays. As
already mentioned before, reduced demand of international
construction and Korea's limited capacity in financing make
any tangible growth of Korea's international construction
unlikely in near future, twoseanrios for Korean interantional
construction industry can be envisioned. The first is to
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curtail the international construction activity to a minimum
level and shift the emphasis to the domestic market and other
industries. The second is to maintain the emphasis on the
role of international construction industry as there still
exists a great potential of Korean construction industry.
Although international construction market is not as active
as it used to be, still we can identify many large potential
markets in the nearfuture, those potential markets include:-
-China, which is thought unlikely to be opened to Korean
contractors, but considering the size of the market, it should
be worth trying and we may be able to find some alternative
ways to exploit the potentials in this market.
-Middle East, which is now sluggish but there will be a
great amount of demand for reconstruction when the war bet-
ween Iran and Iraq is ended.
-Southeast Asia, nowadays the size of this market is comp-
arable to that of Middle East.
Aside from these three traditional international construction
markets, there also exists some potential in the markets of
the developed countries which include:-
-U.S.
-European market, which Koreans have not seriously consid-
ered but size of this market is approximately a quarter of
the total of the world construction market. U.S. and Japan
have substantial amount of construction activities going on
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in the European market while Koreans have never even tried.
-Japanese market, which seems to be so closed but this
market may not be as closed as it used to be. Although very
close geographically to Korea, this market was not seriously
considered as a potential market. Once opened, Koreans may
have better opportunity than other countries because of the
proximity and cultural background. Furthermore the issue
of the balance of trade may be one of the useful bargaining
tools to open the Japanese construction market to Korean con-
tractors.
It is understandable that many Korean contractors are reluct-
ant or even afraid of going into the markets in the developed
countries as they are not familiar to this market and this
market may requires the technologies of higher level than
what Koreans can offer now. HOwever, Koreans should not
characterize the international construction as similar to the
that of the MiddleEast. Middle East construction market is
very unusual market in comparison to the traditional constr-
uction markets. In most of the traditional international
markets, the required services to be imported are financial
and technological resources not labors as they have plenty
although the quality of the labor can be arguable whereas the
Middle Eastern markets needed the foreign labor as well. In
this respect, Koreans have to free themselves from the per-
ception that the international construction as inseparable
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from the Korean labor. Compare to the situations of constr-
uction industry in 10 or 20 years before, Korea has accumul-
ated a tremendous experiences and expertises in construction
through their activities in international as well as domestic
construction markets. Waste of all these valuable experiences
and expertises is a tremendous loss. And the potential mar-
kets in the developed countries cannot be just given up only
by the fact that the present level of technology is not suff-
icient. It is more so as considering the size of the market
which is almost a trillion dollar cash market. Korea is now
exporting many electronics goods, automobiles etc. which
usually considered that only the advanced countries can do.
But because of the vigorous R&D and marketing efforts as well
as international cooperation, higher technology contents
products are expected to be developed and exported. Export-
ing the construction services to the advanced countries is
not more difficult and does not require more investment in
R&D than that for the electronics, automobiles and other high
technology goods. In this regards, the long term development
strategy for the construction technology and materials through
concerted efforts in the fields of R&D and educational system
to produce relevant talent in R&D seems to be the most impor-
tant tasks which Korean construction industry must start to
pursue.
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5.3 Recommendations for Further Research
This thesis has reviewed many aspects of the U.S. and Korean
construction industry. What have been discussed are:-
-Korean construction industry with respect to the ; national
economy and background of growth to present level; structure,
status and present issues facing the industry.
-U.S. construction industry with respect to the; economic,
structural and operational characteristics; introduction to
the contractual system and labor relations.
However, the analysis of U.S. construction as a potential
market for Korean construction industry has mostly concentr-
ated to the areas of the structural and operational charact-
eristics. Further in-depth and comprehensive analysis is
recommended in the areas of:-
-the economic characteristics and behavior of the industry
-contractual system and regulations focusing the variations
existed in the different localities
-practice of mobilization and utilization of labor and dif-
ferences of practices between union and nonunion sectors.
Based on the further research on the abovementioned areas
together with what have been discussed inthis thesis, the
more comprehensive and practical strategies for Korean cont-
ractors planning to enter into the U.S. market can be estab-
lished.
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Two ways of entry into the foreign market can be identified
from an economists' perspective. First, exporting theproducts
to the target country from a production based outside that
country. Second, transferring its resources in technology,
capital, human skills, and enterprises to the foreign country
where they may be sold directly to users or combined with
local resources to manufacture products for sale in local
markets. From a management/operations perspective, these two
forms of entry modes, which offer different benefits and
costs to the international company. Following are the class-
ification of entry modes:-
1. Export entry modes
Indirect
Direct/distributor
Direct branch/subsidiary
Other
2. Contractual entry modes
Licensing
Franchising
Technical agreements
Service contracts
Management contracts
Construction/turnkey contracts
Contract manufacture
Coproduction agreements
Other
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3. Investment entry modes
Sole venture: new establishment
Sole venture: acquisition
Joint venture: new establishment/acquisition
Other
Above classifications are not specifically for the construc-
tion industry but for all the industries. However, it is
recommended to study all three categories of entry modes as
relevant as the possibility of exporting the construction
materials together with the construction itself is worth
investigating. It is also recommended to compare the cases
of the European and Japanese companies already get into the
U.S. market with the case of Korea.
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